Allegory in action: the relation between literal and figurative meaning in the 1590 edition of Spenser's The Faerie Queene by Suttie, Paul
ALLEGORY IN ACTION: THE RELATION BETWEEN LITERAL
AND FIGURATIVE MEANING IN THE 1590 EDITION OF
SPENSER'S THE FAERIE QUEENE
by Paul Suttie
Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D.





This thesis has been composed by me, and the work
which it represents is my own.
Paul Suttie
Abstract of Thesis
Critics have commonly assumed that, in The Faerie
Queene, and in allegorical literature generally, the
figurative meaning of the text is unknowable in principle
to the characters who take part in its literal narrative
vehicle, and may rather be discovered only by the text's
readers. But in fact there are two quite different kinds
of allegory: in one, the figurative meaning of the text
does (as such critics suppose of all allegory) constitute
a distinct structure or 'world' from the imaginary world
constituted by its narrative vehicle; but in the other,
the figurative meaning coexists with the text's literal
meaning inside a single imaginary world. Essentially the
same types were distinguished by Christian Biblical
exegetes throughout the Middle Ages; but medieval writers
theorized the distinction in terms of the fictionality or
truth of the text's literal meaning, a characterization
which is accurate so far as it goes, but problematic for
a modern theorist in that it is designed as an account
only of Biblical allegory rather than of allegory more
generally, and presupposes Christian piety as the basis
of its distinction between allegory's two kinds.
Recasting the distinction in terms of the figurative
meaning's existence or non-existence inside the imaginary
world of the literal narrative allows us to discern the
presence of the two kinds both in allegorical literature
generally and in The Faerie Queene in particular. In
Books One to Three of Spenser's poem, it is primarily for
the characters who inhabit the world of the narrative
that both the literal and figurative meanings of the poem
exist; as readers, we apprehend the two kinds of meaning
and the relation between them primarily through their
imaginary experience. An imaginary world wherein literal
and figurative meanings coexist tends to be structured
largely in terms of the concrete relations between the
two; an example is the imaginary world which we know as
the medieval/Renaissance 'world picture'. I consider and
reject the possibility that the structure given to the
world of The Faerie Queene by its allegory is similar to
that attributed to the world at large by medieval and
Renaissance techniques of allegorical interpretation.
Rather, Spenser's world is structured by the particular
problems of interpretation to which his poem continually
returns: namely, the problems of knowing how to act
properly in a fallen world, and of how to be received
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Introduction (1):
The Relation Between Literal and Figurative Meaning
Descriptions of The Faerie Oueene from Spenser's own
Letter to Raleigh onwards have regularly defined the poem
as an 'allegory'; but the term 'allegory' has been used
so variously -- and, at times, so imprecisely -- as to
be, itself, urgently in need of definition. Two other
terms which, in different ways, have been used frequently
either in apposition or in opposition to 'allegory', and
which stand in similar need of definition, are 'metaphor'
and 'symbolism'. What I hope to set forth in this first
introductory chapter is, on one hand, a clear definition
of how I will use these terms in my discussion of The
Faerie Queene. and on the other, a rationale, based in
concrete examples from literature, for using the terms in
this way. Of course, with words that have been used as
variously as these, there will inevitably be a certain
degree of arbitrariness in deciding what, precisely, any
one of them will mean for one's own purposes; but in
general, I have tried to balance a desire for maximum
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descriptive utility with the wish that my use of terms
should seem neither obsolete nor eccentric.
Metaphor, allegory, and symbolism, as I shall define
them, may be subsumed under the concept of the trope.
Tropes are figures of speech -- that is, special uses of
language -- by means of which the things that are
signified by words become, themselves, signifiers of
other things.1 Thus, for example, conventionally the
word 'dragon' signifies a certain kind of formidable
reptile which is familiar to us from folk and literary
tradition; this reptile, in turn, can be made to signify
any number of other things, for instance, the Devil, or
King Arthur. Now clearly, 'to signify' in this context
does not mean to refer to something that exists in the
real world around us: for I may use the word 'dragon' to
signify a fire-breathing reptilian monster, and the
fire-breathing reptilian monster to signify King Arthur,
without having to believe that either fire-breathing
reptilian monsters or King Arthur have ever really
existed. Rather, the status of the things signified, in
either case, is as things which can be imagined to exist.
Such things are often referred to in literary criticism
as 'images', a term which will be satisfactory so long as
we remember its connection with the imaginable, rather
than supposing that its application must be limited to
the strictly visualizable, or that even those things
which can be visualized must be actively visualized on
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each reading in order to be considered images. 'An
image', for my purposes, means simply 'some one thing
that can be imagined*, whether this thing be as
visualizable as a horse or a ship, or as abstract as love
or politics; or, indeed, whether it be an activity, such
as cutting or hating, a quality, such as redness or
quickness, or even a direction, such as inward or north.
For convenience, we may refer to an image signified by a
word as that word's 'literal meaning', and to anything
which is signified, in turn, through the figurative use
of this image, as a 'figurative meaning' of that image.
To proceed, now, to concise definitions of the three
terms in question:
Metaphor is the figurative use of a single image.
With I. A. Richards, we may refer to the image used
figuratively as the 'vehicle' of the metaphor, and to
the figurative meaning as its 'tenor'.2
Allegory is the coordinated figurative use of a
connected group of images -- connected, in the sense that
they constitute all or part of a single imaginary world.
Sometimes allegory has been described as a species of
metaphor, that is, as a single, 'extended' metaphor; but
because this description compromises the precise
reference of the term 'metaphor' to a single image, it is
better to follow the alternative tradition which
describes allegory as a connected series of metaphors.3
Symbolism is the figurative use of one or more
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images in a particular imaginary world to signify other
things in the same imaginary world. It is not the
contrary of allegory or of metaphor, but something in
addition.4 Thus, metaphors and allegories can be either
'symbolic' or 'non-symbolic'. We can refer to the
vehicle of a symbolic metaphor as a 'symbol', and to its
tenor as the thing 'symbolized'.
This much by way of definition; I shall now look more
closely at each of these figures in its turn.
(1.1) Metaphor
My definition of metaphor as 'the figurative use of a
single image* is intended to distinguish it from three
things which must be present in order for there to be a
metaphor, but which are not themselves metaphors. These
are (1) the word which is used as the basis of the
metaphor, (2) the image signified by this word, and
(3) the figurative meaning attached to this image.
(For example, when we refer metaphorically to the 'ship
of state', the metaphor is neither (1) the word 'ship',
(2) the image of a ship, nor (3) the concept of the
state -- but all three of these things are essential to
the metaphor, which consists in the figurative use of the
image of a ship to mean the state.)®
The first distinction, between the metaphor and the
word used metaphorically, has been clearly established,
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so far as I know, only in Latin rhetorical theory.
Aristotle does not distinguish between the two: on one
hand, he defines metaphor (Poetics. 1457b7-8) as the act
of "giving the thing a name that belongs to something
else" ("metaphors... estin onomatos allotriou epiphora")}
on the other hand, he classifies metaphor as a species of
'word' (onoma), treating it, along with the "ornamental
word" and the "word altered in form", as one of the
alternatives to "the ordinary word for a thing [onoma...
kurion]" (1457bl-3). By the time that Cicero renders the
Greek rhetorical terms into Latin, however, the act and
the word have been distinguished: "translatio", the Latin
equivalent of metaphora, is used only for the act of
connecting a term to an unusual meaning; the word which
is given this unusual meaning is called "translatum",
'carried across'. But this distinction between
translatio and translatum, which is maintained, albeit
imperfectly, in later Latin rhetorical theory6, does not
survive its being rendered into English. In Richard
Sherry's Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550), we find
metaphora or translatio ambivalently rendered as
"translacion, that is a worde translated", and The Arte
of English Poesie (1589), attributed to George Puttenham,
vacillates between defining "metaphore" as the "terme...
transported" and as the "inversion" by which the word is
given its unaccustomed meaning."7 I hope, in
differentiating between the 'metaphor' and the 'word used
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metaphorically', to restore something of the Latin
precision in this matter.
The remaining distinctions, between the metaphor
itself, the image (such as the image of a ship) which it
employs, and the figurative meaning (such as the concept
of the state) which its attaches to this image, are those
for the sake of which I. A. Richards coined the terms
'vehicle' and 'tenor'. When a word, like 'ship', is used
metaphorically, it still retains its ordinary
signification; this signification is the image which
Richards calls the 'vehicle'. The metaphor consists in
the use of this vehicle image, in its turn, to signify
something else -- what Richards calls the 'tenor'. The
vehicle of a metaphor, then, is the literal meaning of
the word which is used metaphorically; the tenor is its
figurative meaning.
So much for the distinctions between metaphor and its
constituent parts. But how does a metaphor come to be?
More precisely, how is it that a 'tenor', or figurative
meaning, comes to be associated with the literal meaning
of a word? There are, it seems, two ways in which this
can happen. The first possibility is that the word will
be used in a context to which its literal meaning does
not apply; the figurative meaning, or tenor, will be the
meaning that the context demands. To take an example
from Quintilian, if we were to read of a man being
"kindled to anger [incensum ira]" (VIII.vi.7), we would
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know at once to understand the image of being kindled as
the vehicle of a metaphor, because anger is not literally
a fire. I shall refer to this as the 'text-and-context*
type of metaphor. The second possibility is that a
commentary will be attached to the word, telling us what
its figurative meaning is. Thus, for example, in the
seventh book of Plato's Republic. the character Socrates
explains to his friends that, in a story which he has
just told them about a group of prisoners who live all
their lives in a cave lit only by a fire, the cave prison
stands figuratively for "the region revealed through
sight", and "the light of the fire in it" for "the power
of the sun" (517b3-4). I shall refer to this as the
'text-and-commentary' type of metaphor.
Generally speaking, text-and-commentary metaphors are
considerably less common in literature than are the
text-and-context type. But often rhetoricians and
exegetes, when discussing particular text-and-context
metaphors, add to them commentaries of their own, stating
explicitly what figurative meanings seem to them to be
implied by the contexts of the words which are used
metaphorically; thus, in effect, they turn text-and-
context metaphors into the text-and-commentary kind. For
example, to Homer's "Truly ten thousand good deeds has
Ulysses wrought", Aristotle adds that here "'ten
thousand'... is put in place of the generic 'a large
number'" (Poetics 1457bl3-15). Sometimes, as in this
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instance, the added commentary tells us little or nothing
that we would not have surmised from the context alone;
but this is not always the case. At other times, the
context of a word requires that it bear a figurative
meaning, but leaves room for interpretation as to what,
precisely, that meaning is. In these instances, the
added commentary contributes significantly to the text,
because it specifies the figurative meaning of a word
more precisely than does its mere context; consequently,
the metaphor which is found in the combination of the two
works -- that is, in the text plus the added commentary
-- is not reducible to the metaphor which exists in the
text alone.
To some text-and-context metaphors, there is no
possible text-and-commentary equivalent, because no term
exists which expresses literally the meaning expressed
figuratively by the context in which the word is used.
For example, the figurative meaning of the word 'current'
in the sentence, 'There is a powerful electric current in
this circuit', cannot be expressed literally.0 This
species of text-and-context metaphor is called
'catachresis'. Often, the reason for employing
catachresis is simply the unavailabi1ity of a literal
term for the thing meant. Hence Quintilian describes
catachresis as "the practice of adapting the nearest
available term to describe something for which no actual
term exists" (VI11.vi.34). With repeated use, such
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catachretic metaphors become 'dead' metaphors; this means
that the figurative meaning is no longer attached to the
literal meaning of the word, but to the word itself,
without the intermediary of a vehicle image. Whenever we
are reminded of the vehicle image -- for example, when we
are reminded that the image of flowing water lies behind
the term "electric current' -- the metaphor comes back to
life.
Other terms which have been applied to particular
ways of using individual images figuratively, such as
'metonymy' and 'synecdoche', refer to species of
metaphor, rather than to distinct tropes9; useful though
they are, there will be no need, for my purposes, to
discuss them separately.
(1.2) Allegory
According to my definition, the term 'allegory', like
the term 'metaphor', refers to one of the kinds of the
figurative use of imagery -- that is, to what
rhetoricians and literary theorists generally call a
'trope'. My use of the word 'allegory', then, should be
distinguished from that of certain other writers, for
whom 'allegory' names not a trope but a literary genre.10
Allegory, as I define it, can be an important
characteristic of a given genre, particularly if that
genre is considered at a specific point in its historical
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development; but it is not itself a genre, any more than
is metaphor. Thus, allegory has featured centrally, at
different times, in genres as diverse as the beast fable,
the dream vision, the morality play, and the epic. But
it does not seem to me to be necessary -- as it does to
Maureen Quilligan -- to have 'allegory' available as a
generic name for works which cannot be classified
otherwise.11 For example, Quilligan's own candidate for
such a work, Langland's Piers Plowman, is a dream vision,
and can be compared, generically, to other medieval dream
visions such as The Romance of the Rose.
Defined as a trope, allegory is closely related to
metaphor, and this in two respects. In the first place,
metaphors are its building blocks -- whence it can be
described as a 'connected series of metaphors'. In the
second place, its composition as a whole is analogous to
the composition of the individual metaphor -- whence, by
analogy with the definition of metaphor as 'the
figurative use of a single image*, it can be defined as
'the coordinated figurative use of a connected group of
images'.
That allegory can be described as a connected series
of metaphors means, first, that within a text which is
used allegorically, there will be a series of words each
of which is used metaphorically (as, for example, in
Plato's story of a fictitious people who live all their
lives imprisoned in a cave, the "prison" is made to stand
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for "the region revealed through sight", and the "fire"
in the prison for "the sun" (517b3 —4)); second, that
these metaphors will be connected with one another, in
the sense that their vehicles will be images which cohere
with one another so as to constitute all or part of a
single imaginary world (as, in our example, the "prison"
and the "fire", along with the prisoners, their chains,
and so on, present a coherent world to the reader's
imagination); finally, that the connectedness of these
images will itself be used figuratively (so that, for
example, when Plato describes the freeing of one of the
prisoners and his being brought out of the cave into the
sunlight, this narrative, which links together the
individual images that are used metaphorically, is itself
given a figurative meaning: "the ascent [from the cave]
and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's
ascension to the intelligible region" (517b4-5)). Such
figurative use of the spatial or narrative relations
among images, which is not reducible to the figurative
uses of the images themselves, is what makes allegory, as
a whole, more than the sum of its constituent metaphors,
and which allows us to treat it as a single figurative
entity, analogous in its entirety to the individual
metaphor, and consisting in the coordinated figurative
use of a connected group of images.
The analogy between metaphor and allegory may be seen
most readily in an analysis of their respective
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constituent parts. Just as metaphor is to be
distinguished from (1) the word used metaphorically, (2)
the image signified by this word, and (3) the figurative
meaning attached to this image, so allegory is to be
distinguished from (1') the text which is used
allegorically, (2') the imaginary world presented by this
text, and (3') the figurative meaning attached to this
world -- all of which, to our general confusion, are
liable to be referred to as 'allegory' in modern literary
criticism. On the strength of this analogy, some critics
have extended the application of the terms 'vehicle' and
'tenor', which Richards coined for describing the literal
and figurative meanings of words that are used
metaphorically, to the literal and figurative meanings of
texts that are used allegorically.12
Understanding this dual relation between allegory and
metaphor will help us to understand how allegory comes to
be, that is, how a figurative meaning comes to be
associated with the literal meaning of a text. On one
hand, since allegory is a 'connected series of
metaphors', it may come about, at least in part, through
the agency of the metaphors that make it up. We have
already seen figurative meanings attached to individual
images -- to Plato's "prison", and to the "fire" in it --
where these images are parts of a world that is used
allegorically. Such metaphorical uses of individual
images help to define the figurative meaning of the
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passage as a whole. On the other hand, insofar as
allegory is itself a single figurative entity, the text
which is used allegorically may receive, as a whole, a
general figurative meaning -- as when Plato's Socrates
introduces his story of the cave with the instruction to
his friends to "compare our nature in respect of
education and its lack to such an experience as this"
(514al-2). Such a general instruction provides a
framework for integrating the precise figurative meanings
attached to specific images, and for extending figurative
meaning to images which receive no specific commentary.
There is, then, an interplay between the allegory and its
constituent metaphors, the whole helping to constitute
the parts and the parts the whole.
With respect to metaphor, we distinguished two
different ways in which a figurative meaning, or 'tenor',
comes to be associated with the literal meaning of a
word: namely, by means of context, and by means of
commentary. We noted, further, that text-and-context
metaphors are considerably the more common sort.
However, when several metaphors are connected in a series
so as to form an allegory, it is not normally possible
for the individual words to receive their figurative
meanings by virtue of their contexts: for a
text-and-context metaphor comes about when a word is used
in a context to which its literal meaning does not apply,
whereas it is a requirement of allegory that the literal
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meanings of its individual metaphors make up a single
imaginary world, that is, that they share a context to
which each of these literal meanings does literally
apply. Accordingly, with respect to the metaphors that
make up allegories, it is, perforce, not the
text-and-context but the text-and-commentary kind which
is the rule. For example, as we have seen, the Socrates
of Plato's Republic offers the kind of explicit
commentary upon the words of his own story which we
associated previously with rhetoricians and exegetes,
whose added commentaries, in effect, turn text-and-
context metaphors into the text-and-commentary kind. In
Plato's case, because the context cannot do the work of
attaching figurative meaning to the words, explicit
self-commentary is essential to the working of his
metaphors.
As for a passage as a whole, this too may receive
figurative meaning either by means of context or by means
of commentary. In the first case, the entire passage
that is used allegorically stands in a non-literal
relation to its context. For example, whereas the
following sentence from Cicero, taken in isolation, bears
no figurative meaning, we can readily see how it would
acquire one merely by being placed in the context of a
larger speech whose topic was political rather than
naval:
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What I marvel at and complain of is this, that
there should exist a man so set on destroying his
enemy as to scuttle the ship on which he himself is
sailing.13
But this sort of allegory, in which the context does
all the work, is rare. Indeed, in comparison with its
smaller relative, the text-and-context metaphor, the
text-and-context allegory is a hard thing to create,
for it is difficult to sustain, through a passage of any
length, a clear sense that its larger context demands a
specific figurative meaning. Furthermore, there is, in
any case, no necessity that a passage which is to be read
allegorically will be situated in a larger context with
which its literal meaning jars. An allegory may be
sustained throughout a text, in which case such a 'larger
context' will not exist. Or, the passage to be read
allegorically may be offered, like Socrates' story of the
cave, as a self-contained fable, so that its difference
in ostensible subject matter from the surrounding story
will not by itself suggest a need to read the passage
allegorically. For all these reasons, by far the more
common way for an allegory to work is by means of
commentary rather than by context, as (to stay with our
example) when Socrates says of the cave story, "compare
our nature in respect of education and its lack to such
an experience as this" (514al-2).
It appears, then, that both with respect to the
individual metaphors that make up an allegory and with
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respect to the allegory as a whole, with very few
exceptions it is commentary rather than context which
determines the figurative meaning. But there are two
things to notice about the commentaries by means of which
allegories generally work.
First, in contrast to the stringent structural
demands of creating figurative meaning by means of
context, it does not matter where commentary occurs in a
work, or even whether it occurs in the body of the work,
so long as it is considered to be authoritative. Thus,
for example, whether the Letter to Raleigh is thought of
as a part of The Faerie Queene is critically unimportant,
whereas it makes a great deal of difference to criticism
whether the Letter is taken to be authoritative as an
exposition of the poem's meaning.
Second, the commentary that we find associated with a
text which is used allegorically is very rarely complete.
Nowhere in the text of Plato's Republic are we offered a
complete exposition of the meaning of the cave story.
Rather we are given various 'clues' -- the general
statement that the whole story pertains to education, and
a few clearly spelt out metaphors -- on the basis of
which we are expected to construct the story's figurative
meaning as a whole. But, as a survey of commentaries
which have been written on the story of the cave will
quickly show, these 'clues' do not constitute even an
unambiguous set of instructions for producing a complete
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commentary, by virtue of which we could say that the
whole figurative meaning of the story exists in the text
of the Republic, albeit in coded form.14 Even serious
and careful readers of such a text will not all produce
substantially identical commentaries; on the contrary,
there will be fundamental and abiding disagreements
between them as to what figurative meaning should be
attributed either to the story as a whole or to its
individual details. Nor have we any way of summoning up,
as an arbitrator among these various interpretations, the
'commentary intended by the author', or even of knowing
for certain that the author of an allegory ever fully
worked out such a commentary, even in his or her own
mind. It is, then, generally no more than an "illusion
that the meaning of an allegory resides somewhere inside
its text".1= Consequently, if we should take up the
proffered task, as innumerable interpreters have done,
and write a more complete commentary on the story of the
cave than does Plato himself -- if we should specify its
figurative meaning more precisely than does he -- then
the allegory which will be found in the combination of
the two works, that is, in the Republic plus our added
commentary, will not be reducible to the allegory which
exists in the text alone.
These two points, taken together -- first, that it
does not matter for the purposes of text-and-commentary
allegory where the commentary occurs in a work, or even
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whether it occurs in the body of the work, so long as it
is considered to be authoritative; second, that the
authority for creating this commentary is often devolved,
in significant part, upon the reader -- mean that, with
regard to allegories, the boundaries of individual works
have very little force in determining the location of
meaning. A single allegory need not be found, and
generally will not be found, within the bounds of a
single piece of writing. Rather, at least as a starting
point, we may think of allegories as spread across a
continuum. At one end we may place an allegory in which
a commentary is contained in the original work which is,
or at least is meant to be, complete and comprehensive in
determining the figurative meaning of the text; as an
example of this we might take Dante's Convivio. In the
middle will be the sort of allegory wherein a partial
commentary is contained in the original work, but in
which much of the precise figurative meaning is
determined only by an added commentary; this is the kind
which exists, for example, in the relationship between
Plato's story of the cave and any of its scholarly
interpretations. At the other end will lie an allegory
in which none of the figurative meaning resides in the
original work, but all, rather, in the added commentary.
Much of the allegory of late antiquity and the middle
ages falls into this category. For example, medieval
commentaries were regularly added to Ovid's
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Metamorphoses, giving to the text figurative meanings
(usually relating to Christian doctrine) of which the
text, by itself, bore no trace.16 The same could be said
of most of the Neoplatonic commentaries on Homer, and
indeed, of a great amount of early and medieval Christian
commentary on the Bible.1"7
This continuum, as I said, is a starting point only.
For the distinction between a work which comments upon
another and a work which comments upon itself is not
always so clear. As an example, let us take the words of
Christ in Matthew 12:40: "as Ionas was thre dayes and
thre nights in the whales bellie: so shall the Sonne of
man be thre days and thre nights in the heart of the
earth." Is this an allegorizing commentary of one work
upon another, or of a single work upon itself? The
answer depends upon whether we take the 'works' in
question to be the individual books of Jonah and of
Matthew, or the Bible as a whole. In favour of the
former view, we might argue that Jonah and Matthew are
entirely distinct in authorship, and that historically,
the writing of Jonah will have been as free of Christian
intention as was Ovid's Metamorphoses. a work which was
also to become an important locus for Christian
commentary. In favour of the latter, we might note that
the Bible, in spite of its multiple authorship and
multiple editorship, has been consciously shaped into a
unified whole, and has been known and treated as a whole
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by centuries of Christian culture; we might add, lest
this point of view seem to depend upon Christian piety,
that the structural relationship between the stories of
Jonah and of Christ may be non-fortuitous regardless of
which story has helped to shape the other.
If we accept that, from a certain point of view, the
Bible can be regarded as a collection of separate works,
it is a small step to seeing certain works of single
authorship in a comparable way. For example, Dante's
Convivio. although entirely written by Dante himself,
takes as the text upon which its commentaries are written
a series of odes, at least one of which he had composed
years before and with a meaning very different from that
offered by the commentary.18 So the Convivio is, in a
certain sense, very like medieval allegorized versions of
Ovid, in that it flagrantly imposes a new figurative
meaning upon an already existing text.
Conversely, if there is a point of view from which we
can regard the Bible as a single work which comments upon
itself, it is a small step toward regarding whole
traditions of commentary in essentially the same light,
for these too can have their own collective methods of
authorship and editorship, and their own unity. A clear
example of this would be the medieval tradition of
Biblical commentary, to which any new addition had to
pass rigorous tests of orthodoxy, based on the perceived
unity of the existing tradition, before being admitted
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into the canon. It is irrelevant to the judgement of
this tradition as a 'literary work' whether its readings
of the Bible are plausible renderings of the intention of
any Biblical author, just as it is irrelevant to the
judgement of the Bible as a whole whether it uses the
book of Jonah for a purpose unforeseen to the author of
that book. We treat the body of commentary not simply as
an exposition of the text upon which it comments, but as
an essential part of the work which includes both the
text and the commentary, and it is this commented text as
a whole for which we should save our literary judgement.
(Sometimes a commentary of single or multiple authorship
is incorporated, together with the text upon which it
comments, within a single book, as in the Geneva Bible
(1560) or in Harington's 'Orlando Furioso' in English
Heroical Verse (1591). In such cases the possibility of
treating the combination of text and commentary as a
single work is more apparent. But there is no very good
reason, it seems to me, for excluding commentaries not
physically bound with their texts from the same kind of
treatment. Rather, the pertinent questions are whether
the body of commentary is taken to be authoritative, and
whether it has a functional unity -- that is, whether its
production is governed by a shared set of rules or
assumptions, and whether it is conceived of, by its
makers and users, as a unified whole.)
But to see how, in practice, an allegorical tradition
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can be conceived of as a whole, rather than as a mere
succession of rival interpretations, we need to
take note of a widely accepted principle, namely that a
text can bear, simultaneously, more than one distinct
figurative meaning. Indeed, in medieval exegesis --
especially, but not exclusively, in Biblical exegesis --
it is taken for granted that for any one text there will
be many figurative meanings. With regard to Scriptural
interpretation, not only is it agreed among medieval
theologians that there are different kinds of figurative
meanings -- these being, according to the thirteenth-
century scholastic consensus, the typological (which,
confusingly, is often called the 'allegorical*)19, the
tropological, and the anagogical -- but these are
themselves no more than "categories", and "in each of
these, the number of mystical meanings in any particular
place can be multiplied".20 Thus, for example, when the
Venerable Bede comments that Solomon's temple stands both
for Christ's physical body and for his figurative body,
the Church Militant, both of these meanings are
typological, as distinct from the tropological and
anagogical meanings which he also offers (De Schematibus
et Tropis Il.xii). The state of affairs with regard to
the interpretation of secular poetry is much the same,
except that in this case, the most common scheme for
classifying figurative meaning, from the twelfth century
right through to the end of the sixteenth, is one which
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divides figurative meanings into just two categories,
called the 'moral' and the 'allegorical' (of which the
latter, like the typological or 'allegorical' category of
scriptural meaning, is not to be confused with the
'allegorical' in the broader sense).21 But since poetic
commentary was never subjected, like Biblical exegesis,
to a scholastic treatment which completely standardized
its form, variant schemes for classifying interpretations
of poetry continue to appear all through this period. At
one extreme is Dante, who is inclined to elide the
differences between poetic and Scriptural systems of
commentary: he seems to suggest that writings in general
can be interpreted according to the three-category scheme
which had become orthodox in Scriptural interpretation
during the previous century.22 At the opposite extreme
is Pierre Bersuire who, well after typology, tropology,
and anagogy have been firmly established as the
categories of commentary on the Bible, ignores both this
and the more common schemes of poetic interpretation to
organize his commentaries on Ovid under his own quite
different headings, namely the natural, the historical,
and the moral.23 Under any of these schemes, what
differentiates one category of commentary from another is
simply the field of knowledge to which it pertains. When
thirteenth-century Biblical exegetes established that
there were precisely three categories of commentary which
could be attached to Scripture, they were saying in
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effect that there were three fields of religious
knowledge, namely sacred history, the trials and progress
of the individual Christian during life, and the
transcendent mysteries of God and salvation; these fields
of knowledge were related, respectively, to the Son, the
Holy Spirit, and the Father, and furthermore to faith,
charity, and hope.24 A writer like Dante is inclined to
attach this same kind of knowledge to all manner of
texts; like the medieval encyclopaedists, what is
important to him in all things is how it can be related
to the sacred.25 Bersuire's categories of commentary, on
the other hand, reflect the view that secular poetry is
most naturally related to bodies of secular knowledge;
his categories for interpreting the Metamorphoses
pertain, respectively, to the sciences of physics,
history, and ethics.26
Understanding that the texts and commentaries which
together constitute an allegory may inhere in a literary
tradition as readily as in an individual literary work
will allow us to avoid the error of supposing that some
exceptional works -- the Bible and Dante's Divine Comedy
are the usual candidates -- themselves somehow contain an
inexhaustible range of figurative meanings, awaiting only
our discovery of them.27 In fact, the inexhaustibility
of figurative meaning is a characteristic not of
well-defined individual works, but only of open-ended and
expandable allegorical traditions, and not by virtue of
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some special property of the particular work to which a
commentary tradition is grafted, but by virtue, simply,
of the ingenuity of each new generation of commentators.
It is a misunderstanding to suppose that either the Bible
or any other work is an inexhaustible well of figurative
meaning; and it is another misunderstanding to suppose
that most medieval commentators thought that it was. In
general, medieval interpreters, whether of the Bible or
of secular poetry, recognize that the inexhaustible
number of figurative meanings which they attribute to
these works cannot all be intrinsically present in the
uncommented texts. Indeed, the influential Augustinian
teaching is that the discovery of a text's intrinsic
meaning, while desirable, is of secondary importance, the
really indispensable thing being that one's own
interpretation -- or interpretations -- are "not opposed
to sound doctrine" (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine
Ill.xxvii). Sometimes, at any rate in their
interpretations of pagan poetry, medieval commentators
actually treat the intrinsic meaning of the text with a
wilful disregard: says Pierre Bersuire in the prologue
to his fourteenth-century moralization of Ovid's
Metamorphoses. "a man may, if he can, gather grapes from
thorns, suck honey from a rock, take oil from the hardest
stone, and construct the ark of the covenant from the
treasures of the Egyptians"; he proceeds with a tour de
force double reading of each figure in the poem, on one
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hand "in bono" (Diana is "the glorious Virgin... armed
with the bow of pliant mercy and the arrow of prayer"),
and on the other "in malo" (Diana is "the evil woman, who
is said to hold the bow and arrows because she wounds
foolish men by plundering them and shoots arrows at them
using temptation and lust as her weapons").28
The conclusion to draw from all this is simply that
we ought to be very careful, when we set about to study
an allegory, to determine whether we mean to examine the
allegory which is contained within an individual work, or
whether we mean rather to examine -- or even to
contribute to -- an allegory which inheres in a
commentary tradition. For example, almost since the time
of its appearance, Dante's Divine Comedy has regularly
been treated as if it contained an allegory in which the
narrator stands for something like Free Will, and his
guides Virgil and Beatrice for concepts such as Reason
and Revelation29; but the commentary which makes these
correspondences resides not in Dante's poem itself but in
the tradition of Dante criticism, just as the vast
majority of the allegorical meaning which has been
attributed to the Bible actually resides not there but in
the Christian tradition of Scriptural commentary. The
allegory of the Dante tradition, like the allegory of the
Scriptural tradition, may well be sufficiently rich and
coherent to be an interesting subject of study in its own
right (as Robert Hollander has suggested)30; but it
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should not be confused with the allegory of the Divine
Comedy itself, which exists only insofar as the poem
itself determines the figurative meaning of its own
imagery by means of context and self-commentary. Thus
when the character Virgil identifies Beatrice as the
"lady of virtue through whom alone mankind ascends"
(Inferno ii.76-7), this commentary on Beatrice is a part
of the allegory of the poem; but the interpretations of
this and other comments to mean that Beatrice is
Revelation, or the Catholic Church, or any of the
multitude of other things with which she has been
equated, are all parts of the allegory of the Dante
tradition.31 Of course, the two things -- the allegory
of the poem, and the allegory of the tradition -- are
related; like any scholarly commentary on Plato's story
of the cave, commentaries on the Divine Comedy build on
the figurative meaning that is already there, specifying
and giving more comprehensive scope to what is general
and partial in the original work. But this honing and
extending of the poem's figurative meaning should not be
confused with the unearthing of something that is already
implicit in it.
Some critics, because they have attributed to works
such as the Divine Comedy figurative meanings which in
fact belong to the tradition of commentary upon the poem,
have supposed that there are two kinds of allegory: one,
of which Dante's poem is invariably the exemplar, which
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is supposed to contain its figurative meanings
implicitly, in such a way that they do not obtrude upon
the surface story, but must rather be discovered by the
reader; and another, less subtle, in which the figurative
meanings are spelt out explicitly as the story goes
along, and which therefore do not need to be searched
for.32 Among this latter kind, which is described by the
term 'personification-allegory', are classed The Romance
of the Rose and Langland's Piers Plowman. Now, such a
division, besides erring, as we have already seen, in its
conception of works like the Divine Comedy, also
cultivates misconceptions about the so-called
'personification-allegories' with which they are
contrasted. In particular, it is wrong to suppose that
personification, (or the figurative identification of
characters in a story with abstract meanings), is
characteristic of a particular species of allegory, and
one, moreover, which is both less sophisticated than, and
antithetical to, the kind of allegory found in Dante. In
fact, personification is a virtually omnipresent feature
of allegory, and is no more nor less sophisticated than
any of its other elements.
Personification may be defined as the figurative use
of an imaginary character. A character, for the purposes
of this definition, may consist in as little as a single
image -- as when a poet refers, without further
elaboration, to 'that tyrant, Love' -- in which case the
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personification is an instance of metaphor. More
commonly, a character may consist in a complex structure
of imagery, comprising actions, thoughts, apparel, and so
on, the whole of which is given a correspondingly complex
figurative meaning, in which case the personification is
an instance of allegory.
The bias against personification appears to be
grounded in the common supposition that a character who
has a clearly specified figurative meaning is somehow
less of a character for that fact. This notion probably
grows from the idea that such a character is the mere
'fleshing out' of his or her figurative sense, or in
other words, that the figurative meaning comes first, and
that the character, such as it is, is a subordinate
being, created only as a kind of signpost pointing toward
this meaning.33 But such an idea is no more than a
hypothesis concerning the author's psychology in
composing an allegorical work; it is not based in the
analysis of the literary product. For as we have said,
most allegory is of the text-and-commentary variety; and
commentary can supervene upon a text, attributing to it a
meaning which did not govern the text's composition, as
easily as it can reveal one which did. We may consider,
for example, Dante's commentary on the odes of the
Convivio. in which he asserts that the lady whom the odes
present to our imagination means philosophy. It makes no
difference to the allegory in the Convivio which of the
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odes were composed with that meaning in mind, and which
were not: in either case, the use of the lady to mean
philosophy is an instance of personification. Indeed,
because there is no essential difference, in analytic
terms, between figurative meanings which the author,
personally, has attributed to the characters in a work,
and those which are attributed to them by later
commentators, we may describe such things as St. Paul's
use of Hagar and Sarah to stand for the Old and New
Testaments (Galatians 4:21-31) as instances of
personification. It may be seen, I think, that such
explicit attribution of figurative meanings to characters
does not compromise in any way their literal status as
characters; certainly it does not reduce them to mere
signposts for the meanings that are attributed to them.
There is one final topic to discuss apropos of
allegory, before moving on to a consideration of
symbolism, and that is catachresis. It might be thought
that catachresis, or the species of text-and-context
metaphor for which there is no text-and-commentary
equivalent, could have no place in allegory, since the
metaphors which are connected together to make an
allegory cannot normally be of the text-and-context kind.
But this is not the case; for often a text which is to be
used allegorically includes a word for which a figurative
sense is intended, but for whose intended figurative
sense there is no literal term. In such a situation, the
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only way for the word to receive its figurative meaning
is for this word to be repeated within the commentary
that attributes figurative meaning to the text as a
whole, and for it to receive its own figurative meaning
by way of this new context. For example, in Plato's
story of the cave, the directions up and down ['ano' and
'kata'] are important features in the structure of
imagery which is used allegorically (515e7, 516a5,e4,
517a2-6, etc.). But there is no literal term for the
figurative meaning which is to be attached to these
images. Accordingly, in the commentary which is attached
to the story, the words 'ano' and 'kata' must themselves
be repeated wherever this figurative meaning is intended;
and only by virtue of their new context, in the
commentary, do the words acquire the desired figurative
sense. Thus, Socrates asks his interlocutors to
understand, with regard to his story, "that the ascent
[ten... ano anabasin] and the contemplation of the things
above tton ano]" refer to "the soul's ascension [ten...
tes psyches anodon, literally 'the upward path of the
soul'] to the intelligible region" (517b4-5).
The use of catachretic metaphors within an allegory
can have repercussions throughout a larger discourse.
For example, in the largely non-allegorical discussion of
education which follows Socrates' commentary on his story
of the cave, the catachretic terms 'ano' and 'kata'
appear repeatedly. At first they are used with explicit
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reference back to the cave story. Thus, Socrates
receives agreement that, "if in this point too the
likeness... holds" (517dl-2), then just as the people in
the story, having once been released from captivity,
would prefer any hardship to having to "go down again"
into the cave (516d4-e4), so those who have attained full
knowledge of the intelligible things "are not willing to
occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their
souls ever feel... the yearning for that sojourn above
[anoLater, these terms are used more freely, as when
arithmetic is referred to as a study which "directs the
soul upward [ano... agei ten psychen]" (525d5-6). Here
the diction ("ano... agei") is still reminiscent of the
cave story -- wherein the former prisoner, returning to
the cave, tries to free the others and to "lead them up
[anagein]" (517a5) into the sunlight — but the reference
is allusive rather than strictly commentarial. The
eventual aim, it seems, is to 'kill' these metaphors
altogether, so that the discussion of education may be
unencumbered by the structure of imagery upon which the
discussion was originally based. But this requires that
an active interest be taken in denying this imagery
any legitimate place in the consideration of education,
even if the words which conventionally signify this
imagery cannot be avoided. Thus, when the discussion
turns to the educational value of astronomy, and Glaucon
suggests that
...this study certainly compels the soul to look
upward [eis to ano], and leads it away from things
here to those higher things... (529al-2),
Socrates rebukes him in no uncertain terms:
You seem to me in your thought to put a most
liberal interpretation on the 'study of higher
things [ta ano]'... for apparently if anyone with
back-thrown head should learn something by staring
at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him
as contemplating them with the higher reason and
not with the eyes... I, for my part, am unable to
suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze
upward [ano] than that which deals with being and
the invisible... (529a9-b5).
Now, what I have said about the catachretic use of
the words 'up' and 'down' in this part of the Republic
could be said of many other words as well. For example,
another look at the exchange from which I have just
quoted will reveal that Socrates is as concerned here to
kill the catachretic metaphor of sight as he is to kill
that of the direction 'up*. Indeed, a great deal of the
imagery which constitutes the story of the cave -- all
that which has to do with light, vision, reflection,
direction, movement -- is used catachretically, and has
the same kind of tenacity within the following,
non-allegorical discourse.
The sort of allegory which makes use of catachresis
has an important place, then, in Plato's explanation of
his theory of knowledge. What is more, it has a
significant place within that theory of knowledge itself
for it is the mechanism by which one of Plato's four
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types of cognition operates, namely the type which he
calls 'dianoia' (which in this context should perhaps be
translated, very literally, as "thinking by means of' or
'thinking through') (511d6-e4). Dianoia is exemplified
by the procedure of geometers, who speak about ("peri")
one thing, namely the visible shapes which they draw, but
for the sake of {"heneka") something else, something
invisible and intelligible like "the square as such" or
"the diagonal as such" (510d5-9) . 34 The language of the
geometers, which refers continually to visible things
even though their real interest is in things that are not
visible at all, "is most ludicrous, though they cannot
help it" (527al-6): they cannot help it, because there
are no words which describe literally the things in which
they are actually interested. Socrates' discourse
concerning education, in which he is forced continually
to use, catachretically, the language of the visible,
even though it is precisely that which is not visible
whose apprehension he takes to be the real goal of
education, could be called 'ludicrous' in precisely the
same way: like the geometers, who speak about their
visible drawings, but for the sake of something else,
Socrates speaks about the imaginary visible world
conjured up by his story of the cave, but with quite
another object in mind.
As we shall see, Plato's catachretic method of
speaking about the intelligible world is adopted
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wholeheartedly by later Platonists, and, in turn, by
Christians influenced by Platonism -- and not only as a
useful means for discussing those 'higher' things for
which no literal terms exist, but also as a justification
for presuming that whatever texts the Neoplatonic or
Christian tradition (as the case may be) considers to be
authoritative, regardless of their ostensible subject
matter, are themselves properly interpreted as
catachretic discussions of these higher things for which
no literal terms exist. But before we can explore how,
precisely, this justification works, we shall first need
to consider the device of symbolism.
(1.3) Symbolism
Every word which is used metaphorically, and every
text which is used allegorically, has both a literal
sense and one or more figurative senses. But there are
two significantly different ways in which these literal
and figurative senses can be related to one another,
which I shall refer to as 'symbolic' and 'non-symbolic'
respectively. The difference between the two may be
illustrated by means of an example from Augustine.
To two separate events which are described literally
in the Bible -- the Israelites' sacrifice of the passover
lamb (Exodus 12:3 ff), and the father's sacrifice of the
fatted calf upon the homecoming of the prodigal son (Luke
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15:23) -- Augustine attributes the same figurative
meaning, namely the sacrifice of Christ on the cross (The
Literal Meaning of Genesis 8.4.8). Now, two of these
three events, namely the sacrifices of Christ and of the
passover lamb, take place within the framework of
Judeo-Christian history; whereas the third, the sacrifice
of the fatted calf, takes place, as it were, in a world
of its own -- a world constituted wholly by the little
story within which it appears. Thus, with respect to the
sacrifices of Christ and the lamb, we can respond to the
question, 'Which event happened first?', that it was the
sacrifice of the lamb -- and we can answer the question
equally well, regardless of whether we believe that
either event ever actually happened, that is, regardless
of whether we believe in the truth of Christian history
as understood by Augustine. In the case of Christ and
the calf, on the other hand, the same question has no
answer, for the two events do not share the context of a
single imagined reality: it is meaningless to ask when a
certain calf was killed, relative to the death of Christ,
when for Christ himself the calf in question is
fictional. Only in the former case, that of the lamb's
sacrifice signifying Christ's, do we imagine a single
world within which one event signifies another. Such
figurative reference of one thing in a particular
imaginary world to another thing in the same imaginary
world I refer to as 'symbolism'. Thus we may say that,
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although for Augustine it is equally true of both lamb
and calf that they refer figuratively to Christ, they
differ from one another in that the lamb 'symbolizes'
Christ, while the fatted calf does not. To put it
slightly differently, while both the lamb and the calf
are images which Augustine uses figuratively to refer to
Christ, only the lamb is a 'symbol' of Christ.
A symbol is always imagined to partake in the same
reality as does that which it symbolizes -- even if this
imagined 'reality' is suspected, or believed, to be
fabulous.35 The crucial point is not that the world
which we imagine them to share is real, but that we
imagine them to share it.
Of course, Augustine does believe that the sacrifices
of Christ and of the passover lamb, not to mention the
rest of the events in Biblical history, really happened.
The world in which Christ and the passover lamb (but not
the fatted calf of the prodigal son story) are imagined
to exist, he takes to be the world of extra-textual
reality. Therefore he can distinguish the way in which
the lamb signifies Christ from the way in which the calf
signifies Christ by appealing, simply, to the respective
truth and fictionality of the two signifying events: the
sacrifice of the lamb "was represented not just by words
but also by a real act", whereas the sacrifice of fatted
calf "is not a matter of... events that really happened"
(The Literal Meaning of Genesis 8.4.8). This means of
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distinction, which presupposes Christian piety, can be
understood as a special case of the means which I have
set out for distinguishing the symbolic from the
non-symbolic. For a symbol is, by definition, something
which exists in the same world as what it symbolizes:
granted, then, the extra-textual truth of the gospel
history, every symbol of that history must also have a
real, extra-textual existence. What Augustine is drawing
attention to in his insistence on the real, historical
existence of the passover lamb and its likes is the need
to preserve a sense of the coherence and wholeness of
Biblical history, as against those various commentators
who had treated even what the Old Testament presents in
the form of historical report as a mere collection of
metaphorical signposts, whose coherence lies entirely in
their figurative meaning. The procedure of such
commentators, he argues, is fundamentally illogical: if,
for example, they take the whole significance of the
character Adam to reside "in a figurative sense" -- if,
that is, they do not treat Adam as a historical personage
in his own right -- then "who begot Cain, Abel, and Seth?
Did they exist only figuratively...?" Such commentators
should "examine the matter more closely to see where
their presupposition leads..." (The Literal Meaning of
Genes is 8.1.4) -- namely, one supposes, to an undermining
of the whole historical scheme of the Bible, of which the
genealogies that begin with Adam are an important
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organizational feature. Jesus himself (and no doubt
Augustine would have expected this point to occur to his
readers) is situated within the whole of Biblical history
by means of genealogical trees (Matthew 1:1-17, Luke
3:23-38). Augustine's concern, that the procedure of
attributing figurative meanings to Old Testament imagery
must not be allowed to dissolve the sense of a whole and
coherent Biblical history, can be appreciated equally
well regardless of whether we share his belief in the
fundamental truth of this history; for we can,
regardless, imagine with him a single history within
which the events that have a figurative relationship to
one another also have a literal, historical relationship
-- as, for Augustine, the sacrifice of the passover lamb,
besides referring figuratively to Christ's sacrifice,
also precedes it as an earlier event in the same history.
What Augustine presents as a reconci1iation of the
figurative use of Old Testament stories with their
historical truth, can equally well be understood as a
reconciliation of the figurative use of these Old
Testament stories with their imagined historical
continuity with the story of the Gospels.
Two things are to be gained by having an account of
the distinction between the symbolic and the non-symbolic
which does not depend on the distinguishing of true from
fictional literal meanings. The first is that such an
account allows us to affirm and to describe the
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distinction between the two kinds of allegory -- a
distinction insisted upon not only by Augustine but by
the whole medieval tradition which follows him3S --
without our having to affirm, as a presupposition of this
distinction, the truth of Christian history. The second
is that it allows us to understand that other worlds may
be imagined, besides the world of Christian history,
whose imagery is symbolic, but whose literal meanings may
not ever have been supposed to be historically true.
Such imagery may be identified as symbolic, not by any
correspondence with extra-textual reality, but by the
fact that it coexists with what it symbolizes in a single
imaginary world.
Such an approach would, for example, help to make
sense of a debate within Dante criticism over the status
of the literal meaning in the Divine Comedy. Charles
Singleton argues -- quite correctly, I think -- that many
of the images which constitute this literal meaning have
a status very like that of the images in the Bible (such
as the passover lamb) whose literal and figurative
meanings were understood to be simultaneously true; but
because Singleton depends on the Augustinian tradition
which distinguishes the kinds of allegory on the basis of
the truth or fictionality of the literal meaning, he can
express the similarity between the Bible and the Comedy
only by attributing a kind of qualified 'truth' to the
literal meaning of Dante's poem, while knowing full well
41
that this literal meaning is a fiction.37 Not only is
this an unfortunately clumsy way of explaining the
matter, and one liable to provoke rebuttals from critics
who suppose that Singleton has been so taken in by
Dante's fiction as to believe that it is true38, but it
misses the real respect in which the Divine Comedy
structurally imitates the medieval construction of the
Bible's meaning. The important point is not that Dante,
while presenting his characters as having figurative
meanings, also presents them, in some sense, as real
people -- for all narrative fictions ask us to imagine
that their characters are real -- but that he presents
them as coexisting with their figurative meanings, within
a single imaginary world. As Singleton observes, the
Beatrice of the Comedy "is both the Florentine woman who
died in 1290 and a person whom Virgil can recognize at
once as that 'lady of virtue through whom alone mankind
ascends'"39; she is both, precisely insofar as Dante's
imaginary world is one unified world, within which the
character Beatrice bears, simultaneously, both a literal
and a figurative meaning. For this reason and no other,
Dante's Beatrice is akin to Augustine's passover lamb,
and to all the other Biblical images which Christian
interpreters construe as bearing two meanings within the
single world of Christian history; and in this respect
alone, it is appropriate to refer to Dante's Beatrice as
a symbol, and to Dante's allegory as symbolic.
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Another medieval work which, in imitation of
Christian history, makes extensive use of symbolism is
the anonymous Quest of the Holv Grail. The book
announces a large number of figurative meanings for its
imagery. We are told, for example, that the coming of
Sir Galahad is to be "compared to the coming of Jesus
Christ" -- not, of course, in the heretical sense that
Galahad is to be understood as another incarnation of
God, but, simply, in the sense that the knight's actions
may be referred figuratively to the deeds of Christ.
Thus, in the adventure in which Galahad opens a haunted
tomb and casts out from it the body of a "wicked and
recreant Christian",
The tombstone covering the body signifies the
obduracy of this world, which was so rife when Our
Lord came down to earth that He met with nothing
else... [and] the dead body signifies mankind, for
men had persisted so long in their obduracy, that
they lay dead and blind beneath the weight of the
sins they had committed down the years. This
blindness was exposed by the advent of Jesus
Christ. 40
Now, obviously enough, the literal meaning of this
story is not historically true, for there never was a Sir
Galahad to perform such a deed. Nevertheless, this
allegory is better compared to Augustine's figurative use
of the passover lamb -- and of the rest of the Biblical
imagery for which he claimed a real historical existence
-- than to his use of the fatted calf, whose existence he
considered to be fictional. For like the passover lamb,
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Sir Galahad is unambiguously presented as existing in the
same world as that which he signifies: this is clearly
established, for example, by the fact that Galahad
himself is the addressee of the above explanation of the
figurative meaning of his actions -- an explanation to
which he humbly responds "that he had never thought the
adventure held so high a meaning".41 Galahad's
figurative relationship to Christ is something that
exists within the imaginary world which he inhabits.42
We may say, then, that Sir Galahad and his adventures
are symbolic of the life and deeds of Christ.
This instance of Galahad's coming to understand the
figurative meanings of his own actions shows just how
concretely the coexistence of symbol and symbolized
inside a single world may be portrayed. Not only does
Galahad know more about his own deed as a result of
having had its figurative meaning explained to him, but
he actually revalues the deed, seeing it as more
significant than he had believed it to be as he performed
it. Something comparable happens to another of the
characters in the story, when Sir Melias, having been
gravely wounded by a pair of knights, is rescued by Sir
Galahad and brought to an abbey to be healed. Neither
Melias, nor Galahad, nor the monks who treat the wound
imagine that the injury has any special significance,
until Sir Galahad mentions to the monks that it was
received "'in seeking the Holy Grail'".
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"What," asked one of the brethren, "is this
Quest then begun?"
"Indeed it is, and we are both companions."
"Then by my faith," said the monk, "I tell you,
Sir Knight who lie sick, it was your sin that
brought this evil upon you."43
The monk then asks Melias to relate the circumstances
of his wounding, and having heard these, declares that
"...these adventures pertain without a doubt to
the Holy Grail, for everything that you have told
me has a meaning which I will interpret for you."44
The monk proceeds to explain that, in the course of
his adventure, Melias had displayed the sins of pride and
covetousness, and that the two knights who had attacked
him had 'represented' these two sins; his eventual rescue
is to be attributed to God: "'He sent you Galahad, the
holy knight, to rout the two knights representing the two
sins lodged in you'".4S Not only does the monk know
that, when a deed is performed as a part of the Quest of
the Holy Grail, it may be expected to have a figurative
meaning, but he understands, too, that the presence of
this figurative meaning changes the way in which the
literal deed itself has to be seen: not in the usual
chivalric terms of mere honour and dishonour, but rather
in terms of the righteousness and sin which govern the
allegorical interpretation of the deeds of the Quest.
Such revaluation of adventures on the basis of their
turning out to have figurative meanings is the rule for
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the Quest knights: the presence, within their own world,
of the figurative meaning of their actions actually
transforms the knights' relationships to their own deeds.
Often, an imaginary world which contains symbols also
contains an imagined cause of the symbols' existence.
This imagined cause, which is supposed to exist inside
the same world as do the symbols and the things
symbolized, I shall refer to as the 'imaginary author' of
the world's symbolism, in order to distinguish it from
the symbolism's actual author -- namely, the writer or
commentator who constructs the allegory in which literal
and figurative meanings coexist within a single imaginary
world. Thus, for example, God is the imaginary author of
the symbolic relationships which characterize the
medieval reading of Biblical history: He, it is
supposed, composes the events themselves which are
reported in this history, in the way that a human writer
composes a text, and so is able to build into the
structure of events a symbolic function.46 God is
similarly imagined to be the 'author' of symbolic
relationships in the Divine Comedy and in the Quest of
the Holy Grai1. But in some other symbolic allegories,
there are very different sorts of imaginary authorship --
as we may observe, for example, in an influential passage
from Plato's Republic.
The allegorical use to which the character Socrates
puts his story of the cave may be categorized as
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non-symbolic: for like the Biblical story of the
prodigal son, the cave story is treated as a fable even
by its narrator, and so constitutes a world of its own
rather than taking part in the narrator's world, to which
it is figuratively referred. But Socrates describes
intelligible reality by means of another allegory, too,
one which is usually referred to as the 'sun simile'
(506e ff); and unlike Socrates' figurative use of the
cave story, this other allegory is symbolic. Not only,
that is, are the sun and the sun's relationship with the
visible world used figuratively to help explain the form
of the Good and its relationship with the intelligible
order, but the sun and the rest of the visible world are
explicitly imagined as coexisting with this intelligible
order inside a single cosmos. Within this imaginary
cosmos, then, the sun and its relationship with the
visible world are symbols of the Good and its
relationship with the intelligible. But these symbols
differ, with respect to the imagined cause of their
existence, from any of the symbols which we have
identified in other allegories. Whereas, in those cases,
the resemblance between the symbols and what they
symbolized was attributed to the providential ordering of
events by God, here the symbols are imagined to resemble
what they symbolize by virtue of the fact that they are,
in the first place, copies of those things. Thus, the
sun resembles the Good because, ontologically, it is the
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offspring ('ekgonos}(506e3)) and likeness
('eikon'(509a9)) of the Good. In this allegory, then,
the relationship between symbol and symbolized is much
more tightly bound up, than in our earlier examples, with
the process of imaginary authorship. For the form of the
Good is not only what is symbolized by the sun: it is,
at the same time, the imaginary author of the sun, and of
the symbolic relation between the sun and itself. There
is, in effect, a reciprocal relationship between the two:
even as the sun indicates figuratively the nature of the
Good, the Good, in turn, is imagined as producing in the
sun a strong likeness of itself, and so as validating the
use of the sun as its figurative representative. Such a
relationship between symbol and symbolized shows even
more forcefully than our examples from the Quest of the
Holy Grail how the coexistence of images and their
figurative meanings within a single imaginary world may
affect our literal understanding of the images
themselves. In the world which Plato asks us to imagine,
the concrete relations between the things in the visible
order and what they symbolize is essential to our
conception of the visible order itself: we imagine these
visible things primarily as symbolic copies (or
'eikones') of the intelligible forms.
Plato's way of imagining the visible world was
adopted, not only by later Platonists, but by the whole
Christian tradition as well. Moreover, this conception
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of the visible world was gradually extended to the
structures of visual imagery presented by texts, even to
those which were understood to be fabulous, so as to
create a comprehensive justification for using literature
figuratively to refer to whatever were currently imagined
to be the truths of the intelligible world. The first
step toward this end was the elevation of the finest
products of the visual arts -- which Plato himself had
disparaged as mere copies of the things seen in the
visible world -- to a status on par with the things in
the visible world at large, which Plato had described as
symbolic likenesses of intelligible reality; revaluation
of the visual arts may be found as early as in the works
of Cicero, and is well established by the time of
Plotinus (in the third century AD).47 The second step
was the extension of this revised status for sculpture
and painting to the visual imagery presented to the
imagination by literature; this was accomplished by
fourth-century Neoplatonists including Iamblicus.40
Finally, this new theory of literature was applied to
Plato's own texts, in order to show that the master
himself had both sanctioned, and practised, such a use of
textual imagery; this last step was the accomplishment of
the fifth-century Neoplatonist Proclus.
Proclus argues that Plato's disparaging description
of poetic imagery, as no better than a derivative copy of
an already derivative visible world, does not, in fact,
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refer to all poetry -- and certainly not to the Homeric
epics to which Neoplatonists granted a philosophical
authority nearly equal to Plato's own -- but only to an
inferior kind of writing which perversely takes the
visible rather than the intelligible world as its
model."19 What is more, claims Proclus, Plato's own
fictions, such as the story of the cave, which are
explicitly intended as imaginary likenesses ('eikones')
of the intelligible order (Republic. 515a4,etc.), are
examples of the superior kind of poetry of which Plato
actually approves (In Rempublicam 73 . 16-22 ).50 From
here, it is a short step, for Proclus, to saying that the
whole allegorical tradition of commentary on Homer --
which by the fifth century AD was itself as impressively
rooted in antiquity as were Plato's own writings, and
which had established no end of correspondences between
the visual imagery of the Odvssev and 11iad and the
supposed truths of the intelligible world -- had a
comparable status (In Rempublicam 73.11-16). All the
imaginary worlds presented by the literature of the
Neoplatonic canon were, he could claim, ontologically the
copies of intelligible reality, just like the visible
world of nature. And just as, in Plato's Republic. the
Good is imagined as producing, in the sun, a likeness of
itself, and so as validating the use of the sun as its
figurative representative, so, in Proclus' scheme, the
intelligible order is ontologically the original of all
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the imagery of canonical literature, and so validates in
advance the Platonic commentators' use of this imagery to
refer figuratively to intelligible truths.
As to the question of why Homer and the other poets
had used visual imagery in writing about the intelligible
order, the answer to this was readily available in Plato.
Just like the geometers, and like the Socrates of the
Republic. the poets (and indeed, the visual artists as
well), could be seen as using their visual imagery
catachretically, to refer to an intelligible reality for
which no proper terms existed. But this catachretic use
of imagery in the description of the intelligible was no
longer treated, with Plato's Socrates, as "ludicrous"
(527a6); the emphasis had shifted, from the fact that the
artists "cannot help it" (527a6), onto the fact that what
they do emulates the process by which the visible world
itself is supposed to come into being. Thus, for
example, Seneca explains that "all art is but imitation
of nature" (Epistulae Morales LXV.3), not in Plato's
sense that the artist looks to the visible world of
nature for his models, but in the sense that art
resembles nature in the way in which it comes into
existence, being modelled, like visible nature, on "the
pattern which [Plato] calls the 'idea'" (Epistulae
Morales LXV.7-9). Plotinus is similarly unapologetic
about the artist's rendering of intelligible reality in
the visual medium when he says that the sculptor Pheidias
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"did not make his Zeus from any model perceived by the
senses, but understood what Zeus would look like if he
wanted to make himself visible" (V.8.1).
The pagan Neoplatonists' treatment of textual imagery
was transmitted to medieval and Renaissance thought
largely through the intermediary of the sixth-century
writer known to us as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.51
For Pseudo-Dionysius, who inherits the ideas of the late
Athenian Neoplatonism characterized by the writings of
Proclus but applies them exclusively to the Christian
tradition, both the things in the visible world and the
visual images employed by the Bible are symbolic
likenesses ("eikones") of intelligible reality (Celestial
Hierarchy 1.3, etc.). These likenesses, whether found in
nature or in the Bible, far from being "ludicrous"
attempts to portray the intelligible in a medium unsuited
to its representation, are necessary aids to our
understanding: "for it is quite impossible that we
humans should... rise up to imitate and contemplate the
heavenly hierarchies without those material means capable
of guiding us as our nature requires" (ibid.). We cannot
know God directly; but nevertheless "we know Him from the
arrangement of everything, because everything is, in a
sense, projected out from Him, and this order possesses
certain images (eikonas)... of his divine paradigms"
(Divine Names VII.3). For Pseudo-Dionysius, then, all
understanding of God must be through the catachretic use
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of visual imagery -- imagery which God, in his goodness,
provides for us, precisely so that we may use it
catachretically.
The principles on which Pseudo-Dionysius bases his
figurative interpretation of nature and Scripture serve
also as a guide for his own catachretic use of imagery to
convey metaphysical doctrines. Thus, he regularly speaks
of the invisible objects of religious contemplation in
the language of vision (for example, he describes them as
sending forth a "beam [aktina]" which, entering "the eye
of our intelligence [to noeron omma]" grants us
"enlightenments [ellampsesin]" (Divine Names 1.2,
Celestial Hierarchy XV.1. etc.)) while at the same time
withdrawing the ordinary meaning of this terminology,
just as Plato's Socrates withdrew from Glaucon the
ordinary meaning of 'gazing upward':
If only we lacked sight and knowledge so as to
see, so as to know, unseeing and unknowing, that
which lies beyond all vision and knowledge. For
this would be really to see and to know: to praise
the Transcendent One in a transcending way...
(Mystical Theology II).
The structure of imagery which Pseudo-Dionysius uses
catachretically in his figurative account of intelligible
reality is recognizably indebted to that which Plato had
used for similar purposes in the Reoublic. In
particular, throughout the Pseudo-Dionysian writings, the
notion is never far from us that God is, figuratively
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speaking, a sun, who is located somewhere 'above' ('ano')
our world. For example, explaining that "the goal of a
hierarchy... is to enable beings to be as like as
possible to God", he writes:
Hierarchy causes its members to be images of
God in all respects, to be clear and spotless
mirrors reflecting the glow of primordial light and
indeed of God himself. It ensures that when its
members have received this full and divine
splendour they can then pass on this light
generously and in accordance with God's will to
beings further down the scale...
(Celestial Hierarchy 111 . 2) .
In other words, every being subordinate to God mimics
God's sun-like radiance, dispensing "light" to its own
subordinates just as God dispenses "light" to the whole
of creation. The principle that every being is a
likeness ('eikon') of God is developed according to the
notion that God is the transcendent paradigm of the sun,
so that every symbolic eikon of God, in resembling Him,
comes, in effect, to resemble also that one indispensible
symbol, the sun.
The two sorts of imaginary authorship which we have
examined -- that which characterized Augustine's
typological readings of the Bible, and that which
Pseudo-Dionysius brought to the Christian tradition from
the late pagan Neoplatonism of Proclus -- merged to form
a composite world for the medieval imagination, rich in
both kinds of symbolism, which survived, largely intact,
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until the beginning of the seventeenth century. On one
hand, works like the medieval Bestiary extended the idea
that God, as author of the world, composes the things and
events which make it up in such a way as to give them
symbolic reference: thus, for example, the behaviour of
the pelican, which is supposed to feed its young with its
own blood, is designed by God to remind us of the
sacrifice of Christ.52 On the other hand, the idea that
every domain has its natural ruler -- as, for example,
the lion rules the beasts, the eagle the birds, and a
rightful king each human nation53 -- extended the
principle that beings subordinate to God, because they
are his eikones, naturally resemble Him with respect to
their relation to their own subordinates. In sum, the
whole structure of the medieval and Renaissance world is
deduced from the kinds of symbolism that are imagined to
operate within it. It will be my contention, in the
following chapters, that a similarly strong claim can be
made with respect to the imaginary world presented to the
reader of Spenser's The Faerie Queene.
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Notes to Introduction (1):
1 For 'trope' as a subgenus of the 'figures of
speech', see for example Holman 185. My definition of a
trope is based to a large degree on Saint Augustine's
insightful and influential description of the way in which
figurative meaning is related to the literal meanings of
words: figurative meaning occurs, he explains, "when the
things themselves which we indicate by [their] proper
names are used to signify something else, as we say bos,
and understand by that syllable the ox, which is
ordinarily called by that name; but then further by that
ox understand a preacher of the gospel, as Scripture
signifies, according to apostle's explanation, when it
says: 'Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out
the corn.' [1 Corinthians 9:9]" (On Christian Doctrine
II.x).
2 Richards 96-7.
3 It is not uncommon to find both these traditions
expressed by a single author or even within a single
treatise. The clearest classical precedent for treating
allegory as a species of metaphor is Cicero's Orator.
which argues that allegories, "from the point of view of
classification" should be regarded as "metaphors
[translationes]" (xxvii); in the Renaissance, Wilson's
Arte of Rhetorique (1560) defines allegory as "none other
thing, but a Metaphore, used throughout a whole sentence,
or oration" (p. 176), and Puttenham's [?] The Arte of
English Poesie (1589) as "a long and perpetuall
Metaphore" (p. 187). The alternative tradition, which I
will follow, springs from Cicero's De Oratore. which
argues that "the figure... consisting of a series of
several metaphors strung together" is not itself a
metaphor, because unlike these other figures it "is a
matter... not of a word but of a sentence [not verbi sed
orationis] (Ill.xliii); thus Wilson distinguishes the
"tropes of a worde", including metaphor, from the "tropes
of long continued speeche or sentences", which include
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allegory (p. 172), and Puttenham [?] similarly
distinguishes the tropes of "single words" from those "of
the whole and entier speech" (p. 178). See also
Quintilian, who writes that allegory "is generally
produced by a series of metaphors [continuatis
translationibus]" (VI11.vi.4 4).
4 Definitions of allegory and symbolism as mutually
exclusive spring mainly from Coleridge's contrasting of
the two (e.g. "Statesman's Manual", p. 30). But even
for Coleridge, what distinguishes the symbolic from the
allegorical is something that the symbol has in addition,
namely that it "partakes of the Reality which it renders
intelligible"; it is this imagined ontological relation
of symbol and symbolized which I describe as the essence
of symbolism, as opposed to 'mere' allegory or metaphor.
5 The ship of state has, of course, a long history
both as a trope and as a rhetorical handbook's example of
a trope: see for example Horace (Ode I.xiv), Quintilian
(VI11.vi.44), and Puttenham [?] (Ill.xviii -- p. 187).
6 See for example Quintilian VIII.vi.4ff, Erasmus
I . 16f f .
7 Sherry 40; Puttenham [?] 178-9.
8 This example is borrowed from Soskice 93-96.
9 See for example Cicero, De Oratore Ill.xliii,
Orator xxvii.
10 See for example Quilligan 13-15.
11 Quilligan 23.
12 See for example Berger (1957) 34, Roche 4,
Kouwenhoven 9.
13 This passage is quoted in Quintilian VIII.vi.47;
the rest of the speech is lost.
14 For one such survey, and an indication of the
degree to which scholars have disagreed as to the
figurative meaning of the cave story, see Cross and
Woozley 207-228.
15 Gordon Teskey, "Allegory", in The Spenser
Encyclopedia 16ff.
1S See for example Pierre Bersuire, The Moral
Reduction, Book XV: "Ovid Moralized", in Minnis and
Scott 367ff.
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17 Re. Neoplatonic commentaries on Homer, see Wallis
135-7; for a treatment of early Christian readings of the
Bible, see Hanson, esp. comments on Clement and Origen,
pp. 117-20. See also Honig 26-7.
10 Wicksteed, in the appendix to Dante's Convivio
(1924), writes: "We have to ask, then, whether we can
accept all the love poems on which Dante comments... in
the Convivio as really having been addressed in the first
instance to philosophy. It is clear that we cannot...
We shall be safer in basing our judgment as to the Lady
of the Window and the ode that concerns her [Ode I in
the Convivio3 upon the internal evidence of the Vita
Nuova and the ode itself, than upon the express
assertions, avowedly made with a purpose, of the
Convivio" (431ff). See also Minnis and Scott 379.
19 Medieval writers who used the term 'allegorical'
to refer specifically to what I have called the
typological sense of scripture recognized that the word
'allegory' could also be applied to all the figurative
senses collectively. Thus Aquinas, for example, notes
that for some writers (most importantly for Augustine),
"allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses"
(Summa Theologica I.i.10); and the Letter to Can Grande.
attributed to Dante, explains that "although these
mystical meanings are called by various names, they may
one and all in a general sense be termed allegorical,
inasmuch as they are different (diversi) from the literal
or historical; for the word 'allegory' is so called from
the Greek alleon, which in Latin is alienum (strange) or
diversum (different)" (Dante (1920) 199).
20 Nicholas of Lyre, Literal Postill on the Bible.
qtd. Minnis and Scott 268.
21 Minnis and Scott 324. A twelfth-century example
is Alan of Lille's prose prologue to the Anticlaudianus.
pp. 40-1 in Sheridan's translation; a sixteenth-century
example, Harington's commentary on his translation of
the Orlando Furioso -- see especially the introduction,
pp. 5-6.
22 Convivio 63-4. There is some controversy over
this passage. I am following Singleton's interpretation
in "Dante's Allegory" (1967) 92, which seems to me to be
truer to the text than those of Robert Hollander (1969)
32-40, and Minnis and Scott 382-3. See also Dante's [?]
Epistle to Can Grande, which explicitly prescribes the
'theological' senses for interpreting the Commedia
itself .
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23 Minnis and Scott 324.
24 Alexander's Sum of Theology, qtd. Minnis and Scott
221; Henry of Ghent, The Sum of Ordinary Questions, qtd.
Minnis and Scott 258-9.
23 For the encyclopaedists' view of the natural world
as suited to theological commentary, see Whitman 126-7.
2 63 Minnis and Scott 324 .
27 See for example Dunbar 279, 500.
23 The Moral Reduction. Book XV: "Ovid Moralized", in
Minnis and Scott 367, 371-2.
23 All these equations had been made by 1333: see
the anonymous commentary of that date qtd. by Robert
Hollander (1969) 275-6. Compare the modern reading of
Frank 240.
30 Robert Hollander (1969) 19; see also Michael
Caesar's anthology of Dante criticism, which goes some
way toward realizing such a study.
31 Caesar notes the "frequent disagreement among the
early commentators about major allegorical meanings, the
figure of Beatrice being a case in point: for most she
represents theology, but she is also interpreted more
generally as a type and figure of the spiritual life
(Guido da Pisa) and by Jacopo Alighieri as representing
the Bible" (pp.7-8); while amongst twentieth-century
commentators, Dunbar alone, for example, claims that
Beatrice represents Grace, 'Super-ratio', Contemplation,
Theology, the Church, the Divine Nature of Christ, the
Will, and the Guelph political faction (see his diagram,
p. 98).
32 Frank 233-4, 237-9; Dunbar 280.
33 Dunbar 280; Robertson 247-9. The etymology of the
word 'personification', 'mask-making', may have
contributed to this notion; but the meaning of the term
has shifted too much since its coining (see Whitman
269-70) for an etymological interpretation to have any
real force.
34 The meaning of this passage has been widely
debated by Plato scholars; a clear expression of
the interpretation which I take to be correct is
given by Stocks 83.
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35 I am adapting, here, Coleridge's well-known
characterization of a "symbol" as something which "always
partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible"
("Statesman's Manual", p. 30). Coleridge's Christian
commitment means that he need not consider the
possibility that this "Reality" is fabulous -- a position
which I discuss with reference to Augustine in the
following paragraph.
36 See, for example, Bede's distinction between
literal meanings which are "factual" and those which are
"verbal only" (De Schematibus et Tropis Il.xii, trans.
MacQueen 50ff), and Aquinas' distinction between
"literal" and "parabolic" meanings (Summa Theologica
I.i.10).
37 Singleton (1967) 94-5.
38 Green passim; see also the reply in Singleton
(1957) 129.
39 Singleton (1957) 134.
40 Quest of the Holy Grail 61-5.
41 Quest of the Holy Grail 65.
42 See Tuve 53-4, who finds "in the Oueste the
unimpugnable evidence of readers within the work."
Quest of the Hoi v Grail 67-70
Quest of the Holy Grail 70 .
Quest of the Holy Grail 67-70
45 See, for example, Aquinas Summa Theologica I.i.10,
and Nicholas of Lyre, Literal Postill on the Bible, qtd.
Minnis and Scott 266. See also Tuve 222.
47 Cicero Orator 8-9, Plotinus V.8.1. The
reappraisal of the visual artist from Cicero through to
Plotinus has been fairly widely noted: see, for example,
Dillon (1977) 93-4, and Coulter 98-100.
48 Coulter 102.
49 Coulter 46.
50 This and the following citation are by page and
line number to Kroll's Greek edition of the In
Rempublicam. No complete English translation of this
work is available, but helpful translations and
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discussions of the passages which I have cited may be
found in Dillon (1976) 251-2, and Coulter 47-54. See
also the discussion in Whitman 92-8.
BX Pseudo-Dionysius, aided by his successful adoption
of the name of Dionysius the Areopagite (a convert of St.
Paul, mentioned in Acts 17:34), was gradually accepted,
in the East, during the two centuries after his writing,
not only as an orthodox thinker but as one of almost
unrivalled authority; after their translation into Latin
by John the Scot Eriugena in 858 AD, his works enjoyed
similar authority in the West (Wallis 161). His
continuing influence is apparent in scholastic
discussions of allegory: for example, Aquinas cites his
authority repeatedly in this regard (Summa Theologica
I.i.9-10). Renaissance philosophers including Ficino and
Pico della Hirandola were comparably indebted -- see
Karlfried Froehlich, "Pseudo-Dionysius and the
Reformation of the Sixteenth Century", in Pseudo-
Dionysius, Complete Works, p. 36.
=2 White 132-3.
S3 Tillyard 27-8, 82-4.
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Introduction (2):
The 1590 Edition of Spenser's The Faerie Oueene
My aim in this second introductory chapter is to see
what can be said in general about the relation between
literal and figurative meaning in the 1590 edition of The
Faerie Queene. insofar as it is presented as the unified
work of a single author, Edmund Spenser -- that is, in
the first three books of the poem itself, including their
proems and arguments, together with the dedicatory
sonnets and the Letter to Raleigh, but not including the
commendatory verses expressly written by other hands.
Most modern critics investigating the general
structure and meaning of The Faerie Queene have given
some consideration to the Letter to Raleigh, which might
be called Spenser's own essay on that topic.1 The main
point of debate among these critics has been to what
extent the Letter is an accurate description of the poem,
with the extreme positions marked out on one side by
A. C. Hamilton, who asserts that "If the letter is
properly read... there are no divergencies with the
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poem", and on the other by C. S. Lewis, for whom "the
account of the poem given in the Letter to Raleigh is
demonstrably untrue, not only as regards its separate
individual statements, but also in its whole tenor".2
What I will be interested in determining, however, with
respect to the Letter to Raleigh, is not the extent to
which it is adequate or inadequate as a description of
The Faerie Queene. but how it functions as a prescription
for reading the poem, or in other words how, as an
authorial commentary on the poem, it has influenced the
form and the content of commentaries added to the poem by
others. My question, as it happens, is one that would
make sense neither from Hamilton's point of view nor from
Lewis's. For Lewis, the Letter is irrelevant to our
actual reading of the poem; for Hamilton, the Letter.
"properly read", merely tells us about the poem what it
already reveals to us about itself. But both these
writers, I will argue, as well as all those who have
taken up positions somewhere between their two extremes,
read the poem differently than they would have, had the
Letter to Raleigh never been written.
One prominent feature of the Letter to Raleigh is its
apparent indication that the figurative meaning in the
poem may be divided into two categories, which Spenser
calls the "general" and the "particular". With one
exception (which looks like a slip on Spenser's part3),
the former pertains to the ethical 'fashioning' of "a
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gentleman or noble person", and the latter includes all
the other figurative meanings which have been put into
the work, such as the complimentary comparisons of
Gloriana and Belphoebe to the queen. Not much is said
about these "particular" meanings (indeed, since Spenser
says at the outset of the Letter that he is concerned
here only with "the general intention and meaning" of the
poem, not with "expressing of any particular purposes...
therein occasioned", his mention of the "particular"
meanings of Gloriana and Belphoebe should be thought of
as no more than a brief digression from the Letter's
stated purpose), but the fact that these meanings are
called "particular" rather than "general" seems to
indicate that they are to be thought of as isolated
instances of figurative reference, not, like the
"general" meanings, as components of a coherent scheme of
reference which extends throughout the poem.
These categories would appear to have influenced, to
varying degrees, most of the schemes which modern critics
have used for categorizing the figurative meaning which
they associate with the poem. The Variorurn edition of
Spenser's works generally allows for an "historical"
allegory, and in some books for a "moral" or "moral and
spiritual" allegory as well; these correspond roughly to
Spenser's "particular" and "general" categories of
figurative meaning, respectively. More recently, Robin
Wells argues for three types of figurative meaning in the
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poem, adding the "mystical" to the Variorum's historical
and moral categories, while Elizabeth Watson, departing
still farther from Spenser's own scheme, invokes four
categories: the moral, spiritual, mystical, and
political.4
Such systems devised by Spenserian critics, however
closely or distantly they resemble the scheme suggested
by The Letter to Raleigh, are usually described by those
who invoke them as expositions of something already
present in The Faerie Queene. as levels on which "Spenser
writes".5 But as is perhaps most evident in the Variorurn
edition, they tend to be used largely for organizing
commentary which is being added to the poem, rather than
for analyzing self-commentary which is already present in
it. Like the medieval categories of Scriptural
commentary, they serve primarily as filing systems for
the material of an infinitely expandable allegorical
tradition, and only secondarily as vocabularies for
naming the types of meaning which are already present in
the allegorical work. Now it may be true that, like the
medieval Scriptural tradition, and as Robert Hollander
has suggested of the Dante tradition (see Introduction
(1): p. 26), the Spenser tradition may merit study as an
allegory in its own right, in which case we would need to
know about all these systems and how they are related to
one another; but insofar as it is our aim to study the
allegory of The Faerie Oueene itself, we ought to be very
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wary of what we do in invoking any such system of
categories of allegorical commentary, lest we find
ourselves simply setting up a filing system for
commentaries of our own. (This is not to say, of course,
that there are no examples in the self-commentary which
resides within The Faerie Oueene itself of what Watson,
for example, would call moral, spiritual, mystical, and
political meanings; no doubt there are. But there are
also examples of what Thomas Aquinas would have called
allegorical, tropological, and anagogical meanings, and
for that matter, of what Pierre Bersuire would have
called natural, historical, and ethical meanings. The
self-commentaries contained in The Faerie Oueene could be
assimilated to any number of different systems.)
In contrast to these other schemes which claim to
describe the structure of Spenser's allegory, the scheme
set forth by The Letter to Raleigh is directly affiliated
with the poem itself. It has a special value, not in
that it may be presumed to have any special descriptive
accuracy (for it is an open question to what extent the
characterization of the poem given by the Letter
accurately summarizes the instances of self-commentary in
The Faerie Oueene)r but in that it has generally been
treated as an authoritative prescription for reading the
Spenserian allegory. Consequently, its division of the
poem's figurative meanings into the categories of the
"general" and the "particular" must be treated as more,
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in the first place, than just a explanation of how the
poem is structured as an allegory. Rather, it should
itself be considered an instance of the self-commentary
which constitutes that allegory, and the categories of
the "general" and the "particular" not merely as
descriptive of The Faerie Queene's meaning, but as partly
constitutive of it. In short, this is the over-all view
which Spenser himself offers of the figurative meaning of
his poem, and the fact that this view has regularly been
treated as authoritative by readers and critics of The
Faerie Oueene has had an enormous impact on the way in
which the poem itself has been read in its individual
details.
(2.1) Spenser's "General Intention"
The bulk of what Spenser has to say about the
"A1legorical1 deuises" which he has employed in The
Faerie Oueene is to be found in his explanation, in the
Letter to Raleigh, of the poem's "general intention and
meaning". The main thrust of this explanation is that
The Faerie Oueene offers "doctrine by ensample" rather
than "plainly in way of precepts", and that,
accordingly, the poem's hero, Prince Arthur, should be
treated as an "ensample" of virtuous behaviour, a
character whose actions are worthy of emulation.
Accustomed as we are to the complexities of the poem
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itself and to the even greater complexities of its
critical heritage, it is easy to overlook the fact that
this description of Arthur's function in the poem is no
mere preamble to Spenser's explanation of the actual
workings of his allegory, but is itself his most thorough
explanation of the sense in which the poem is to be read
as an allegory. (As an example of a critic who overlooks
this point we may take Edwin Honig, who treats Spenser's
discussion of previous epic poets "who have 'coloured'
their doctrine 'with an historical fiction'" as something
unrelated to his promise to explain "the allegorical
meaning of the work".6) The commentary which the reader
is invited to attach to the poem, at least insofar as
this initial account of the poem's "general intention and
meaning" goes, is to consist in nothing more exotic than
a statement of the "precepts" which Arthur's actions
exemplify. In other words, we are to add to the poem, to
particular statements of the form 'Arthur did this and
that', general statements of the form 'One ought always
to do this and that sort of thing'. Similarly, to the
actions of the "xii. other knights" who are presented as
exemplars of "the xii. other vertues", we are invited to
add general comments along the lines of 'The holy (or
temperate, or chaste) person will always act thus'.
Of course, to a modern reader, both the proposed task
of deriving moral precepts from the exemplary behaviour
of the poem's principal characters, and any actual
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precepts which might be obtained as a result, will almost
certainly seem unexciting; but we should not suppose, on
this basis alone, that this task cannot really be the one
which Spenser invites his readers to undertake, or that
it would have seemed, to him or to his contemporaries,
too pedestrian to merit the aura of mystery which is
conjured by such language as "darke conceit" and
"clowdily enwrapped in Allegoricall deuises". In fact,
it is precisely this task which Spenser describes in
these terms, and in doing so, he is very much a creature
of his age: that this sort of generalizing moral
commentary was a part of the tradition of allegorical
reading current in his day may be seen, for example, from
Harington's moral glosses on the Orlando Furioso.7 This
objection having been laid aside, however, it must still
be acknowledged that Spenser's explanation of the
exemplary function of his principal characters cannot be
a complete account of the workings of his allegory, for
not everything that Spenser says about the allegorical
meaning of his poem, even in the Letter to Raleigh
itself, can be explained by this simple model of it.
The most glaring example of the inadequacy of
Spenser's account of his "general intention and meaning"
in The Faerie Queene is the specific example he offers,
also in the Letter to Raleigh, of his "generall
intention" with respect to the character of the "Faery
Queen" herself. After reporting that Arthur, having
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"seene in a dream... the Faery Queen... resolued to seeke
her out", Spenser explains that "In that Faery Queene I
meane glory in my generall intention". Now in one sense,
it is easy enough to see what Spenser is driving at here:
for if, as we have been told, Arthur is to exemplify
virtue, then it is quite understandable that Spenser
should wish us to think of him as receiving "glory" for
his reward. But in another sense, this example which
Spenser offers of the workings of his allegory immensely
complicates our understanding of it. For he does not say
that Arthur seeks glory; he says that Arthur seeks the
Faery Queen, and that the Faery Queen 'means' glory. The
assertion of this relationship between the character
Gloriana and the abstract quantity "glory" introduces
into Spenser's prescription for the allegorical reading
of his poem an entirely different sort of relationship
between text and commentary from that which the reader
has been led to expect by the preceding explanation of
how the allegory works. The explanation was that a
commentary consisting in ethical precepts should be
attached to the actions undertaken by the poem's
principal characters; in the example which is given, in
contrast, the commentary sets forth not a precept but an
abstract quantity, and it is attached not to one of the
characters' actions, but to one of the characters
themselves.
Thanks to this problematic example, everything
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further which Spenser says in the Letter to Raleigh about
the "generall intention" of his poem is ambiguous in
meaning. He says, for example, that "in the person of
Prince Arthure I sette forth magnificence... which
vertue... is the perfection of all the rest". On one
hand, this appears to be no more than a restatement of
what was said above, that Arthur is intended as the
"ensample" of how "a braue knight, perfected in the
twelue priuate morall vertues", would behave. According
to this reading, to "sette forth magnificence" would mean
to conjure up fictional situations in which the virtue is
demonstrated. But on the other hand, if we bracket what
Spenser says about his "particular" intentions with
respect to the characters Gloriana and Belphoebe, it
looks as though we should read the following as balanced
statements: "In that Faery Queene I meane glory in my
generall intention"; "So in the person of Prince Arthure
I sette forth magnificence". Taking the statement in
this context, it is easy enough to interpret "sette
forth" to mean something more like 'personify*, and so to
understand the statement as a whole to say that, as
Gloriana 'means' glory, so Arthur 'means' magnificence.
Precisely the same ambiguity attaches to Spenser's
subsequent explanation of his intention with respect to
the patrons of the first three books: "the knight of the
Redcrosse, in whome I expresse Holynes... Sir Guyon, in
whome I sette forth Temperaunce... [and] Britomartis a
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Lady knight, in whome I picture Chastity." None of the
verbs which Spenser uses in this account, to "expresse",
to "sette forth", or to "picture", helps us to resolve
the ambiguity as to whether these characters are intended
as exemplars or as personifications of their respective
virtues. On the contrary, how we read this explanation
of the functions of Redcross, Guyon, and Britomart
depends entirely on how we have interpreted the prior
statement, "in the person of Prince Arthure I sette forth
magnificence".
In spite, then, of the Letter to Raleigh's explicit
assertion of the exemplary nature of The Faerie Oueene's
allegory, there is the possibility of seeing a quite
different model of the poem's allegorical workings
implicit in the actual examples of commentary which
Spenser provides. Thus, for example, Jan Karel
Kouwenhoven writes that
...the Letter defines the Faery Queen, Arthur,
Red Cross, Guyon, and Britomart as concepts.
These characters are not more or less glorious,
magnificent, holy, temperate, and chaste persons
but personifications of 'perfect' virtues. So
they do not exemplify what they represent: they
symbolize it.s
Such an interpretation of the Letter to Raleigh leads
to the kind of commentary on the poem in which
We are told that in the episode of the Wandering
Wood, the [Redcrosse] knight is Holiness, Una is
Truth, Error is obvious error: ergo, the episode
72
means that Holiness defeats Error with the aid of
Truth.9
This way of reading The Faerie Queene was once very
popular among commentators, and in spite of the severe
drubbing it has received in recent decades at the hands
of such noted critics as A. C. Hamilton and Thomas P.
Roche10, its influence is by no means exhausted. Perhaps
because we are not used to thinking of exemplification as
a species of allegory, we can easily assume that
Spenser's claim to "sette forth" or "expresse" the
virtues in the poem's principal characters must mean that
these characters are intended as personifications, when
in fact it would be equally reasonable to read this claim
as a restatement and a further application of what was
said earlier in the Letter about Arthur's exemplary role.
And in any event, there seems to be no such ambiguity in
the case of the Faery Queen herself, who is said simply
to "meane glory". It remains a question for critics,
then, how to reconcile the two types of allegory which
are attributed to the poem by the Letter.
An extreme response, and an unconvincing one, is that
of Kouwenhoven, who, having concluded that Spenser
describes Arthur and the rest as personifications rather
than exemplars of their respective virtues, bends the
Letter's earlier explanation that the poem offers
"doctrine by ensample" to fit this conclusion.
Kouwenhoven's claim that "ensample", as Spenser uses it,
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does not mean "literal exemplum"x:L, looks very weak in
view of the fact that Spenser explains his intention to
provide "doctrine by ensample" by analogy with the method
of Xenophon, who "in the person of Cyrus and the Persians
fashioned a gouernment such as might best be" -- a pretty
clear instance of a "literal exemplum". More plausible
readings of the Letter make room in their interpretations
for both personification and exemplification, either by
treating these as two separate types of allegory which
operate separately in the poem, or by envisioning a
single allegorical structure for the poem which is
complex enough to incorporate both.
An elegant example of the first sort of reading is
the interpretation of the poem propounded by John Erskine
Hankins. He writes:
In moral allegory Spenser's method is twofold.
A character may be an exemplum or a type of a
particular virtue or a particular vice. But he may
also be the virtue or vice itself as it presents
itself within the soul of the individual man; or he
may be a faculty of the soul capable of being
influenced by virtue or vice... In such a case he
is never a person but is a quality or impulse
within the individual soul. The interior of the
soul is the battle-ground on which the action is
fought.12
In the first type of allegory, which Hankins calls
"exemplification" or "external allegory", "Redcross is a
holy man, Guyon a temperate man, Britomart a chaste
woman, Artegall a just man, etc."13 In the second type,
in contrast, which Hankins calls "internal allegory",
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"only one person is concerned, the entire action taking
place within his soul. Holiness, temperance, chastity,
justice are not persons but are qualities of his soul
which may be either strengthened or weakened by his
conduct."14 Such "internal allegory", as Hankins
conceives it, is analogous to the kind found in
Prudentius' Psvchomachia. where a pitched battle between
characters named after the virtues and vices signifies
the individual Christian's war against temptation.15
Hankins's interpretation of the Letter to Raleigh is
based, to a considerable extent, on a comparison with the
preface which was written by Tasso expounding the
allegory of his own poem, Gerusalemme Liberata.16 Now,
as Hankins says, Tasso's Allegory of the Poem clearly did
influence Spenser in his composition of the Letter to
Raleigh; but it is not entirely satisfactory to see the
latter, as Hankins appears to do, as simply a less
clearly expressed equivalent to the former. For it is
not simply that Spenser does not clearly say, as Tasso
does, that there are two separate types of moral
interpretation to be made of his poem, one which treats
the principal characters as exemplars, and the other
which treats them as personifications; on the contrary,
he seems actually to imply that Arthur, in his capacity
as an exemplary knight, is himself the beneficiary of the
"glory" person!fled by the Faery Queen. In other words,
the one figure most clearly described by the Letter to
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Raleigh as a personification is offered as signifying,
not something which pertains to "the soul of any man or
of any woman", but something which pertains to Arthur
specifically. So if, insofar as the characters are
treated as personifications, the action in which they are
involved is to be thought of as taking place "within the
individual soul", then that individual soul, on the
evidence of the Letter to Raleigh, must be Arthur's. The
poem's action, interpreted as "internal allegory", takes
place inside the mind of a fictional character, who
himself partakes of the action insofar as it is
interpreted as exemplary. This intertwining of
personification and exemplification, for which there is
no precedent in Tasso's account of Gerusalemme Liberata.
is what Hankins must specifically deny in order to
interpret The Faerie Oueene's "external" and "internal"
meanings as two separate species of allegory which
operate separately in the poem.1"7
The other alternative, that the poem has a single
allegorical structure complex enough to incorporate both
personification and exemplification, is championed by
all those modern critics who take seriously the notion
that (as Pauline Parker puts it), "In actual fact, the
whole action of all six books and all the land of faerie
with its forests, castles, and seashores, exist in
Arthur's soul, and there only."18 Among these are
A. C. Hamilton, James Nohrnberg, and Alastair Fowler.19
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An incidental benefit of conceiving Arthur as, in one
sense or another, a 'containing' figure for the action of
The Faerie Queene. and one which has been noted by more
than one critic, is that it gives Arthur the kind of
central role in the poem which it seems he should have,
given the emphasis placed upon him by the Letter to
Raleigh.20
The principal difficulty for such an interpretation
is how to account for Arthur's own presence inside the
action which supposedly takes place inside him -- a
problem which does not arise in interpreting the
Psvchomachia or the Gerusalemme Liberata. because in
those poems an identity is never asserted between the
'containing mind' and any of the characters whose actions
signify its internal struggles. Fowler addresses this
difficulty with the suggestion that, if Arthur the
exemplary knight is a 'containing figure' for the action
of the poem, such that the "other characters... serve to
objectify traits of his personality", then the Arthur who
appears inside the poem cannot himself be this exemplary
knight, but must instead be a "fictive self",
representing this exemplary knight in the same way that a
character inside a dream often represents the dreamer.21
Nohrnberg suggests a comparable distinction between the
'magnificent' Arthur promised by the Letter and the
Arthur delivered by the poem, who instead of fully
realizing his virtue, it seems, "moves about like a man
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in a dream".22 The obvious precedents for such
interpretations of The Faerie Queene, although neither of
these critics invokes them, are allegorical dream-visions
such as The Romance of the Rose and Piers Plowman, in
which the character who experiences most of the poem's
action is clearly identified as the dream-persona of the
narrator. The difference, of course, is that, if the
Arthur whom we see acting in The Faerie Queene is a
dream-persona or something similar, then we never catch a
glimpse of Arthur the dreamer, but must construe his
existence as well as his exemplary moral qualities
entirely from the rudimentary commentary which Spenser
attaches to his poem by way of the Letter to Raleigh.
The alternative to conceiving of two distinct
Arthurs, one the exemplary knight who desires glory, the
other the dream-persona whose quest for the Faery Queen
represents that desire, is more difficult to conceive of
clearly; I will venture to explain it by analogy with the
way in which Spenser attributes a figurative meaning to
the action of the second canto of the poem's first book.
The 'argument' to this canto reads as follows:
The guilefull great Enchaunter parts
The Redcrosse Knight from Truth:
Into whose stead faire falshood steps,
And workes him wofull ruth.
This
upon the
argument constitutes an allegorizing commentary
action which it introduces. It seems quite
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clearly to assert that the character Una 'means' truth,
and Duessa falsehood, just as, in the Letter to Raleigh,
the Faery Queen was said to "meane glory". In other
words, the argument does not merely refer to the fact
that Una is "true" (I.iii.2), that is, that she
exemplifies truth; it asserts that she signifies truth
itself. Similarly, within the framework of this
commentary, Duessa does not exemplify but signifies
falsehood. But what are the two imaginary worlds
conjured up by text and commentary respectively?
According to the text, that is, to the body of the second
canto, the Redcross knight is parted from his companion
Una by the wiles of Archimago, and Duessa takes her
place. According to the commentary, the Redcross knight
is parted from truth by the wiles of Archimago, and
falsehood takes its place. What the commentary does not
say is that holiness is parted from truth by hypocrisy.
It does not, in other words, describe a 'psychomachia' of
abstract forces, taking place within the mind of an
unnamed person, but tells us something about the
fictional characters Redcross and Archimago. There are
two ways in which we could make sense of this. The first
would be to suppose that the Redcross knight whom we see
acting in the poem is a dream-persona, or something of
that sort, for the 'real* Redcross knight, who does not
appear except in this brief commentary, and that the
dream-persona's separation from Una signifies the 'real'
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knight's lapse into error. The second is to see the
commentary referring back to the very same imaginary
world as was described by the text, but with a different
significance. In other words, the figurative
significance which is attached to what is said literally
to happen, also literally happens, and in the same
imaginary world: Archimago separates Redcross from Una,
and he separates Redcross from the truth in the sense
that he inculcates in him false beliefs about Una's
character.
Something similar to this second solution could be
proposed as an alternative to the notion that there are
two distinct Arthurs, one who dreams the poem's action,
and the other who participates in the action as his
dream-persona. The text, that is, the poem itself, tells
us that Arthur seeks the Faery Queen; the commentary on
this action in the Letter to Raleigh appears to say that
Arthur seeks glory. What the commentary says, as much as
what the text says, is literally true of the Arthur who
appears in the poem, who has "great desire of glory and
of fame" (II.ix.38). Indeed, Arthur's persistence in
seeking the Faery Queen, marriage to whom would bestow
enormous glory and fame upon him, is the clearest
evidence of this trait in his character, and is cited as
such by Prays-desire {ibid.). The two meanings are
present in the same narrative, but they do not collapse
into one: Arthur seeks the Faery Queen, and he desires
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the glory that winning her would bestow on him. What the
commentary adds to the poem is that the one fact
signifies the other.
This way of applying Spenser's commentary on the
action of the poem to the same imaginary world in which
the action takes place makes The Faerie Queene a symbolic
allegory, that is, an allegory in which text and
commentary coexist in a single imaginary world. But such
symbolic readings of the action are not always
satisfactory, for frequently the commentaries that
critics read back into the action of the poem cannot
really be made to accord with the action as it is
presented by the text. For example, A. C. Hamilton
suggests that when Florimell flees from the Witch's
monster, "The tearing and loss of her 'broken girdle'
(III.viii.2) is the loss of her maidenhead".23 To the
text which says that Florimell loses her girdle, in other
words, Hamilton attaches the commentary, 'Florimell is
raped'. But Florimell is not raped, either at this or at
any other time in the story. Hamilton's commentary is
comprehensible only under the assumption that Florimell
herself somehow takes part in two very different stories:
one, the story told by the poem, in which what she flees
is a monster that intends to eat her, and in which what
she suffers is the loss of a piece of clothing; the
second, the story told by Hamilton, in which what she
flees is someone who intends to rape her, and who
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succeeds in doing so. To keep these two stories separate
we would need to apply to Florimell the same kind of
distinction as that which Fowler makes between the Arthur
who dreams the action of the poem and the "fictive self"
who takes part in the action. But even this explanation
is not remotely satisfactory: for if Florimell's loss of
her girdle in the imaginary world which the poem presents
to us means that, in some other imaginary world,
Florimell is raped, then to what, in this other world,
could Spenser's subsequent description of Florimell as a
"virgin" (111.viii.42) possibly refer?
The problem here, I hasten to add, is not simply with
Hamilton; it is not simply that he, in particular, has a
peculiarly piecemeal and incoherent way of interpreting
the poem as allegory. On the contrary, it would appear
that anyone will inevitably produce reams of comparable
absurdities who follows a general strategy of
interpreting the action of The Faerie Oueene in either of
the ways in which Spenser himself may be construed as
interpreting Arthur's quest for Gloriana and Archimago's
parting of the Redcrosse knight from Una. For example,
to take only the first of almost innumerable instances,
in the poem's opening canto, the Redcrosse knight defeats
a monster called Errour. Following Spenser's example in
the second canto, we could take this to mean that the
knight overcomes error itself. But if this is what the
episode 'means', then how can we make sense of the fact
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that Redcrosse is anything but free from error in his
subsequent actions?24 As with Hamilton's interpretation
of Florimell's loss of her girdle, the question is
equally unanswerable regardless of whether we postulate
two knights, one the dream-persona of the other, or only
one, to whom both text and commentary refer. In fact,
this obvious commentary on the poem's opening episode so
manifestly fails to correspond either to how the knight
fares, or to any commentary which might readily be
attached to how he fares, in subsequent episodes, that
the very failure of correspondence might itself be
thought to be the point: that the ability to defeat
personifications of vice in open battle, like a character
in Prudentius' Psychomachia, is insufficient
qualification for virtue in a world structured by
Spenser's more complex allegory.2®
It appears, then, that none of the ways in which
critics have attempted to make sense of the Letter to
Raleigh as a prescription for reading The Faerie Queene
is fully satisfactory in practice, for every attempt to
find in the Letter a consistent set of rules for reading
the poem is frustrated by specific instances, whether in
the Letter itself or in the body of the poem, where the
proposed rules prove inadequate in accounting for the
allegorical reading which the specific passage demands.26
It may be added that, even where a critic does manage to
write an extended commentary on the poem which is
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self-consistent and in accord with a reasonably sensitive
interpretation of Letter to Raleigh, this commentary is
liable to seem, to many other readers, deeply
unsatisfactory, and not merely in its specific details,
but in its very essence, that is, with respect to the
very notion that any such commentary could be a
satisfactory account of what the episode 'means'. For
example, Hankins offers a reading of the episode in which
Britomart visits the house of Malecasta which is coherent
in itself and in accord with his understanding that the
Letter proposes two separate types of allegory, operating
separately in the poem. According to him, this story is
an example of "internal allegory"; in it, accordingly,
Britomart is to be interpreted not as a person but as a
personification of the chastity which an unspecified
woman is struggling to retain. "When Britomart suddenly
awakes, seizes her sword, and causes a great uproar", he
suggests, "that is probably the moment when the lady
slaps the gentleman's face."27 The objection that many
readers would have to such an interpretation of the story
is not simply that they might prefer to attach a
commentary to the episode which differs somewhat from
Hankins's in its details, but that any such commentary
seems completely to bury the really interesting story,
the story which is actually told by the poem, under
another, less interesting story made up by the
commentator. The more extensively critics append
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commentaries of this sort to the poem, the more certain
it becomes that the poem itself will begin to be seen to
be disappearing beneath the masses of stories which have
been appended to it, provoking a backlash among critics
designed to strip these superfluous accretions away.
Such a reaction, of course, soon faces its own
problems, for as its proponents remove from the poem what
they see as the specious commentaries which have come to
encumber it and to interfere with its appreciation in its
own right, they inevitably find themselves confronted
again with Spenser's indications, especially in the
Letter to Raleigh, that some such systematic commentary
on the poem is called for. Whether it is Edwin Greenlaw
or A. C. Hamilton reacting against the sort of reading
typical of F. M. Padelford and Lilian Winstanley and the
other critics anthologized in the Variorum edition of
Spenser's works, or Jan Karel Kouwenhoven reacting
against the sort of reading common in Hamilton and his
contemporaries, the pattern is the same, of writing
polemic on one hand against the kind of additions to the
poem which they themselves offer on the other.2®
To me, it seems that there is only one way off the
horns of this dilemma, namely to stop trying to find that
ideal commentary for the poem which will render it
coherent without burdening it with the accretions of
stories that Spenser did not tell and ideas that he did
not propound, and to observe instead, as precisely as we
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can, how the poem provokes commentary upon itself, and
how the commentaries which it provokes supervene upon the
poem which provokes them. From this point of view, the
Letter to Raleigh has a place of special importance, not,
as has usually been assumed, because it is a guide,
either good or bad, to what the poem means, or because it
is an authoritative prescription for writing a commentary
on the poem, but simply because it has exerted a more
general influence upon the poem's interpretation than any
other piece of self-commentary which Spenser wrote,
provoking responses to the poem, and methods for
responding to the poem, different from any that would
have been, had the Letter never been written.
We may consider, for example, the history of critical
interpretations of the episode wherein Florimell is
pursued by a succession of male characters, beginning
with "a griesly Foster.../ Breathing out beastly lust her
to defile" (III.i.17), but soon including Prince Arthur,
who "Her selfe pursewd, in hope to win thereby/ Most
goodly meede, the fairest Dame aliue" (III.i.18). There
have been, in general, two very different sorts of
conclusion made with respect to the question whether it
is a virtuous action on Arthur's part thus to "follow
beauties chace" (III.i.19). Now, all critics, so far as
I can see, have agreed that the answer must be 'yes' in
at least in one respect, in that one of Arthur's motives
in joining the pursuit of Florimell is to remove the
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threat posed to her by the "foster" -- as the poem puts
it, "To reskew her from shame, and to reuenge her wrong"
(III.iv.45). But a disagreement springs from the fact
that this is not Arthur's only motive. It is clear from
the beginning that he wishes also to catch Florimell for
his own sake (III.i.18); and when, at a fork in the road,
the foster goes one way and Florimell another, the two
motives are disentangled: it is, thereafter, "That
Ladies loue" which Arthur unambiguously pursues, in hope
"to win so goodly pray" for himself (III.iv.46-7). So
the rescue motive, while commendable, can in effect be
left aside, and the real question concerning the morality
of Arthur's action restated more specifically as follows:
is Arthur's desire for Florimell virtuous?
The traditional answer to this more specific question
is also 'yes'. Arthur's desire for Florimell, it is
argued, is virtuous because it is the Platonic love of
that "true beauty" which "has its source in a beautiful
soul", and which "arouses noble desires in noble minds",
including, of course, Arthur's.29 The corollary to this
traditional conclusion is that Florimell is mistaken to
fear Arthur and to continue fleeing from him: it is only
"because of her fright" that "she is unable to recognize
[his] noble intent".30 This interpretation continues to
receive support from most of the critics who have written
on the episode in recent decades.31 There are, however,
some dissenters, who suggest that Arthur's desire, and
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his continued pursuit of Florimell after "Timias has long
since diverted the forester", demonstrate a lapse from
virtue, not only because the episode shows him unfaithful
in his love for the Faery Queen, but also because his
desire for Florimell itself seems to contain "a trace of
the predatory".32 From this perspective, Florimell's
response to Arthur's pursuit might be thought somewhat
more sound. It seems, then, that some account is needed
of how commentary on this episode can have gone in two
such different directions.
Before attempting to provide such an account,
however, it will be worth noting that a third, or
compromise interpretation is also possible, based upon
the distinction which some critics have made between the
Arthur who contains the poem's action (the 'dreamer') and
the Arthur who participates in it (the 'dream-persona').
With this distinction in place, it can be argued that
while the desire of the dreamer is always exemplary, the
behaviour of the dream-persona, interpreted literally,
may not be.33 But in practice, this 'compromise' is no
more than a variation on the traditional assessment which
makes Arthur an exemplar of virtuous, Platonic love. For
just as in the modern interpretation of dreams the
occasional immorality of the dream-persona is treated
only as a characteristic of the dreaming state and is
neither censured in itself nor attributed literally to
the dreamer, so in the two-tiered approach to the
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character of Arthur the moral failings of the Arthur who
appears in the action are mentioned only in demonstrating
his non-identity with the exemplary knight described by
the Letter to Raleigh, and the real moral assessment of
Arthur, made with respect to the exemplary figure, is
entirely favourable: Arthur's desire, it is asserted, is
not a problematic yearning for Florimell herself, but the
noble yearning "for the heavenly beauty" which Florimell
represents.3 *
There are, then, essentially two different directions
in which commentary on this episode has gone. According
to one, Arthur's pursuit of Florimell either exemplifies,
itself, the action of the noble Platonic lover, or else
represents the desire of such a lover in the manner of a
dream. According to the other, Arthur's pursuit of
Florimell demonstrates his capacity for inconstancy and
for "a trace of the predatory". An examination of the
various commentaries which have taken either of these two
points of view shows that the conclusion reached by a
commentator depends, at bottom, on whether the poem is
interpreted through the filter of the Letter to Raleigh.
The traditional interpretation grows out of the
assumptions that the Letter is authoritative in telling
us that Arthur is a character of exemplary virtue, and
that, consequently, anything which the poem says about
the virtuous in general can safely be taken to apply to
Arthur. Such an approach soon arrives at the conclusion
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that Arthur, pursuing Florimell, exemplifies the "braue
sprite" in whom love "kindles goodly fire", as opposed to
the forester, who exemplifies "the baser wit" whom "It
stirreth vp to sensuall desire" (III.v.l). Nowhere in
the poem, however, does Spenser tell us that Arthur's
pursuit of Florimell exemplifies such virtuous desire.
(His desire for Gloriana is clearly identified with the
virtuous love of the "braue sprite", (III.v.2), but that
is quite another matter). Only if we assume from the
beginning that everything which Arthur does either is
virtuous in itself or represents something virtuous does
such a distinction clearly present itself between the
respective meanings of Arthur's and the forester's
involvement in "beauties chace". A contrary perspective
which, in spite of the Letter's claims, does not assume
a priori that all of Arthur's actions must be entirely
virtuous, soon finds evidence in the poem which suggests
that he is less than morally exemplary in desiring and
pursuing Florimell. The pursuit begins with the strong
implication that Arthur and Guyon, pursuing Florimell "in
hope to win thereby/ ...the fairest Dame aliue", share a
common goal with the "griesly Foster", from whom they
mean, certainly, "To reskew her", but of whom, at the
same time, they are "Full of great enuie and fell
gealosy" (111 .i.17-8). Lest this implication be lost on
us, the narrator returns our attention straight away to
Britomart, "whose constant mind/ Would not so lightly
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follow beauties chace" (III.i.19), seeming to imply,
thereby, the inconstancy of the knights who have behaved
otherwise. By comparison with Britomart, the exemplar of
chaste love, Arthur looks like less than the 'perfect'
knight which the Letter to Raleigh promises, at least in
respect of this one virtue.3S
A proponent of the traditional point of view on this
episode might argue that a reading of the poem which
finds Arthur in any respect blameworthy ignores the
prescriptions for interpreting the poem laid down by the
Letter to Raleigh. A comparable objection could be made,
however, with respect to the traditional reading itself,
namely that there are significant aspects of what Spenser
wrote which the traditionalists, in turn, must ignore, in
order to establish the coherency of their reading of the
poem. One of these I have already mentioned: the
traditional reader must overlook the criticism of Arthur
and Guyon implicit in the narrator's praise of Britomart
for abstaining from the chase. But the matter does not
end here; the interpretation of Arthur's pursuit of
Florimell as a virtuous expression of virtuous love has
ramifications which spread like ripples through the more
general interpretation of the poem. As I noted earlier,
the corollary to the virtuousness of Arthur's chase is
that Florimell is mistaken to fear him and to continue
fleeing from him. Accordingly, the apparent fact that
"all she does is to experience terror" is to be
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attributed not to the character of the world she
encounters -- for even if in some instances her terror is
"well-grounded", at other times it is "groundless" -- but
rather to her own propensity for reacting to every
situation in the same way: "always terror, always gallop
gallop gallop away".36 Her defining characteristic, one
might actually conclude, is her "being unable to
interpret the world", her being "(as we say) 'all at
sea'."3"7 But surely this is far too slight an assessment
of the character who quite rightly judges, while the
reader still has no reason to suspect that Proteus
represents anything but heaven-sent "succour... to her
distressed cace" (111.viii.29), that she is "not saued
yet from daunger dred/ ...but chaung'd from one to other
feare" (111.viii.33). And if, in this case, Florimell
turns out to be a better judge than the first-time reader
in perceiving that the figure whom the narrator has
introduced as her rescuer will turn out to be no more
than another would-be predator upon her chastity, can we
really, with perfect confidence in our judgement, refer
to Arthur, whom she likewise fears, as "a knight, who (as
we know) meant her nothing but good -- who was, in fact,
the Rescuer par excellence"?3B On the contrary, it seems
that she flees from him not because she confuses him with
the forester (III.iv.50), and not because she mistakes
his intentions, but precisely because "he her followd
still with courage keene" (III.iv.51) -- "courage" being
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used here quite unambiguously in a libidinous sense, as
with the "courage" of the old fisherman who later tries
to rape her (111.viii.23). If "fast she from him fled,
no lesse affrayd,/ Then of wilde beastes if she had
chased beene" (III.iv.51), then what is this but the
appropriate response to a pursuer who aims "to win" her
as his "goodly pray" (III.iv.46)? There is, indeed, "a
trace of the predatory" about Arthur, and Florimell's
fear of him seems to be, not "groundless", not evidence
of an inability to interpret the world, but rather of a
sensitivity to this aspect of his character. And even
if, in spite of this trait, Arthur is in all other
respects "the Rescuer par excellence", what of this? If
every would-be rescuer is intent on claiming the one he
rescues as the reward for his pains -- and we are told
clearly enough that Arthur is to be included, along with
Proteus, in this category -- then the very idea of the
rescuer is suspect in an erotic context. In this
respect, I would dare to go farther even than those
critics who have previously found Arthur's desire for
Florimell less than virtuous: where they have allowed
that Arthur remains virtuous at least in respect of his
more noble intention to rescue her from the forester, I
ask whether it is not precisely the motive of the
rescuer, as rescuer, which comes increasingly under
suspicion in the course of Book Three and "beauties
chace". If so, it is from Florimell's perspective on the
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world that this important issue is raised. Far from
"being unable to interpret the world", she is an
important observer of it. It is true, perhaps, that she
sees every pursuer in essentially the same terms, and
that accordingly, "all she does is to experience terror";
but if, for a moment, we take her point of view
seriously, we begin to see the world in which she lives
in a compelling new way:
When Florimell flees one ravisher only to be
nearly caught by another, or when successive
lustful monsters behave with nightmarish
similarity, we dimly sense some terrible elemental
agent capable of infinite metamorphosis and more
real than the overtly discrete episodes. The
possibility of a comprehensive diabolical referent
haunts the text.39
Comprehensive enough, I would argue, to implicate even
the knight of magnificence. But such an interpretation
of the poem cannot fully emerge so long as the assumption
prevails that the Letter to Raleigh is essentially
authoritative in declaring Arthur to be a character of
exemplary virtue.
In saying that, if the Letter to Raleigh had not come
down to us along with The Faerie Queene. our
interpretation of the poem would have been quite
different, I am not arguing that we should turn our backs
entirely on the Letter to Raleigh, as if it were nothing
but an interference in the proper work of understanding
the poem. On the contrary, the Letter is as much a part
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of the Spenserian allegory which we are exploring as is
the poem itself. What is more, a move to reject the
Letter because what it tells us about the poem jars in
many significant ways with what the poem tells us about
itself would be self-defeating, because, as we shall see,
the problematic relationship between the Letter to
Raleigh and The Faerie Queene is no more than an
intimation of the problematic relationship that The
Faerie Queene has with itself. A policy of rejecting any
commentary which clashes with the text upon which it
comments would swiftly destroy the very fabric of the
poem.40 But while we should not reject the Letter.
neither should we privilege it unduly, simply because of
its general scope and its claim to reveal the poet's
method. We need to see the Letter as just one layer
within the complex of texts and commentaries which
generate the Spenserian allegory, and to observe not only
its influence upon the poem's interpretation, but also
what the poem would have been apart from this influence.
In this spirit, there is another aspect of what the
Letter to Raleigh says about the poem whose influence on
criticism we need to understand.
(2.2) Spenser's "Particular Purposes"
By comparison with the Letter to Raleigh's account of
Spenser's "general intention" in The Faerie Queene. the
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treatment there of his "particular purposes" is somewhat
cursory:
In that Faery Queene I meane glory in my
generall intention, but in my particular I conceiue
the most excellent and glorious person of our
soueraine the Queene, and her kingdome in Faery
land. And yet in some places els, I doe otherwise
shadow her. For considering she beareth two
persons, the one of a most royall Queene or
Empresse, the other of a most vertuous and
beautifull Lady, this latter part in some places I
doe expresse in Belphoebe...
But this latter account, however brief and parenthetical,
has been no less influential as a prescription for
interpreting the poem than the former, in large part
because it has seemed to be closely related to certain
other apparently authorial instructions for understanding
the poem, which appear in some of Spenser's dedicatory
sonnets as well as within the poem itself, principally in
the proems to the various books.
Several of the dedicatory sonnets flatter their
addressees that they may find themselves represented in
the poem -- though perhaps only, as the Earl of Oxford is
told, "Vnder a shady vele".41 Such indications, if taken
seriously, can be seen as developing the Letter to
Raleiah's apparent indication that the 'shadowing' of
Elizabeth in the characters Gloriana and Belphoebe is
just one of Spenser's various "particular purposes" in
the poem, in which case the figurative use of Gloriana
and Belphoebe to refer to Elizabeth takes on the
96
appearance of an exemplary instance of a kind of topical
allegory. Over the centuries, there has been no lack of
commentators who have understood themselves to have been
invited, on this basis, to interpret various other
characters in the poem as likenesses of major personages
in Elizabethan politics, although, of course, debate has
accompanied the project as to which character represents
whom, and for how many of the poem's characters such
topical analogues may be found; however, criticism of
this sort of procedure by Edwin Greenlaw and, more
recently, by A. C. Hamilton and others, has made apparent
to most contemporary Spenserians the extent to which
detailed readings of the poem as topical allegory must
always be arbitrary constructions based on the
ingeniousness of commentators rather than on meaning
objectively present in the text, and, moreover, the
extent to which, at their worst, such readings tend to
attribute to Spenser a more detailed knowledge of
Elizabethan politicking than he is likely to have had.43
A more persistent influence on The Faerie Oueene's
commentators has been the account, in the Letter to
Raleigh and in the proems to the various books, of how
the poem functions as an allegory, as opposed to the
question of what specific figurative meanings it bears.
Before we examine this influence, however, it will be
necessary to say something about the relationship between
the "I" who speaks in the Letter to Raleigh and the "I"
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who speaks in the proems. Now, clearly enough, both of
these voices are ostensibly the poet's own, and both
claim an authoritative knowledge of the poem's workings.
What is more, the impression that they are, in some
sense, two expressions of the 'same' voice, is bolstered
by the extent to which (as we shall see) they agree in
their description of how the poem works as an allegory.
Finally, it is clear, I think, that the voice of the
proems and the voice of the Letter to Raleigh are
produced by Spenser under similar pressures: for the
prominence, within the work, of both the proems and the
Letter is such that they, more than most other parts of
the 1590 edition of The Faerie Queene. must have been
expected to assume the burden of the task of claiming
favourable attention from those who might reward the poet
for his efforts, as well as the burden of the task of
deflecting potentially hostile responses.43 These
similar pressures under which Spenser produces the voices
that speak in these different places suggests that we
should look for a similar distinction in each instance
between the ostensible author who appears in the text and
the real author who tactfully constructs these personae
for himself. But in order to do this, we shall need to
bring into alignment two different sets of critical
vocabulary: for while various critics have questioned
the reliability of the Letter to Raleigh on one hand and
of the "I" within the poem on the other, the former
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problem has been treated largely as a question of
accuracy (that is, the accuracy of one text in describing
another), while the latter has been treated largely as a
question of irony (that is, irony in, or at the expense
of, a narratorial voice).44 But in fact, the problem of
the accuracy of the Letter to Raleigh and the problem of
the reliability of The Faerie Queene's narrator are
analogous if not ultimately identical; for in each case
the important issues are, first, the extent to which an
ostensibly authorial voice is correct in its ostensibly
authoritative description of the workings of the poem,
and second, the extent to which the ostensible authority
of this voice has functioned prescriptively in shaping
interpretations of the poem.
The 'author' of the Letter to Raleigh and the
'author' of the proems are essentially at one in their
descriptions of the poem's relation to Queen Elizabeth.
Just as the former asserts that Elizabeth is represented
in the character Gloriana, "and her kingdom in Faery
land", so the latter tells Elizabeth that
...thou, 0 fairest Princesse vnder sky,
In this faire mirrhour maist behold thy face,
And thine owne realmes in lond of Faery...
(II .Pr.4 ) .
And just as the Letter to Raleigh claims that Elizabeth
is in some places 'shadowed' in the character of Gloriana
and in other places in the character of Belphoebe, so one
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of the proems humbly requests of the queen that she not
...refuse,
In mirrours more then one her selfe to see,
But either Gloriana let her chuse,
Or in Belphoebe fashioned to bee...
(Ill.Pr.5).
A comparison of the Letter to Raleigh with the proems
gives the impression of a single author expressing the
same ideas with different degrees of deference to readers
of different ranks. Because the ideas themselves are
effectively the same in both cases, it would be easy to
suppose that they can be extracted from the different
attitudes of subservience which are required for
presenting them to different audiences, and attributed
straightforwardly to the poet himself who lurks behind
his various humble personae. But in fact, as I hope to
show, these ideas themselves form part of an elaborate
compliment which the poem pays to the queen, and not only
they but the authorial persona who espouses them are
shaped entirely by this purpose; and while it is
essential for the purposes of this compliment that they
be taken as describing accurately the poem's workings as
an allegory, they nevertheless, considered in themselves,
have no descriptive power whatever as an account of how,
in general, the allegory of the poem works (although, as
we shall see, they can have a significant prescriptive
power over the allegorical interpretation of the poem, if
they are treated as authoritative guides to its meaning.)
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Like the Letter to Raleigh's account of the "general
intention and meaning" of the poem, these indications of
the author's "particular purposes" should not be omitted
entirely from a description of the poem's workings as an
allegory, because they themselves, as internal
commentaries on the imagery of the poem, form part of the
allegory that they claim to describe; but neither should
they be accorded a special authority over other instances
of the poem's self-commentary, simply because of their
claim -- which is ultimately a false one -- to reveal the
basic structure of the poem.
The elaborate compliment to the queen to which I have
referred is alluded to by C. S. Lewis, when he writes
that "We should not say 'To appreciate Belphoebe we must
think about Elizabeth I'; but rather 'To understand the
ritual compliment Spenser is paying Elizabeth, we must
study Belphoebe.'"4= This, I take it, is as much as to
say that Belphoebe and Gloriana are not really copies of
Elizabeth, but are rather assemblages of conventional
qualities of virtue and beauty which are then attributed
to Elizabeth -- and in an even more exalted degree --
regardless of the extent to which she might genuinely
have possessed these qualities herself. Building on
Lewis's observation, we might argue that the very
description of these characters as portraits or shadows
or mirror images of the queen, in the Letter to Raleigh
and the proems to the various books, is a part of this
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"ritual compliment", which consists not only in asserting
that the resplendent characters Belphoebe and Gloriana
signify Queen Elizabeth (an assertion which, in itself,
would be unproblematic with respect to the present
discussion, in that it says nothing about how the
allegory works), but in describing these fictional
characters specifically as copies (or what Plato, and the
Platonic tradition generally, would call 'eikones* ) of
the queen whom they signify, and then in invoking various
commonplaces of Platonic philosophy to establish the
superiority of Elizabeth to these copies (II.Pr.5), and
indeed, to all possible fictional representations
(III .Pr.1-3).
Another, perhaps more precise way of putting the
point that Belphoebe and Gloriana are not really copies
of Elizabeth would be to say that these characters are
not copies of the real Elizabeth, but rather of a
fictional "Goddesse heauenly bright" (I.Pr.4) who does
actually possess their exemplary qualities in an even
higher degree than themselves, and who is then
flatteringly supposed to be Elizabeth. Now, it is has
been justly observed, by Louis Adrian Montrose and by
David Lee Miller, that such an imaginary, semi-divine
Elizabeth is not Spenser's personal invention, but is
rather a fiction collectively created and (at least
officially) collectively believed in by loyal
Elizabethans.46 On this basis -- that "Elizabeth...
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herself was already, as monarch, a kind of historical
fiction" -- Miller apparently would have us again take
seriously the notion, purveyed by the proems and the
Letter to Raleigh, that the characters Gloriana and
Belphoebe who appear within the poem are copies of the
'real' Queen Elizabeth: that is, of the figure who,
although she is "a kind of... fiction", is nevertheless
effectively outside the poem, in the collective imaginary
space of ideology.47 But, I think, such an analysis of
the poem's relation to the public myth of Elizabeth
misses something important, namely that even if the
"Goddesse heauenly bright" of the proems and the Letter
to Raleigh is merely a version of a collectively
maintained fiction, Spenser's version of the fiction is a
part of the imaginary world presented by the 1590 edition
of The Faerie Queene, and to this extent is unavoidably
'inside' the poem.40 In particular, the relationships
that Spenser's imaginary Queen Elizabeth has with other
things in the imaginary world presented by The Faerie
Queene distinguish his version of that fiction from any
other rendering of the myth to which, as a "ritual
compliment", it dutifully contributes. Principal among
these imaginary relationships are the channels of
inspiration and imitation which link the "Goddesse
heauenly bright" on one hand to the imaginary "I" of the
proems who is the ostensible author of The Faerie Queener
and on the other hand to the imaginary poem which she
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inspires this imaginary poet to write.49
I repeat: the imaginary poem which she inspires this
imaginary poet to write. Although, as critics, we now
habitually distinguish between the "I" or 'narrator' who
is presented as the author of The Faerie Queene and the
real author who "may be separated from" this persona "by
large ironies"00, and although we may similarly
distinguish between the fictional "Goddesse" Elizabeth
who appears in the proems and the entirely human
Elizabeth to whom this and many other, similar fictions
were ritually addressed, in general we have not yet
similarly distinguished between 'the poem' as fictionally
represented in the poem, and the poem in which it is
represented -- even though this distinction is just as
real and just as significant as those others.
To help us understand the practical significance of
this distinction, let us consider another, similar
compliment to Elizabeth which appears elsewhere in The
Faerie Queene. In the main narrative portion of Book II,
Arthur, having rescued Guyon from Pyrochles and Cymochles
and returned to him his shield, asks his new companion
"why on your shield so goodly scored/ Beare ye the
picture of that Ladies head?" -- observing, as he does
so, that "Full liuely is the semblaunt, though the
substance dead" (II.ix.2). Guyon replies:
Faire Sir... if in that picture dead
Such life ye read, and vertue in vaine shew,
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What mote ye weene, if the trew liuely-head
Of that most glorious visage ye did vew?
(II.ix.3).
The "picture", of course, is of "the mighty Queene of
Faerie" (II.ix.4) whom Arthur is seeking, and as an eikon
of the Faery Queen, can be used by him in the way that
the Socrates of the Reoublic advised his interlocutors to
use the sun, namely, as a means toward apprehending the
nature of the original whose likeness it bears. But just
as, in some respects, the sun and the visible things in
general were, for Socrates, potentially deceptive and
even "ludicrous" representatives of their originals,
because the qualities of the visible world which were to
be likened to the qualities of the intelligible order --
visibility, directionality, and so on -- were the very
opposites of the qualities which actually belonged to the
invisible and non-spatial intelligible order (see
Introduction (1): pp. 32-4), so, Guyon warns Arthur, the
likeness of the picture which he bears on his shield to
its original has to be understood as no better than the
likeness that the dead can bear to the living. Indeed,
the Platonism of the passage extends somewhat further,
for just as the picture on Guyon's shield can be used by
Arthur as a symbol to call to mind its original, so the
bodily beauty which the picture represents can be used in
turn as a symbol of its own original, the beauty of her
soul, "Thousand times fairer then her mortall hew"
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(II.ix.3).51 Potentially, the chain of symbolism passes
upward still further, beyond Gloriana to the God who made
her, as Guyon explains to Medina:
In her the richesse of all heauenly grace
In chiefe degree are heaped vp on hye...
That men beholding so great excellence,
And rare perfection in mortalitie,
Do her adore with sacred reuerence,
As th'Idole of her makers great magnificence.
(Il.ii.41).
Indeed, not only is Gloriana described, like Plato's sun,
as an eikon of the very Creator, but in being depicted as
such she comes to resemble the sun itself, so that "As
morning Sunne her beames dispredden cleare" (II.ii.40) and
thereby "her light the earth enlumines cleare" (II.ix.4).
Generously sending forth her pictures and "her prayses"
(II.ix.4) throughout the world in such a way as to draw
the virtuous into the chain of symbols that leads upward
through her to God, Gloriana is like one of those members
of the Pseudo-Dionysian hierarchy who, having themselves
"received... [the] divine splendour... then pass on the
light... to beings further down the scale" (Celestial
Hierarchv III.2 -- see Introduction (1): p. 53).
We will have no difficulty in identifying the context
in which Arthur attempts to gain an appreciation of the
Faery Queen through her picture on a shield as an
imaginary world, or in distinguishing the imaginary
author, within this world, of the picture on the shield
(it was painted by an artist who saw Gloriana directly)
106
from its actual author insofar as it is a literary image
(namely Spenser). Within the imaginary world presented
by the poem, the picture on Guyon's shield is created as
an eikon of Gloriana, and so can be used by Arthur, who
inhabits this world, as a symbol for her: the former
process makes possible the latter. But from our point of
view outside the imaginary world presented by the
narrative, the process is in a certain sense reversed:
for us, the exchange in which Arthur praises the picture
on Guyon's shield and Guyon dispraises the picture in
relation to the original is a part of what creates the
character of the Faery Queen in the first place. In
other words, we do not suppose that, somewhere 'behind'
the narrative 'surface' of the poem, there must first be
a Faery Queen in order to make possible the painting on
Guyon's shield and his various verbal descriptions which
portray her in her absence; rather, any such character
whose existence we infer and whose qualities we gather in
spite of her not appearing personally in the narrative
exists only insofar as the narrative constructs her as
absent.
So constituted, the character of Gloriana herself is
used in constructing Spenser's version of the imaginary
character of Queen Elizabeth. As we have seen, Gloriana
is described in the proems to Books Two and Three as a
mirror image of Elizabeth, and in the Letter to Raleigh
as her "shadow". In another passage from the proem to
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the third book, the Faery Queen is described as yet
another kind of eikon, a painted portrait:
...0 dred Soueraine
Thus farre forth pardon, sith that choicest wit
Cannot your glorious pourtraict figure plaine
That I in colourd showes may shadow it...
(III.Pr.3) .
These various images -- reflection, shadow, portrait --
are effectively interchangeable, as is shown by the way
in which they are used in close proximity to one another.
(For example, in the proem to Book III, we are offered
painted images in the third stanza and mirror images in
the fifth.) What remains constant throughout these
various accounts is that in each case Gloriana is
described as the derivative image or eikon of Elizabeth.
Furthermore, it is asserted that this eikon can be used
in precisely the way that Arthur uses the eikon of
Gloriana on Guyon's shield, namely, as a means toward
apprehending the nature of the original whose likeness it
bears. Just as, in some respects, the picture on Guyon's
shield inevitably falls short of the object which it is
intended to represent, even by so much as the "dead" fall
short of "life" (II.ix.3), so Gloriana is described as
inevitably falling short of her original, whose true
character not even the greatest artists in history could
have captured fully in an artistic representation
(III.Pr.2-3). But while this shortfall is presented
apologetically to Queen Elizabeth herself, it is also
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presented as having its benefits for more humble readers;
for thanks to that shortfall,
...feeble eyes your glory may behold,
Which else could not endure those beames bright,
But would be dazled with exceeding light.
(II.Pr.5) .
In other words, just as, for Arthur, the portrait of
Gloriana on Guyon's shield is useful in spite of its
shortcomings because it allows him a partial apprehension
of what he otherwise would not see at all, so for those
with more "feeble eyes" than Elizabeth herself, the
queen's poetic eikones are indirect means of looking upon
what they could never look upon directly.
This description of the relation between Gloriana and
Elizabeth is at least as indebted to the broad Platonic
tradition of Spenser's time as is the similar description
of the relation between Gloriana and her portrait on
Guyon's shield.52 For example, the treatment of eikones
as useful in respect of their very inadequacy (in that
their shortcomings make them suitable to the perceptive
powers of lower orders) is a commonplace of the Platonic
tradition: it is, for instance, an important feature of
Pseudo-Dionysius' system (see Introduction (1): p. 51);
and indeed, the idea is very nearly spelled out by Plato
himself, for in the Reoublic. the very reflected images
which at one point are said to fall short of capturing
the full reality of what they reflect (596d8-e4)
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elsewhere are useful in providing a partial knowledge of
their originals for those whose eyes are not yet strong
enough to look upon the originals directly (516a5-8).
For Plato, such mediated knowledge by means of eikones is
exemplified by the allegorical method through which
Socrates acquaints his interlocutors with the Form of the
Good (see Introduction (1): pp. 34, 49); likewise in The
Faerie Queene. it is the figures allegorically associated
with the queen who are described as her eikones and
presented as means by which her subjects may gain a
partial appreciation of her "glory".
Of course, it is not literally true that the sight of
Queen Elizabeth was too glorious for ordinary eyes to
bear. The complimentary fiction which we are discussing
appeals to Platonism not only in setting Elizabeth above
her depictions in art, but also in setting her above the
ordinary power of the senses to perceive. It creates a
fictional figure less akin to the real queen than to the
sun which, in Plato's allegory of the cave, the released
prisoners cannot look upon directly. Another passage
which attributes this sunlike quality to the fictional
Elizabeth is found in the proem to Book One, where the
'author' petitions her as follows:
...0 Goddesse heauenly bright,
Mirrour of grace and Maiestie diuine,
Great Lady of the greatest Isle, whose light
Like Phoebus lampe throughout the world doth shine,
Shed thy faire beames into my feeble eyne...
(I .Pr . 4 ) .
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Indeed, as not only sunlike herself, but also a "Mirrour"
of a yet higher "Maiestie", Elizabeth is portrayed like
one of those members of the divinely sanctioned hierarchy
whom Pseudo-Dionysius described as "clear and spotless
mirrors reflecting the glow of... God himself", who once
they have "received this... divine splendour... then pass
on this light... to beings further down the scale" of
being (Celestial Hierarchy III.2 -- see Introduction (1):
p. 53). In the queen's case, the "beings further down
the scale" include the 'author' of the proems and his
projected readers, other subjects of this sunlike queen.
This description will be reiterated in the 1596 edition
of The Faerie Queene. where, in the proem to the sixth
book, she will again be described as "a mirrour sheene",
reflecting "brightnesse" into "The eyes of all" her
subordinates (VI.Pr.6).
Let us now directly compare the presentation of
Elizabeth as the sunlike original of Gloriana to the
presentation of Gloriana as the sunlike original of her
portrait on Guyon's shield. It was clear enough, in our
earlier case, that the entire situation and all the
people and objects that played significant roles in it
-- Arthur, Guyon, Gloriana, and the shield -- were parts
of the imaginary world presented by The Faerie Queene,
and that, therefore, imagining how such a shield came
into existence within this world (for example, supposing
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that Gloriana gave a sitting so that an artist could
paint it) was entirely different from describing its
origin as a poetic image (that is, through the language
of Spenser's poem). But in this second case, the
distinction between the imaginary process of authorship
within the imaginary world, and the real process which
creates that imaginary world, is more difficult to make.
For the imaginary people and objects which correspond, in
this case, to Arthur, Guyon, Gloriana, and the shield --
namely 'the reader', 'the author', 'Queen Elizabeth', and
•the poem' -- masquerade under precisely the names of
those people and objects outside the poem's imaginary
world who are involved in the real process through which
the imaginary world is created, and in the case of 'the
poem', under the name of the very linguistic device which
presents that imaginary world -- the very thing, that is,
whose 'inside' is the imaginary world in question, and
whose 'outside' is the world of extra-textual reality.
To maintain clearly, in our thought, the distinction
between (on one hand) the imaginary relations among
'reader', 'author', 'queen', and 'poem', and (on the
other hand) the real relations among the reader, author,
queen, and poem, can be difficult, to say the least; but
it is also, I have found, ultimately rewarding for the
purposes of appreciating how the real poem actually
works. To show what I mean by this, I offer two
observations:
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First -- no one, I think, would ever have supposed,
solely because Arthur's ability to use the picture on
Guyon's shield as a symbol of Gloriana depends on that
picture being, in the first place, a kind of quasi-
Platonic eikon of the Faery Queen, that the whole
allegorical functioning of The Faerie Queene must depend
on the allegory's existing in the context of something
like the Platonic metaphysics; for Arthur's use of this
shield as a symbol of its original is just one among
practically innumerable examples of figurative use of
imagery within the poem, and by no means typical of them
all. But although, in the final analysis, the imaginary
use of Gloriana by those readers with "feeble eyes" as a
symbolic means of apprehending a "Goddesse heauenly
bright" whose sight they otherwise "could not endure" is
similarly no more than one of the multitude of figurative
uses of imagery by characters within the poem, it is far
more difficult to set aside the notion that this
quasi-Platonic use of an eikon must have something to
tell us about how the allegory of The Faerie Queene
functions in general', for in this latter case, it is an
imaginary version of the allegorical poem itself, rather
than merely an imaginary shield, which is described as a
link in a Neoplatonic chain of iconic symbols, and it is
an imaginary version of the poem's reader, rather than an
imaginary prince, who is supposed to be able to enter
this upward-leading chain of eikones by reading that
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object figuratively.
Second -- within the imaginary world presented by the
poem, Gloriana and Belphoebe are created as eikones of
Elizabeth, and so can be used by the reader who inhabits
this world as symbols for her: the former process makes
possible the latter. From our point of view outside the
imaginary world presented by the narrative, however, the
process is in a certain sense reversed. For us, it is
the imaginary author's (and other characters') on one
hand praising Gloriana and Belphoebe in their own right,
and on the other hand dispraising them insofar as they
are mere poetic representations of something imagined as
being outside the poem, which in large part creates the
imaginary character of Queen Elizabeth, and her imaginary
extra-poetic location, in the first place. We do not
need to suppose that the quasi-Platonic metaphysics
according to which Gloriana and Belphoebe are eikones of
Elizabeth must in some sense pre-exist and make possible
the figurative use of Gloriana and Belphoebe as symbols
of Elizabeth; on the contrary, the Platonic character of
the imaginary world in which these relations exist takes
shape only through the presence of these figurative
relations which are specified as symbolic and iconic.
These two points -- first, that 'the poem' which is
described as a link in a chain of Neoplatonic eikones is
just one among the multitude of imaginary objects
presented by The Faerie Queene. not The Faerie Queene
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itself; and second, that it is specific figurative
relations within the imaginary world presented by The
Faerie Queene which account for the Platonic structure of
this world, rather than, conversely, the Platonic
structure of this world which makes possible the presence
of figurative relations in it -- are of particularly
great importance for current criticism of The Faerie
Queene, because the venerable tradition which justifies
reading poems allegorically on the basis of assigning
poetry a place in a universe of eikones (see Introduction
(1): pp. 47ff), and upon which Spenser draws in
describing his poem as allegorical insofar as it is a
bearer of eikones, has enjoyed a certain revival in
popularity in recent decades, particularly among Spenser
critics. Thus, for example, Thomas Roche writes that
"Allegorical reading (or more simply allegory) is a form
of literary criticism with a metaphysical basis", a basis
which he proceeds to explain with reference to
Pseudo-Dionysius and to the Renaissance Neoplatonist Pico
della Mirandola.53 In a similar vein, Isabel MacCaffrey
writes that all allegory assumes "an 'objectively' valid
relationship between material and transcendent being".54
More recently, David Lee Miller, citing MacCaffrey's
precedent, argues that to understand the allegorical
workings of The Faerie Queene. we must "assume that the
poem, the world in the poem, and the world that the poem
is in share a common ontology that is itself
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allegorical", and goes on to describe these workings in
terms that Proclus might have used of the Homeric epics
or Pseudo-Dionysius of the Bible: "Ultimately perhaps all
the words and things in the poem are synecdochic traces
[read, 'eikones'] of the wholeness they signify."=B
Now, none of these critics (I think) would mean, by
the claim that allegory presupposes something like a
Neoplatonic metaphysics, that in order for there to be
such a thing as allegory, the likes of Pseudo-Dionysius
or Pico della Mirandola must actually have been
approximately right in their descriptions of the
extra-literary universe; certainly Miller, for one,
explicitly conceives of the Neoplatonic ontology as an
imaginary construction56, and MacCaffrey, too, finds it
necessary to use inverted commas in referring to such an
ontology as "'objectively' valid". What these critics
want to use as the basis for allegory's existence, then,
is not the world's actually being constructed as the
Neoplatonists describe it, but rather only its being
imagined to be so. Now, this can be meant in one of
two ways: either every allegorical work necessarily
presents such a world to the reader's imagination before
it can assign figurative meanings to its imagery; or else
we, as readers, must bring to every allegory the
imaginative assumption that such a Neoplatonic world
exists in order to be able to read the poem's imagery
figuratively.
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I shall deal first with the latter alternative, since
it is, in a sense, the grosser error. For to claim that
interpreting the imagery of a poem figuratively depends
on a metaphysical framework of interpretation which is
brought to the poem by the reader rather than on
something intrinsically present in the text is to lose
sight of the characteristics of a specific work which
make it allegorical. Thus Roche, for example, in
explaining the nature of the allegorical meanings which
he attributes to The Faerie Oueene by reference to
Harington's metaphysical justification for attaching
allegorical readings to Ariosto's Orlando Furioso.
overlooks the fact that what he is citing is a
justification for commentating allegorically upon a poem
which was not itself written as an allegory.57 Such an
explanation, which does not reveal what makes a work
like The Faerie Oueene an allegory in a way that the
Orlando Furioso is not, is no explanation at all: it is
merely a reinvoking of the old Proclean justification for
building around a text a tradition of allegorical
commentary, regardless of whether the text itself either
calls for such commentary or offers any commentary upon
itself (see Introduction (1): pp. 48-50). Thus, although
Roche maintains that some works (such as The Faerie
Oueene) are allegories, and that others are not, his
account of allegory leads logically to the conclusion
that the kinds of commentary which he prescribes for
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allegories could be made, with equal legitimacy, on any
work whatever, as is perhaps most evident in his
conclusion that any commentary on The Faerie Queene may
legitimately be described as "an allegorical meaning" of
the poem, so long as its "structural patterns" can be
made to "coincide" with "the structural patterns of the
narrative".58 This is not a prescription for reading
Spenser's allegory; it is a prescription for making an
allegorical Spenser tradition.
The revival of this essentially Neoplatonic
understanding of allegory is to be attributed in large
part, I think, to Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism,
which reintroduced many of its essential elements into
critical thought. Frye made the connection between the
modern activity of writing critical commentary on
literature and the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance
activity of writing allegorical commentary on poetry and
scripture, pointing out that, in fact, "all commentary"
as modern critics understand it "is allegorical
interpretation".In doing so, he made possible a
direct comparison between the modern problem of the
apparently illimitable amount of meaning which
commentators of various critical schools can 'find' in a
literary text such as Hamlet. and the medieval and
Renaissance problem of the apparently illimitable number
of allegorical meanings that can be attributed to
passages in Scripture and poetry.60 His solution, too,
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was essentially medieval: as both Augustine and
Pseudo-Dionysius had done (each in a different way), he
argued that commentary is limited, in general, not by the
explicit content of each particular text, but by a total
structure of meaning to which all texts refer.61 He
differed from the medieval and Renaissance inheritors of
Augustinian and Dionysian thought principally in his
disconnecting from any claims about the structure of the
extra-literary universe the total structure of literary
significance whose existence he postulated.62 In other
respects, his conception of an ideal order governed by a
transcendental Logos looks conspicuously like the
Christianized Neoplatonic metaphysics with reference to
which medieval and Renaissance commentators (including
Harington) claimed legitimacy for the figurative meanings
which they attributed freely to Scripture and poetry.63
A critic like Roche proposes, as a basis for reading
The Faerie Queene. something very like what Frye suggests
as a basis for critical commentary in general: the
revival of an essentially Neoplatonic idealism, without a
corresponding commitment to Neoplatonism as a description
of the extra-literary universe. Such a model of allegory
may have a certain inherent appeal for the Spenser critic
because, as we have seen, it is in accord with the
fictional description that Spenser offers of his own
allegory, in the proems to the various books of The
Faerie Queene. In fact, it seems entirely possible that
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the harmony between the model of allegory presented by
Spenser in the proems to the various books of The Faerie
Queene and the model articulated in Northrop Frye's
Anatomy of Criticism arises not merely from their common
ancestry in Christian transformations of Neoplatonic
theory: for Frye himself acknowledges the growth of the
Anatomy of Criticism out of his work specifically on The
Faerie Queene.64 But even if Frye's approach to critical
commentary has successfully established, between
disparate periods, a connection which makes it possible
for a modern critic like Roche to take seriously the
methodology of a Renaissance allegorical commentator
like Harington, it remains the case that Frye's account
of allegorical commentary in general should never have
been taken as a sufficient model for reading a poem like
The Faerie Queene: as Frye himself makes clear, such a
work, which "'is' an allegory" even before the
commentators have made their additions to it, complicates
the usual allegorical relation between text and critical
commentary by becoming involved, itself, in the process
whereby the critic creates an allegorical commentary upon
it.ss In missing this point, Roche goes seriously
astray; for even if Frye's hypothesis concerning an ideal
order of literary meaning were granted, what Roche
proposes as a model specifically for reading allegories
would in fact be insufficient for the purpose precisely
insofar as the works with which he is concerned are
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actually allegorical.
The remaining alternative for critics who wish to see
allegory as having a basis in an imaginary Neoplatonic
metaphysics, namely that every allegorical work
necessarily presents such a world to the reader's
imagination before it can assign figurative meanings to
its imagery, we have already considered to some extent,
with reference specifically to the allegory of The Faerie
Queene. As we have seen, The Faerie Queene does present
an imaginary world whose structure owes a great deal to
the Platonic metaphysical tradition; and from a point of
view within this imaginary world, it is true that it is
in virtue of this metaphysical structure that certain
objects -- for example, Guyon's shield -- bear iconic
images which can be used allegorically as symbols of
their metaphysical originals. It is even true that the
poem itself is imagined as one of the objects within this
world which bears iconic images that may be used
symbolically on this basis. But it is also true that,
from our point of view outside this imaginary world, the
process is effectively reversed: for us, the imaginary
world within which these processes of signification take
place acquires Platonic qualities only because Spenser
makes use of the Platonic tradition in exalting the
qualities of the imaginary objects which are signified,
in these cases, above those of the imaginary objects
which are used to signify them; it would have been
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equally possible (though less unambiguously complimentary
and therefore less politically judicious) for him simply
to have asserted that Belphoebe and Gloriana signify
Queen Elizabeth -- without further defining how they are
to be imagined as signifying her -- and the poem would
have been no less allegorical as a result. Furthermore,
it is far from true that all of the images in The Faerie
Queene which are used figuratively are imagined as
eikones of what they signify -- in fact, as I shall
demonstrate, only a few of them are so imagined -- and
once again, the poem is no less allegorical as a result.
It is only if Spenser's imaginary characterization of his
poem as a kind of 'mirror* is taken as a genuine and
authoritative description of how, in its details, the
poem works as an allegory, and then used as a
prescription for reading these details figuratively, that
the allegory of The Faerie Oueene begins to seem to
depend upon, or as David Lee Miller says, "to be
organized with reference to", the Platonic structure of
its imaginary world.66 Miller, in giving a detailed
account, on this basis, of what he takes to be the
allegorical workings of the poem, makes the mistake which
he himself neatly describes in a different context: he
"misreads... [his] own procedure, offering as an act of
decoding what is in fact the work of production."67
In order to see how little of The Faerie Queene's
allegory is actually grounded in the Platonic structure
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of its imaginary world, it may be useful, first, to point
out some of the structures of imagery within this world
which, although they are probably indebted to the
Platonic tradition, are not used allegorically.
Among these are the False Una (I.i.45ff) and the False
Florimell (III.viii.5ff). Although they are presented,
like Gloriana and the painting on Guyon's shield, as
things created in imitation of superior originals,
neither of these creatures is used, at any point, as a
symbol of her original. On the contrary, the whole
purpose of their creation is that they will be mistaken
for the very things themselves of which they are copies;
in this sense, they are the opposite of symbols. For,
whereas to read an eikon symbolically is to direct one's
attention through the copy toward that of which it is a
copy, and in so doing to gain a sense of the qualitative
difference that sets the two apart, the intention in
these cases is to direct attention away from what is
copied and toward the copy, and in so doing to cause the
inferior qualities of the copy to be mistaken for the
true qualities of the original. What the False Una and
the False Florimell resemble in the Platonic scheme is
not the imagery (such as the diagrams of the geometers or
the imaginary world of the story of the cave) which is
used figuratively to represent things not available to
literal language or to the powers of the senses, but
rather the imagery which Plato describes as being created
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by those painters and poets who copy the mere superficial
appearances of already visible things, and which then
deceives the credulous into thinking that they are
beholding the things themselves (Republic 596e-599a).
Far from being allegorical itself, such a use of imagery
was identified by Proclus as the perverse alternative to
the legitimate, allegorical kind of art (see Introduction
(1): pp. 48-9); we may think of it as being, in a certain
sense, allegory's opposite.
Some other pairs of The Faerie Queene's characters,
as well as certain apparently 'paired' places, are
sometimes thought of as standing in the relationship, to
one another, of eikon and original: thus, for example,
it is supposed that, just as the False Florimell is an
inferior copy of the true, so in some sense Florimell
herself is an inferior copy of Gloriana; or that the
House of Pride and the Bower of Bliss are presented as
debased images, respectively, of the House of Holiness
and the Garden of Adonis.6® It seems to me, though, that
such interpretations read into the imaginary world of The
Faerie Oueene a structure that is not intrinsically
there, since nowhere is it said (and indeed, it would be
memorably strange if it were the case) that Florimell is
a copy of Gloriana or that the Bower of Bliss is a copy
of the Garden of Adonis. Certainly it is true that in
each of these cases there is an explicit association
between the two things: in the former instance, in
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Arthur's mind, when he wishes that Florimell were
Gloriana or that Gloriana were like Florimell
(III.iv.54); and in the latter, in the narrator's
contrasting of the evil and good Genii (II.xii.47-8).
But in the one case, there is nothing to suggest a
metaphysical basis to what is, after all, only a "wish";
and in the other, while clearly the two Genii are in some
sense good and evil versions of the same thing, there is
no particular reason to think of the evil Genius as a
copy of the good, any more than we ordinarily think of
our 'worser self' as the copy of our 'better self' .
However, even if such a Platonic structure were granted
to the relationships between these pairs of images, it
would remain the case that the things which are
considered derivative copies -- Florimell, the Bower, the
evil Genius, the House of Pride, and so on -- are not
used, figuratively, as symbols of their originals, but
rather, if anything, as distractions from them. For
example, Arthur does not use Florimell in the way that he
uses Guyon's shield, as a means of gaining a better
appreciation of Gloriana; rather, in pursuing Florimell
he is distracted from his pursuit of Gloriana, and in
wishing that "that Lady faire mote bee/ His Faery
Queene.../ Or that his Faery Queene were such, as shee",
he conflates, rather than distinguishes, the respective
qualities of the two. Just as Redcross, in failing to
distinguish copy from original, mistakenly supposes that
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the qualities of the False Una are the true qualities of
Una herself, so, here, Arthur mistakenly wishes that the
qualities of Florimell (which, for the sake of argument,
we are calling the inferior qualities of the eikon) were
the true qualities of Gloriana (whom we are calling the
original). So even granting a Platonic structure to such
relationships, we must still conclude that what is
structured Platonically in such cases is not the
allegorical use of the poem's imagery, but precisely
its non-allegorical use.
Certainly there are instances in The Faerie Queene of
imaginary things which resemble images used traditionally
by Neoplatonists as symbols of imaginary intelligible
realities: for example, the hermaphroditic statue in the
Temple of Venus.69 But such traditional esoteric images
are fairly rare in the poem; and we would soon go astray
if we assumed that all of the images in The Faerie Queene
which look like images used commonly by Neoplatonists --
for example, the poem's representations of the pagan Gods
-- were used by Spenser, in the Neoplatonic manner, to
symbolize intelligible truths. For example, as I shall
argue in Chapter One (pp. 207-13), Spenser sometimes uses
the pagan Jove not as a symbolic eikon of the (Neoplaton-
ically-influenced) Christian Deity, but rather as a
figure which actually blocks recognition of the nature of
this God. As for the various other images which Miller
invokes in attempting to establish that the allegory of
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The Faerie Queene is "organized with reference to" an
"ontology that is itself allegorical", some of these have
a far from convincing relationship to Platonic structures
or traditions of any kind: for example, "the 'golden
wall' that surrounds Cleopolis (II.x.72), [and] the name
'Telamond' at the head of Book IV"."70
Finally, even the clearest examples of Platonic
symbolism in The Faerie Queene, namely Arthur's use of
the picture on Guyon's shield as a symbol of Gloriana and
the imaginary reader's use of Gloriana and Belphoebe as
symbols of the imaginary Elizabeth, do not clearly
co-exist within a single, neatly-ordered Platonic cosmos
such as Miller would have all the poem's imagery organize
itself "with reference to". Rather, we have on one hand
the chain of eikones that the ostensible author of the
poem describes as leading from Belphoebe and Gloriana to
Elizabeth and thence to God, and on the other the chain
that Guyon describes as leading from the painting on his
shield to Gloriana in the flesh to Gloriana's mind and
once again, finally, to God; in the latter series, we
proceed from Gloriana to God without passing Elizabeth
along the way. Now, certainly it is possible to imagine
a single, coherent Platonic order of which both these
sequences are partial expressions; but the point that the
poem itself does not do so may be of some importance.
For the fact that Arthur's quest for Gloriana is never
presented -- as the reader's interpretation of Gloriana
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clearly is -- as a progress toward Elizabeth (despite
Miller's suggestion to the contrary71) means that the
two types of allegory which Spenser, in the Letter to
Raleigh. calls the "general" and the "particular", and
which are exemplified, respectively, by Arthur's pursuit
of glory through Gloriana and the reader's pursuit of an
ideal Elizabeth through Gloriana, are never presented as
being ultimately one. The notion that the allegory of
the poem is organized in such a way that it tends toward
a single "vanishing point"72, in the way that everything
in a Neoplatonic cosmos leads symbolically, along
converging chains of eikones, to the ineffable One, is
something which The Faerie Oueene encourages us to
imagine through its description of itself as a link in
such a chain, rather than something which is genuinely to
be found in the details of its allegorical workings. In
supposing that the allegory of The Faerie Oueene really
does work in this way, Miller ultimately mistakes what in
other respects he recognizes as merely the poem's
"ideal... image of itself" for the poem as it actually
exists.7 3
Once we have established that the symbolic and
Neoplatonic relationship which Spenser describes as
existing between Queen Elizabeth and the characters
Gloriana and Belphoebe is not a report of the actual
workings of the poem's allegory but a fiction designed to
compliment the queen, we may place this relationship
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within the context where it really belongs, namely among
the other fictional devices which Spenser employs in The
Faerie Queene. When this is done, it may be seen, I
think, that at least one episode in the poem's main
narrative which presents to the reader's imagination a
supposed ei£o/2-and-original relationship actually draws
to our attention the very imaginative process on which
Spenser quietly relies in the proems, whereby the exalted
qualities which appear in a so-called eikon, and which
actually originate there, are subsequently extended from
this image to its supposed paradigm.
Just as Spenser's queen is invited to look into his
poem as if into a mirror in which she may see herself and
her realms, so too the imaginary princess Britomart is
confronted with a "mirrhour" in which she can see an
image not only of her own face but of everything in the
world which pertains to her (111 . ii . 17,19 ) . But the
images which Britomart sees do not necessarily show the
things which they supposedly reflect as she will later
find them; in particular, when she gazes upon her future
husband, "She sees an imagined, idealized beauty, more
attractive than the Salvage Knight proves to be in
fact".74 Like Spenser's imaginary, radiant queen, this
image of Arthegall in the magic mirror is distinctly
sun-like, his face appearing to Britomart "as Phoebus
face out of the east" (III.ii.24); but neither this
radiance nor the "Heroicke grace" with which he carries
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himself are much in evidence when she meets the man
himself. It is as if the image in Merlin's mirror is the
real goal toward which Britomart strives, and of which
Arthegall himself can never be more than an imperfect
reflection. What is more, we as readers, like Britomart
herself, are put in the position of searching in the
later books of The Faerie Queene for an ideal Arthegall
who in fact never appears so clearly as in the passage in
Book Three in which Britomart sees him in the mirror.
Both for Britomart and for ourselves, it is not simply
that this 'mirror image' of Arthegall turns out not to be
an accurate likeness of him, but that the image seems
actually to have a certain priority over the man himself.
Not only does it appear before him in the poem, but it
seems more clearly aligned than does its supposed
original with the conception of the knight of Justice,
not to mention with his imaginary role in begetting the
Tudor dynasty, a role which would seem to demand an
unambiguously virtuous character if it is to be perceived
as complimentary to Queen Elizabeth.
What Spenser means to achieve by drawing attention,
in this way, to the very device by means of which he has
repeatedly complimented Queen Elizabeth, is open to at
least two quite different interpretations. On one hand,
it is possible that in creating an image of Arthegall
which does not accurately reflect its supposed original,
he wishes delicately to demonstrate the artificiality of
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the whole convention by means of which he has repeatedly
complimented the queen, by pointing out that what is
called a mirror in poetry does not necessarily show
things as they really are.75 On the other hand, the
implications of the workings of Merlin's mirror with
respect to the workings of the poem itself as a kind of
magical mirror for Elizabeth may not be intended as
subversive at all: rather, the point may be to draw
attention to the magical powers of the poet himself who
constructs the so-called 'mirror' in which the ideal
figure appears, and thereby delicately to point out the
positive influence that such a poet may have on the image
of the one who is represented. 'Delicately', I say in
either case: for if Spenser is conscious that it is only
an imaginary queen for whom The Faerie Queene is a mirror
and Gloriana and Belphoebe mirror images, then he is
equally aware that the queen whom he compliments by means
of this fiction is very real indeed.
(2.3) Spenser's Imaginary World — A Prospectus
If, as I have argued, the ostensible author's
attributions of overall structure to the figurative
meaning of the 1590 edition of The Faerie Queene turn out
to be no more, in practice, than instances of the
self-commentary which make the poem allegorical -- and
not, as they are offered, authoritative descriptions of
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what is already to be found in the poem prior to the
prescriptive influence they may have on its commentators
-- then the bulk of the task of describing the
allegorical workings of The Faerie Queene lies still
ahead of us. In the following chapters, I shall eschew
the 'top-down' approach which attempts to comprehend the
allegory of the poem through its overall representations
of itself in the Letter to Raleigh, dedicatory sonnets,
and proems, and begin, instead, with individual instances
of the poem's figurative use of its own imagery,
proceeding to generalizations only as patterns of
recurrence and analogy emerge from amongst these. Before
engaging in this project, however, it will be necessary
for me to address an influential notion of the way that
figurative meanings are attached to narrative details of
The Faerie Queene. which I hope these introductory
chapters will have allowed us to see as significantly
misconstruing the poem's actual workings. Having done
this, I shall proceed to glance ahead at some of the main
themes that will emerge, in the chapters ahead, from my
reading of the poem.
The misinterpretation of the poem's allegorical
workings that I wish, first, to correct, consists in the
idea that the figurative meanings of The Faerie Queene's
imagery exist only, or at least principally, for us, its
readers, rather than, in general, as parts of the actual
or possible experience of the characters who inhabit the
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world constituted by that imagery. As representatives of
this view, I take two influential characterizations of
the poem's allegory which come, respectively, from an
early work by Harry Berger, Jr., and from a late work by
C. S. Lewis. Berger, in The Allegorical Temper (1957),
pauses from his analysis of Guyon's adventure in the cave
of Mammon to generalize as follows:
The basic situation — almost too obvious to
mention -- is this: in the concrete fictional
world of the poem the character sees with his eyes
the persons and places of the quest; the narrator,
telling us of the character's sensory experiences,
reveals -- through one or another poetic device --
their allegorical meanings... Allegory... is dark
to the character in the story... [Tlhe translation
of visible fact is made over the head of the hero
to the reader...76
Lewis, in Spenser's Images of Life (1967), similarly
extrapolates from his reading of allegory in The Faerie
Queene "to notice certain principles... about allegory at
large":
First there is the paradox that, to the
characters participating in an allegory, nothing is
allegorical. They live in a world compact of
wonders, beauties, and terrors, which are mostly
quite unintelligible to them. Secondly and
contrarily, our own experience while we read an
allegory is double. It is divided between sharing
the experiences of the characters in the story and
looking at their life from somewhere outside it,
seeing all the time meanings that are opaque from
within.77
That such notions both of allegory generally and of
Spenser's allegory in particular still have some currency
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may be seen, for example, from comments made by Humphrey
Tonkin in his recent book on The Faerie Queene (1989):
"Normally", writes Tonkin, "we are in a position of far
more knowledge than the characters could possibly have";
for as readers, "we are always aware that there is
another dimension, another kind of meaning, hidden behind
the... narrative."70
Now, there are some allegories of which such accounts
would indeed be valid, namely, those allegories which I
have called 'non-symbolic'. Thus, for example, in
Plato's non-symbolic allegory of the cave, it is clearly
the case that the figurative meanings which Socrates
attributes to the world of his fable, and to the various
images that make it up, do not exist within this
imaginary world: for it is a point salient to his
allegorical use of this world that, to the hypothetically
released prisoner, the visible sun which eventually he
would be able to look upon directly is the final
("teleutaion") object of his apprehension, and not (as
it is for Socrates' interlocutors) merely a sign of
something higher, namely the final ("teleutaia") goal
of their education, the intelligible form of the Good
(Republic 516b4, 517b9-cl). Nevertheless, Berger's and
Lewis's accounts of allegory are not, as they suppose,
true in general -- we may consider, for example, the
allegorical Quest of the Holy Grail, in which typically
the knights of the quest do come to know the figurative
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meanings of their adventures, and actually to revalue
their deeds on that basis (see Introduction (1): pp.
43-5) -- and neither, in practice, do they turn out to be
largely true of The Faerie Oueene.
There has, of late, been some considerable progress
toward seeing the extent to which the allegory of The
Faerie Oueene is, in the terms that I have been using,
symbolic: that is, the extent to which, as in the Quest
of the Holy Grail, the figurative meanings of its images
coexist with their literal meanings inside a single
imaginary world. This progress is manifested in the new
importance accorded, in some recent critical
commentaries, to the involvement of The Faerie Queene's
characters in interpreting (or 'reading') the places and
situations in which they find themselves. Thus, for
example, Tonkin's reiteration of the model of allegory
propounded by Berger and Lewis is tempered by a
recognition that "In Spenser action tends to be generated
by the need to interpret: we begin with the data and the
hero must make sense of them."79 Indeed, it is even
noted that the characters' experience as interpreters of
their world tends to be analogous to our own experience
as readers: thus, "Redcross and the reader are faced
with a similar problem: understanding the phenomena they
meet".®0 But I believe that we need to go further still,
beyond seeing merely an analogy between our interpretive
role outside the poem's imaginary world and that of the
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characters inside it, as if the characters' interpretive
activity were merely a fictional example of the task that
is given primarily to the reader. Far more than this,
the characters' acquiring or displaying knowledge of the
figurative meanings of the things in their world is the
regular mechanism by which the poem creates these
figurative meanings in the first place; that is to say,
it is largely because characters in the poem interpret
their world figuratively that we as readers are able to
do so.
In some cases, the character who, as commentator,
facilitates our allegorical reading of the poem is
someone who appears, at first hand, in the action which
is to be interpreted -- someone, that is, for whom the
imagery that is commented upon exists as immediate sense
experience. Thus, for example, Guyon's companion the
Palmer is actually looking at the rocks that have
threatened their boat and at the "carkasses exanimate"
(II.xii.7) which litter them when he interprets the scene
allegorically:
...Behold th'ensamples in our sights,
Of lustfull luxurie and thriftlesse wast:
What now is left of miserable wights,
Which spent their looser daies in lewd delights,
But shame and sad reproch, here to be red,
By these rent reliques, speaking their ill plights?
Let all that liue, hereby be counselled,
To shunne Rocke of Reproch, and it as death to dred.
(II.xii.9 ) .
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As we shall see, such commentary which comes from the
very mouths of those who participate in the poem's action
is by no means uncommon in The Faerie Oueene.
In other instances, however, the imaginary figure
into whose mouth the poem's self-commentary is put is not
someone who participates in the poem's action and
encounters the imagery commented upon as actual sense
experience, but rather the poem's ostensible author,
whom we may follow recent critical practice in calling
'the narrator'. Now, it may not be immediately obvious
that we should see the narrator of The Faerie Queene as
someone who lives inside the imaginary world upon which
he comments: for, fictional figure that he is, he might
as easily occupy a different imaginary world from the
characters in his narrative, just as the Socrates of
Plato's Republic lives neither in the real world (that
is, he is not identical with the real Socrates) nor in
the world of the prisoners in his fable of the cave. But
unlike Plato's Socrates, the narrator of The Faerie
Queene is presented to the reader, from the very first
stanza of the poem and with great regularity thereafter,
not as the inventor but merely as a reporter of the
stories which he tells. For him, the "Knights and
Ladies" whose "gentle deeds" he intends to extol (I.Pr.l)
are historically real characters, who have actually lived
and acted, some centuries before his own time. Spenser
did not have to present matters in this way: he could as
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easily have presented his narrator as one who does not
believe in the veracity of the stories he tells, or even
as one who makes them up as he goes; alternatively, he
could have presented his narrator as a contemporary of
the poem's main characters, or even as one who knew them
personally and actually witnessed or participated in the
actions in which they are involved. But the fiction
which he does choose is that the narrator is a historian,
reporting the deeds done in a former age in the world
which he himself inhabits.
Regardless, then, of whether a particular instance of
the poem's self-commentary is presented as an utterance
of one of the characters who takes part in the action or
of the narrator who looks back on the action from a later
age, it is in any case true that the text and the
commentary are spoken from within the same imaginary
world, or in other words, that the allegory is symbolic.
The principal qualification to be made to this
description of the allegory of The Faerie Queene. it
seems to me, is not that some of the figurative meanings
of the poem's imagery do not exist within the imaginary
world inhabited by its characters, but rather that some
of its literal meanings do not exist there. In other
words, the chief examples of non-symbolic allegory (and
metaphor) in The Faerie Oueene are those which have
their tenors, rather than their vehicles, inside the
world of the narrative. Amongst these are, for example,
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the frequent epic similes comparing the progress of the
knights in their adventures and of the narrator in
reporting their adventures to that of a ship sailing
through dangerous seas (I.vi.l, I.xii.l, II.ii.24, etc.).
We may compare the place of such allegories as these in
the symbolic imaginary world of The Faerie Oueene to the
place of the parable of the prodigal son within the
symbolic Biblical history imagined by Saint Augustine
(see Introduction (1): pp. 35-7): in each case, the
non-symbolic allegory refers not out of the symbolic
world to some other world beyond it, but rather into the
symbolic world from another, fictional world -- a world
which is invented, ad hoc, as a vehicle for referring to
truths inside the world of the main narrative.
Now it is true, of course, that the knowledge of
characters inside the world of The Faerie Oueene's main
narrative does not always encompass all the figurative
meanings of the things in their experience; but this is
no more than a kind of dramatic irony.®1 The things
which they do not know, if these things are parts of the
poem at all, are not things which they cannot in
principle know -- not things which, as Berger and Lewis
imagine, are separated from the world of their experience
by a boundary intrinsic to the nature of allegory itself.
On the contrary, they are things which are true within
their very own world, and which they could potentially
learn, as Guyon learns the allegorical meanings of
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obstacles such as the Rock of Reproach by listening to
the pronouncements of the Palmer. (We might compare the
way in which the knights of the Quest of the Holy Grail
tend not to know the figurative meanings of their
adventures while performing them, but are nevertheless
able to learn these meanings afterwards by listening to
the explanations offered by the various monks and hermits
whom they meet.)
Given, then, that within The Faerie Queene the
relations between literal and figurative meanings are,
for the most part, symbolic -- that is, internal to the
imaginary world presented by the poem -- it remains to be
seen what form these imaginary symbolic relations take.
Do they resemble the symbolic relations (1 Augustinian'
and 'Pseudo-Dionysian') that shape the imaginary world
which is sometimes called the medieval or Renaissance
world picture (see Introduction (1), pp. 53-4), or do
they take an entirely different form? Such a question
cannot be answered fully prior to the detailed
investigation of the way that the poem presents its world
to us; but an initial clue, at least, to the general form
of the poem's symbolism would seem to lie in what was
said above: namely, that The Faerie Queene. as a
narrative, is presented to the reader as an enormous,
fictional act of retelling -- a retelling of something
which, from the point of view of the fictional narrator,
is true. In choosing to create this particular fictional
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relationship between the narrator of The Faerie Oueene
and the story narrated, Spenser involves his narrator in
one of the poem's important themes, the theme of report.
To introduce this theme briefly: it is one thing for
Spenser's principal characters to perform their missions
successfully; but it is something beyond this for their
successes to be translated into the good report that will
bestow fame and glory upon them. Having overcome the
pitfalls that jeopardize their quests themselves, it
remains for them to overcome the threat of slander that
jeopardizes their receiving their due rewards. This
theme is prominent from the first book, in which the
Redcross knight's slaying of the dragon is only the
penultimate action, the final one being the contest in
the home of Una's parents between his version of the
story and the rival version presented by Archimago; it
becomes still more prominent as the poem progresses,
until, in the 1596 installment, slander itself appears
as the most intractable of adversaries for Spenser's
knights -- and indeed, for the narrator himself.
Because the narrator of The Faerie Queene is
presented as a reporter of historical events, the story
which he supposedly narrates -- that is, the whole of the
poem — itself takes on an imaginary role in preserving
for these knights that which is so important to them,
namely a memory of their accomplishments, in a version
which does credit to their names (I.Pr.1-2). At the same
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time, however, the narrator is made liable to all the
difficulties which beset a reporter of past events. In
any retelling of events, there are the possibilities, on
one hand, of getting the story wrong, either through
error or through bias, and on the other, of being
suspected of having got the story wrong for one or both
of these reasons. (It has been widely observed of late
that, as Carolynn Van Dyke puts it, "the narrator's
comments are the reactions of a fallible observer".02 I
am adding the point that not only may the narrator be
fallible, but he may intentionally misconstrue the action
upon which he comments.) Of course, the events reported
in The Faerie Queene never really happened in the world
outside the poem; consequently, a sense of the
distinction between events themselves and the report of
them can exist only insofar as the poem itself creates
it, by actively drawing attention to the possibilities of
bias and error in the voices of his storytellers -- which
means, effectively, by drawing attention to the active
role of these storytellers as interpreters of the stories
that they report.03
If, in The Faerie Queene. the symbolic relationships
between the literal and figurative meanings of the poem's
imagery are assimilated, to some degree, to the
relationship between events and reports, then in order to
be able to describe these symbolic relationships, we will
need, first, to give consideration to the ways in which
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the poem's characters, including its narrator, become
involved in reporting the poem's events. Some of the
questions I will consider in doing so are the following:
Why do these characters become involved in the reporting
of events? What do they accomplish in their acts of
reporting? What sorts of interpretations do they make of
events? And, what errors or vested interests do their
interpretations reveal? Only as these questions are
answered will it become possible, by increments, to
describe the imaginary symbolic world within which the
The Faerie Oueene's literal and figurative meanings
co-exist; and only, I think, to the extent that we can
describe this world, can we really lay claim to having
understood the workings of Spenser's allegory.
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Chapter One;
The Legend of Holiness -- Making One's Way
What is perhaps most striking about the way in which
the story develops in the first book of The Faerie Queene
is just how quickly it deviates from the course announced
for it in the Letter to Raleigh and in the pageant-like
opening stanzas of the book's first canto. The very
first event that takes place, as the static quality of
the opening pageant gives way to action, is that the
story's protagonists turn aside from their progress
toward their goal (I.i.6-7), promptly to lose their way
altogether (I.i.10). In spite of superficial appearances
to the contrary (which we shall need to investigate)
(I. i. 27-8), this way, once lost, is something which they
never even begin genuinely to regain until after the
half-way mark in their adventures -- if, indeed, they can
properly be said ever genuinely to have been 'on course'
in the first place.
The Redcross knight's victory over the monster Errour
(I.i.14-26) does seem to bring to an end the going astray
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which has characterized the adventure of "the wandring
wood" (I.i.13), in that after Errour has been slain, the
knight and his companions, by refusing to be tempted away
from the main path "to any by-way", are able quickly to
find the route out of the labyrinthine forest which
previously had eluded them, and so to pass "forward on...
[their] way" (I.i.28). The sense that the victory over
the monster has been a turning point in this respect is
augmented by our being told that, after the battle, they
go "backward" the way they came rather than pressing on
in the same direction (I.i.28); and this sense is further
reinforced, to give the impression that the knight's
success at arms has had a positive significance with
respect to the progress of his quest at large, first by
Una's greeting his achievement as a feat "worthy... of
that Armorie" which he has donned in order to undertake
his mission against the dragon (I.i.27), and further by
the narrator's parenthetical indication that, as Redcross
continues "on his way", he does so "with God to frend"
(I.i.28).
Despite all this, however, there are also ominous
indications that the path which the trio follows out of
the woods -- and apparently beyond it -- is the wrong
one. In the first place, in spite of what I said above
about its indicating a turning point in the adventure,
there does seem to be something inherently suspicious
about their proceeding "backward" out of the forest, when
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progress in the quest is otherwise virtually defined in
terms of going "forward" (I.i.28, etc.); indeed, we may
question to what extent the change of direction does
represent a significant turning point, after all, given
that the path they follow after the knight's victory is
the same one that led them to Errour's cave in the first
place (albeit they now follow it in the opposite
direction), and that it is once again problematically
described as "That path... which beaten was most plaine"
(I.i.28; compare I.i.ll, "That path... which beaten seemd
most bare", as well as the "broad high way.../ All bare
through peoples feet" which leads to the House of Pride
(I.iv.2) and the "broad high way" which, according to
Caelia, "All keepe... and take delight/ With many... for
to go astray" (I.x.10) -- all of them reminiscent of the
Biblical "broad waye", trodden by "manie", "that leadeth
to destruction" (Matthew 7:13)J.1 A. C. Hamilton, with
his suggestion that the path through the wandering wood
must have been "beaten... by those entering rather than
leaving"2, implies that, after Errour is defeated, the
knight and his companions should be seen as following the
"beaten" path not toward destruction but away from it;
but there is nothing in the poem itself thus to mitigate
the ominous effect of the repetition of the unfavourable
description as the party retraces its steps. Even the
apparently commendable resoluteness with which they now
stick to this path until it takes them out of the forest
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is very like what they showed, before they encountered
Errour, in "resoluing forward still to fare,/ Till that
some end they finde or in or out" (I.i.ll). Since, as it
turns out, the "beaten" path which they resolve to follow
to the "end" leads both "in" and "out" of the forest, we
might reasonably suppose that there is less difference
between the one "end" of this path and the other than
seems, superficially, to be the case. If this were so,
then we would have to see Redcross, on leaving the woods,
not as having recovered from error and regained the right
path, but as having been erroneously confirmed in his
resolute following of the wrong one.3
Such an interpretation of the opening events of the
first book seems to accord better with what happens next
than does a more traditional and more trusting reading
which takes as authoritative Una's and the narrator's
respective claims that his victory over the monster has
advanced the knight in his quest and that it has earned
him God's approbation. For, as has been frequently
observed by the poem's commentators, the Redcross knight
wins what Una calls the "great glory" of victory over
Errour (I.i.27) and, as the narrator says, proceeds
"forward on his way (with God to frend)" (I.i.28) only
for him to stray almost immediately into the succession
of errors that leaves him, ultimately, a wretched and
despairing captive in Orgoglio's dungeon (I.viii.38-41).4
What we need to reckon with here is the wrong
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interpretation of the Redcross knight's encounter in the
wandering wood, not only from within the poem (as in the
narrator's confident ascription of God's approval to the
knight's actions), but, more consequentially, from within
the narrative itself. When they first arrive at the
"hollow caue,/ Amid the thickest woods" (I.i.ll) which is
to be the site of the confrontation, Una warns her
champion against wilfully exposing himself to the grave
danger of a needless battle (I. i.12-13); but the knight
insists on making trial of the darkness, apparently
determined to prove that he is no coward, and bolstered
by an inflated sense of his own virtuous self-sufficiency
(I.i.12-14). Now, none of this would seem to have
anything to do with the confrontation with theological
error that is usually found in this episode, nor, more
generally, with the kind of knighthood that one puts on
in donning "the armour of a Christian man specified by
Saint Paul" (Letter to Raleigh); and were the episode to
continue as it begins, we might never have supposed that
it did represent such things, or indeed that there were
any other 'Error' before us than that which entangles
a "youthfull" knight who is presumptuously "greedy" to
prove his prowess (I.i.14).5 What can mislead us into
revising our assessment of this rash encounter in the
knight's favour, however, is that Una rashly revises
hers, in her joy and relief at her knight's triumphant
escape from mortal peril. Whereas earlier, she had
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argued the "wisedome" of proceeding forward only with the
greatest of caution (I.i.13), now she herself comes
forward "in hast", in order "to greet his victorie"
(I.i.27), and says to him,
...Faire knight, borne vnder happy starre...
Well worthy be you of that Armorie,
Wherein ye haue great glory wonne this day,
And proou'd your strength on a strong enimie,
Your first aduenture: many such I pray,
And henceforth euer wish, that like succeed it may.
(I.i.27).
It is only, I think, if we take this retrospective
celebration of the knight's battle with Errour to be a
reliable interpretation of the encounter's significance
that Errour herself seems to require the kind of
figurative meaning which is usually attributed to her,
and which makes her defeat seem to be the worthy
endeavour of a specifically Christian knight. (Even the
"bookes and papers" which she vomits (I.i.20) -- and to
which I shall return a little later -- are never clearly
identified with the erroneous theology that they are
usually supposed to represent.) That we are rash if, on
the basis of Una's gloss, we take the monster to be a
personification of theological error, seems to me to be
strongly indicated by the fact that the knight himself,
who appears to treat Una's interpretation of the battle
as reliable, in doing so confirms himself in the very
errant path upon which he has set out in his "first
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aduenture". In particular, he seems to take to heart
Una's prayer that he should have "many such" adventures;
for no sooner has he got "out of the wood" than "He
passed forth, and new aduenture sought" (I.i.28). This,
it would seem, is strange behaviour, coming from someone
who is already committed to the mission of slaying the
dragon which is wreaking havoc on Una's homeland. Nor
can we properly dismiss this line as merely a formulaic
bridge between one encounter and the next, for the knight
continues to show precisely the same interest when "At
length they... meet vpon the way" someone who might have
news "Of straunge aduentures, which abroad did pas"
(I.i.29-30). It becomes clear that the knight intends
immediately to pursue the adventure which Archimago
offers, "Of a straunge man.../ That wasteth all this
countrey farre and neare" (I.i.31). Indeed, if by the
time he leaves Archimago's dwelling (I.ii.6), the knight
has altogether abandoned his original quest, it would
seem that this has not been entirely the result of the
wizard's nocturnal enchantments: on the contrary, it is
as if the knight himself, by the time he first meets
Archimago, has already forgotten about "that infernall
feend" (I.i.5) who is the proper adversary of the
Christian knight, having become far more interested in
amassing, for his own "great glory", "many such"
victories as that which he won over Errour.
We might suppose that Una would step in, at the point
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where her knight's forget fulness becomes apparent, with a
timely reminder of the undertaking to which he is already
committed. Far from it, however, she offers only the
conventional advice which a wandering knight of the
secular romance tradition might expect to hear -- advice
which not only encourages Redcross in the errant
self-image which she already has unwittingly fostered,
but which proves to be quite disastrous in its own right:
Now (sayd the Lady) draweth toward night,
And well I wote, that of your later fight
Ye all forwearied be...
Then with the Sunne take Sir, your timely rest,
And with new day new worke at once begin:
Vntroubled night they say giues counsell best.
(I.i.32-3 ) .
As we know, it is anything but an "Vntroubled night" that
lies in store for the Redcross knight. Archimago, in
seconding Una's suggestion -- "Right well Sir knight ye
haue aduised bin" (I.i.33) — is wickedly ironic; for in
fact Una, as much as the knight himself, is walking,
without so much as being prompted, into his trap.6
The mistake which the Redcross knight makes, and
which Una exacerbates, in the encounters with Errour and
Archimago is comparable to the mistake made by many of
the knights in the Quest of the Holy Grail, who suppose
that their ordinary modus operandi as knights of the
secular romance tradition will be appropriate to a quest
whose nature is spiritual and symbolic.7 Prior to the
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start of the Grail Quest, the customary way of increasing
one's knightly renown was to ride forth in search of
adventures and causes to be championed; but once the
adventure of the Grail begins, the established values are
inverted, and such straying from encounter to encounter,
with no overall purpose save the augmenting of one's own
glory, becomes a positive detriment to the accomplishment
of a task which requires both humility, and the symbolic
interpretation of each individual encounter with a view
to the ultimate goal. So, too, the hero of the Legend of
Holiness seems, in his early adventures, not yet fully to
have grasped the spiritual nature of his mission against
"that infernall feend" (1.1.5), or of the Redcross armour
which he has put on in order to accomplish it; he
appears, rather, to conceive of himself in conventional
romance terms, as a wandering (or "errant" (I.ii.34,
I.x.10, etc.)) champion of causes and righter of wrongs.0
The monster, Errour, which he first encounters epitomizes
not erroneous theology but the kind of opponent which an
errant knight must continually seek out and destroy in
order to sustain his own mode of existence; as such, she
is not a summing up of all error in one creature, in such
a way that it can be conveniently dispensed with all at
once, but rather an exemplary case of the kind of
encounter of which there can always be "many" more
(I.i.27).9 Even the mass of books which Errour vomits,
although it is not clearly identified, could as easily be
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taken to represent the endless profusion of stories of
knight-errantry which were known and read in Spenser's
time, as to refer, for example, to the abstruse
theological errors of "Sabelianism, Nestorianism,
Manichaeism, as well as Arianism"10 -- all of which were
probably rather further than the secular romances from
popular consciousness, and which were further, too, from
the minds of Protestant thinkers concerned to reform the
nation's reading habits.11
Now, to argue, as I have done, that Una is a poor
interpreter and a poor adviser in the first canto of The
Faerie Queene. and that her interventions are a factor in
the Redcross knight's going astray, will no doubt require
some defense. For while the apparently authoritative
commentating voice of the poem's narrator, which Spenser
critics once took straight, is now widely seen as
frequently, if not systematically, the butt of irony
(see Introduction (1): pp.97-8), the corresponding
authoritativeness of Una's commentating voice seems
(whether out of sentimental attachment to the character
or in deference to the fact that she is repeatedly
referred to as "Truth" (I.ii.Arg, I.iii.Arg)) to have
remained as inviolate as the character herself.12 But
if, in the first encounter with Archimago, she can offer
such patently bad advice -- advice in which she fails as
completely as the knight himself to recognize either the
inappropriateness of the proposed mission or the badness
159
of its proposer -- then why should we accept, without
putting it to the test, her assessment of his victory
over Errour only a few stanzas earlier? In fact, as we
shall see, Una and the narrator are similar to one
another in the sort of unreliability which they exhibit
throughout the course of the Redcross knight's spiritual
degeneration in the first half of Book One: for both of
them tend to act the part of the knight's apologist,
praising his actions for better or for worse, whether he
behaves righteously or sinfully.
In spite of this unreliability, however, it remains
the case that Una and the poem's narrator are our
principal interpreters of the action in the early part of
the first book: thus, for example, it is when Una reads
the knight's victory over Errour as an exemplary
adventure which he should strive often to imitate, and
when the narrator promptly seconds her assessment, that
the exemplary allegory which the Letter to Raleigh has
promised us seems to begin emerging from out of the
poem's action. But since the interpretation of this
first episode from within the imaginary world of the
poem (as its effects on the knight himself show) is a
/nisinterpretation, we might say that, in a sense, it is
not only the story itself, but the moral allegory which
is built upon this story, that begins to go astray as
soon as the poem's action gets underway. It is because
these two things -- the story and its interpretation --
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go off track together, that it can seem, paradoxically,
as if all is still well at the time when the Redcross
knight leaves the wandering wood and proceeds "forward on
his way". What seem to be the moral standards by which
we may judge the appropriateness or inappropriateness of
the actions undertaken in the story turn out to be based,
themselves, on the unreliable opinions of the characters
engaged in that story -- and indeed, to be the basis,
within the action, for the misplaced self-confidence
which accounts for their persistence in going astray.
We are in danger, ourselves, of misapprehending the
significance of the characters' actions, because the
means by which we are encouraged to interpret the poem
are entangled, from the beginning, in the characters' own
misapprehension of what sort of story they are meant to
be involved in.
If the Redcross knight's going astray at the
beginning of his quest can be linked to the fact that
neither he nor Una seems to have a clear idea, in the
first place, of what sort of story he is meant to be
involved in, then the beginning of the movement which
leads to his rehabilitation and the ultimate success of
his mission can be marked, in contrast, at the point
where the story in which he is supposed to be taking part
is clearly articulated -- that is, at the point in the
seventh canto where Una retells this story, in response
to the queries of Prince Arthur (I.vii.43-51). It is the
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first time that the dragon quest has been mentioned by
the characters themselves who are involved in it; and the
first time, in fact, since the narrator's reference to it
at the opening of the first canto, that it has been
mentioned at all. Now, suddenly, the forsaken purpose is
restored to view -- both for the characters in the story,
and for us, its readers. It is by saying what was meant
to be happening, as much as by explaining what has gone
wrong, that Una begins the process of putting the story
back on track. As the Letter to Raleigh tells us, it was
her telling of this same story at the court of the Faery
Queen which set the quest in motion in the first place;
now, in encouraging her to renew that act of storytelling
with which the quest began, Arthur renews the story's
impetus toward a successful conclusion.
Importantly, in telling Arthur about the dragon quest
from which her knight has been distracted, Una emphasizes
the unfitness for that mission of ordinary "knights
aduenturous", "Full many" of whom have already become the
dragon's "pitteous pray" (I.vii.45). The specific reason
for their failing -- their "want of faith, or guilt of
sin" (I.vii.45) -- recalls for the reader the symbolic
nature of the battle that is to be fought against "that
old Dragon" (I.xi.Arg.) or "that infernall feend" (I.i.5)
(compare the battle, in Revelation 20:9, against "the
dragon that olde serpent, which is the deuil and Satan"),
and it shows, too, that Una herself is aware of the
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qualities which are required of the Christian knight who
is to win this fight. Once reunited with her champion,
she proceeds to make certain that he becomes, finally, a
knight of precisely these qualities: no longer does she
ride "beside" him (I.i.4), nor act as his apologist
regardless of what course of action he chooses, but
rather takes the lead in actively guiding him toward his
proper goal, and interprets the significance of
situations and events not reactively or apologetically
but always in relation to this goal that lies ahead.
And just as, with her earlier inept responses to the
knight's actions, she misled both Redcross himself and
any trusting reader into seeing the knight's problematic
behaviour as exemplary, so now her astute responses to
events put both knight and reader back on track toward
the correct interpretation and the proper conclusion of
the quest.
Una is inaugurated, into the new role of reliable and
constructive interpreter which she plays in the second
half of Book One, with her correct identification of
Duessa as "falshood" (I.viii.49). The poem's readers
have been privileged with an awareness of Duessa's
figurative meaning since reading the argument to the
book's second canto, but only now, with Una's gloss on
the significance of Duessa's deformity, is this meaning
made clearly available to the characters themselves who
are taking part in the developing story. Only in thus
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putting a period to her enemy's destructive influence
over the course that their story takes (an influence
about which we shall have more to say) does Una clearly
mark the end of the misleading influence that she herself
had in the knight's early adventures, and begin to show
herself worthy of the name "Truth" which has been
associated with her from the time when her enemy Duessa
was first named "falshood" (I.ii.Arg.). Hereafter, Una
is shown continually guiding her knight in his quest,
always with an eye to bringing him, in a state of
physical and spiritual readiness, to the scene of the
battle that he must eventually fight with the dragon
(I.ix.20, I.x.2, I.xi.1-3). When necessary, moreover,
she now forcefully reminds him of this mission, as she so
notably failed to do upon their first encountering
Archimago: thus, seeing him about to succumb to the
persuasions of Despair,
Out of his hand she snatcht the cursed knife,
And threw it to the ground, enraged rife,
And to him said, Fie, fie, faint harted knight,
What meanest thou by this reprochfull strife?
Is this the battell, which thou vauntst to fight
With that fire-mouthed Dragon, horrible and bright?
(I.ix.52).
In sum, Una takes on an active and critical role in the
developing story -- becoming at once storyteller,
interpreter, and guide -- for the sake of forwarding the
quest.
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Prior to Una's assuming this role, the functions of
storyteller and guide are performed principally by Una's
especial "foe" (I.vii.50), Duessa. Although Una, and,
later, Redcross himself, tend to emphasize Duessa's power
in "witchcraft" (I.vii.50) and the "wicked arts"
(I.xii.32), it is, for the most part, not literally
magical spells which we see Duessa casting over her
victims, but rather spellbindingly deceptive lies; it is,
in other words, through her consummate skill in
storytelling that she principally deceives. Thus, in her
very first meeting with the Redcross knight, she quickly
summons up (I.ii.22-6) the sort of account of herself
that will make her seem most fitting as a companion to
the knight of Holiness -- in fact, very like the account
which the Letter to Raleigh tells us that Una gave of
herself at Faery court, as a result of which the knight
was assigned to her. The very name which Duessa gives
herself in this account, "Fidessa" (I.ii.26), implies her
Tightness for the role which she usurps. This taking of
a name for herself is particularly important as an act of
establishing control over the storytelling that takes
place within the poem, not only insofar as it contributes
to the history which she invents for herself, but more
importantly, because it allows her to evade association
with the stories told about her by others, as is revealed
almost immediately by her escaping the knight's detection
as the villainous Duessa of Fradubio's story
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(I . i i . 34-42 ). By separating herself from the reports
associated with her name, she gives herself a free hand
in creating her own version of her story for the knight's
consumption. A short time later, in the House of Pride,
she demonstrates once again her awareness of the power of
storytelling -- an awareness which the Redcross knight,
in choosing to rely exclusively on "swords" rather than
"words" to defend himself against the charges made by
Sansjoy (I.iv.41-2), shows that he does not share -- by
taking pains to respond to the Saracen's interpretation
of events with her own version of the story: a version
which clears her own character of any wrongdoing while
further degrading that of the Redcross knight (I.iv.47).
Meanwhile, alongside her continuing use of storytelling
to guide the development of events, Duessa also plays the
part of guide in the more literal sense: thus, "To
sinfull house of Pride, Duessa/ guides the faithfull
knight" (I.iv.Arg -- "faithfull", in this instance,
perhaps connoting 'credulous').
We have seen, then, that both Una and Duessa use
storytelling, along with direct physical guidance, as a
means of story-making; they tell versions of events which
lead toward the fulfillment of the version which they
propound. From the second to the seventh cantos, the
knight, in effect, lives a story told by Duessa; from the
eighth canto onward, he begins at last to live the story
that was assigned to him when it was first told by Una at
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Faery Court. Una begins to displace Duessa as the
principal storyteller within the story when she first
tells a version of how "False Duessa.../ Mine onely foe,
mine onely deadly dread" has "Inueigled" her knight "to
follow her" (I.vii.50). In using Duessa's true name --
which Duessa herself has scrupulously avoided doing in
her contact with the Redcross knight and even with his
pagan adversaries (thus, she is "Fidessa" even to Sansjoy
(I.iv.45, etc.)) -- Una seizes control of the
interpretation of her adversary's character, and thereby
of the story in which her knight has been involved as
Duessa's champion.
Before Una's seizing of the initiative, however,
there is a long period of wandering for both Redcross and
Una, in which neither takes a critical attitude toward
the knight's errant behaviour. Thus Una, for example, in
mistakenly welcoming the disguised Archimago as her
long-lost knight, repeats her earlier error (I.i.32-3) of
accepting that the
...aduenture in strange place,
Where Arch imago said a felon strong
To many knights did daily worke disgrace...
( I . iii .29 )
constitutes a legitimate diversion from the quest which
he originally undertook on her behalf. The generous and
forgiving nature which Una shows in accepting this
explanation is usually read as an unequivocal sign of her
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virtue, irrespective of the cruel irony to which this
virtue is here the victim.13 But in fact, her uncritical
acceptance of "His louely words" is what makes her, once
more, such an easy dupe for Archimago (I.iii.30).
Meanwhile, in Una's absence, the Redcross knight is
showing himself to be an equally uncritical interpreter
of his adventures, without even the excuse of the "true
loue" that leads Una to assess his actions so generously
(I.iii.30). First he accepts Duessa as a suitable
replacement for the lady whom he has abandoned
(I.ii.26-7), and before long he has also accepted
Lucifera as a suitable substitute for Gloriana (I.v.16),
all the while apparently convinced of his own gallantry
and praiseworthiness. At the same time, however, it
becomes increasingly apparent to an attentive reader that
the knight is descending to a moral parity with the pagan
adversaries against whom he strives so self-righteously.
Thus, even in his early encounter with Sansfoy, the
combatants are as alike to one another "As... two rams
stird with ambitious pride" (I.ii.16); while by the time
he fights Sansjoy, the motives of the adversaries are so
indistinguishable that Redcross can comically suppose
that Duessa's attempt to encourage his opponent with the
promise of "the shield, and I, and all" is meant for
himself (I.v.11-12).14 The narrator may insist on a
distinction between the Redcross knight and his
challenger at the House of Pride -- claiming, first, that
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the Saracen fights for "bloud and vengeance" and the
Christian knight "for prayse and honour" (I.v.7), and
then, repeatedly, that "th'one for wrong, the other
striues for right" (I.v.8,9) -- but in their context,
these assertions only intensify our awareness of the
knight's self-delusion13: for not only is it the pursuit
of "prayse and honour" which will lead him directly into
the service of Lucifera16, but even the desire for "blood
and vengeance" which is attributed disparagingly to
Sansjoy will appear more strikingly in the Redcross
knight's own actions than in the pagan's behaviour, when,
after Duessa has hidden the fallen Sansjoy in a
"darkesome clowd" (I.v.13), the Redcross knight
Not all so satisfide, with greedie eye
...sought all round about, his thirstie blade
To bath in bloud of faithlesse enemy...
(I.v.15).
As the gap widens between the reality of the Redcross
knight's moral degeneracy and his strengthening
impression of his own chivalric virtue, the narrator
continues to play the part of the knight's apologist
which he first assumed in the poem's opening episode --
as blind, apparently, to the implications of the story he
is telling as the knight is to the reality of the story
he is acting out. By this point, it has become clear
that the voice which earlier assured us that the knight
went forth after his victory over Errour "with God to
169
frend" is ready to describe even the most immoral
behaviour as exemplary. What is more, as a result of
this indiscriminate praise, the very allegorical process
whereby moral precepts are derived from the narrative
exempla has gone as far astray as the knight's
self-righteous interpretation of his own actions, and is
producing generalizations that are the victims of an ever
greater and more conspicuous irony. The opening stanza
of canto five has been rightly cited by various critics
as the nadir of the narrator's reliability17, even as,
in the fifth canto generally, his praise for the errant
knight becomes most insistent.
There are two principal respects in which the Redcross
knight fails to understand the significance of his own
adventures in the first half of Book One, which we might
describe, respectively, as failure to listen and failure
to observe. The many instances in which he fails to
listen critically have been enumerated in a recent
article by Richard Mallette. The most striking of these
is his scarcely "busying.../ ...his dull eares, to heare"
Duessa's initial account of herself (I.ii.26)ls; but
there are a number of others as well. For example, when
Fradubio finishes telling the story which, properly
interpreted, could warn the knight away from Duessa, he
allows himself be distracted from the warning by her
pretended swoon (I.ii.44-5), and appears never again to
give it his thought19; while, in the House of Pride, he
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"confirms his deepening insensitivity to the power of
language" when he fails utterly to comprehend the
relative power of "swords" and "words" in choosing to
rely exclusively upon the former in defending himself
against the story told about him by Sansjoy
(I.iv.41-2).20 Even as early as the fateful evening in
Archimago's cell, he shows himself to be an uncritical
listener, in failing to register anything amiss in the
old man's stories "of Saintes and Popes", adoringly
strewn with "an Aue-Mary after and before" (I.i.35) --
stories which would almost certainly have alerted an
Elizabethan reader to the danger of his situation.21
A similar gap opens up between the perceptions of
knight and reader with respect to his other failing,
which I have called the failure to observe. Thus, when
Redcross blithely travels by a "broad high way" (I.iv.2)
to a house built "on a sandie hill" (I.iv.5), the signs
of imminent disaster are clear for any reader who is
familiar with the gospel according to Matthew.22
Similarly, when he gallantly offers himself as a champion
to Duessa, "A goodly Lady clad in scarlot red,/ Purfled
with gold and pearle of rich assay" (I.ii.13), even a
passing familiarity with the book of Revelation, and the
woman described therein as "araied in purple and skarlat,
and guilded with golde, and precious stones, and
pearles"23, should be sufficient to warn the reader that
the knight is in for trouble.
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Now, I recognize that it is hardly something new to
cite these New Testament allusions as aids to the
reader's interpretation of the first book of The Faerie
O.ueene: however, what is, I think, worth considering
anew, is the precise status of these allusions with
respect to the knight himself who so manifestly does not
benefit from their presence in the text. For a critic of
the school of Harry Berger or C. S. Lewis (see
Introduction (2): pp. 132-ff), these allusions might seem
to be classic examples of the way in which allegory
conveys information to the reader "over the head" of the
characters in the story, for whom this information is, in
principle, unavailable.24 In such a reading, the
Redcross knight's failure to recognize Duessa or the
House of Pride for the evils that they are would be seen
as ironies having to do, not with any particular
interpretive failing on his part, but rather with the way
that the poem itself functions in general. But we ought
to consider two points which run counter to such a
conclusion.
First, the details in the descriptions of Duessa and
the House of Pride which allude to the New Testament are
presented not "over the head" of the Redcross knight,
but, rather, precisely as parts of the account of what he
sees. So his situation in failing to recognize these
evils is not comparable, for example, to his lagging
behind the reader in learning that Duessa is "falshood" --
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a fact which is indeed conveyed to the reader, initially,
in a manner inaccessible to the knight (I.ii.Arg), and
which is only made available to him later, when Una
repeats it for his benefit (I.viii.49). Rather, the
details in the passages in question become known to us,
in the first place, only through a report of the knight's
own experience.
Second, the knowledge of the New Testament which a
reader requires in order to observe these allusions does
not constitute a privileged frame of reference to which
the characters in the story can have no access, but,
rather, is the very knowledge which the Redcross knight
must himself acquire in order to become fit for
completing his quest (I.x.19). In fact, not only the New
Testament in general, but the specific details of the New
Testament of which the Redcross knight would have had to
be aware, in order, for example, to have recognized his
folly in allowing himself to be led to the House of
Pride, are both known by certain characters in the world
that he inhabits, and applicable by these characters to
the specific situations in question. Thus Caelia, in
pointing out to the knight the moral difference between
"the broad high way" and "the narrow path" (I.x.10)
refers both to the book which he will soon begin to study
(specifically, to Matthew 7:13-14), and to the roads
which have, in their world, a quite literal existence as
well as a figurative meaning -- the former being the
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"broad high way" (I.iv.2) that leads to destruction in
the form of the House of Pride, and the latter the
"narrow way" (I.x.35) which leads to life in the form of
"the new Hierusalem" (I.x.57). Caelia understands the
moral significance of following the various roads in
Faery Land because, through her knowledge of the New
Testament, she understands what they symbolize.
We may grasp much more tangibly the importance of the
Redcross knight's learning, in the House of Holiness, how
properly to interpret the Scriptures, if we see that this
practical skill is precisely the thing that he lacked in
his earlier adventures. Like Caelia, he must learn to
read his adventures symbolically, in the light of the New
Testament, if he is to understand what distinguishes his
armour (Ephesians 6:13ff) and his quest (Revelation 20:2)
from those of the ordinary "errant knight" (I.x.10). The
primary significance of the New Testament allusions in
Book One lies not, then, in any connections that the
poem's readers may see them as authorizing between the
imaginary world in the poem and the real world in which
the poem was written -- as when they are made the basis
of an allegory whose tenor is a Protestant version of
English church history -- but in the exempla which
they provide, within the world of the narrative, of the
practical importance of being able to apply a good
knowledge of the Bible to the events in one's own life.
In the Redcross knight's misadventures, we see the
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consequences of an insufficient knowledge of Scripture
and of the resulting inability to know the right and
wrong in one's own experience; while in ourselves,
conversely, insofar as we are able to anticipate the
knight's woes, we see the usefulness of knowing the
Bible. This is, certainly, a Protestant allegory:
but less, I think, in the sense of representing,
allegorically, a Protestant version of history (a history
to which, in fact, the poem alludes only in the most
general terms), than in the sense of being an allegory
for Protestants -- that is, an allegory in which the
Protestant emphasis on knowing the Bible gives one an
unmistakable interpretive advantage, and which thereby
exemplifies, for the reader who understands its clues,
the practical rewards of a Protestant education.
Now, it may be objected to my reading of the knight's
relation to the poem's Biblical allusions that the
Redcross knight does in fact have a copy of the New
Testament even before he reaches the House of Holiness,
as is demonstrated by his making a present of it to
Arthur (I.ix.19). It might be argued, on this basis,
that his failure to notice the significance of Duessa and
the House of Pride cannot be the result of a lack of
Scriptural knowledge, but must rather be attributed to
his having, in principle, (as Berger and Lewis have
argued), a different relationship to the things in his
experience than do the poem's readers. But his being
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seen to possess a copy of the New Testament is less
important to my argument than the fact that he clearly
does not know how to interpret Scripture correctly until
Fidelia teaches him how to do so (I.x.l9ff). The Bible's
power to save souls may be mentioned at its first
appearance (I.ix.19); but only once the knight has been
taught to read it properly do we see this power in
action, when, in learning the lessons that Fidelia
preaches from it, he begins to reflect upon the moral
status of his past actions, and thereupon to repent of
his sins (I.x.21).
The Legend of Holiness further dramatizes the
indispensabi1ity of being able to draw upon a knowledge
of the Bible in interpreting one's experiences, by
presenting an imaginary world in which, unless one has
access to the moral structure that is revealed in it
through allusions to the Scriptures, good and evil are
frequently, even regularly, indistinguishable from one
another. Not only does evil typically disguise itself,
in this world, under the semblance of good — with
Archimago, Duessa, the House of Pride, and the wandering
wood, for example, all appearing under a superficially
benevolent or otherwise "goodly" (I.ii.13, I.iv.5) aspect
-- but, at the same time (though this has been noticed
less commonly by critics), things in this world which are
genuinely good frequently appear in forms which suggest
evil. For instance, Arthur's physical description at his
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first appearance in the poem is full of imagery and
emotive words which could easily be mistaken for clues
that he is a figure of evil: thus, for example, his
helmet is described as "haughtie" and "horrid"
('haughtie', in particular, being a loaded word in a book
wherein evil appears again and again as the sin of
pride), and is shaped like a "Dragon", complete with
"greedie pawes" and a "dreadfull hideous hed" and even a
"scaly tayle" which recalls the long and dangerous tails
that regularly adorn Spenser's monsters (I.vii.31;
compare the tails of Errour, I. i. 16-18, and of the
dragon, I.xi.llff); all this seems to associate him
closely with the various evils in Una's experience, and
in particular, with the dragon that has laid waste to her
native land.26 There is a comparably troubling quality
to the first appearance of Fidelia, who comes forth
initially bearing "a cup of gold,/.../In which a Serpent
did himselfe enfold,/ That horrour made to all, that did
behold" -- troubling not only because the serpent is
frequently a sign of evil, or even because of the
horrible aspect of this serpent in particular, but also
because the cup itself is uncannily reminiscent of the
"golden cup" recently borne by Duessa, whose contents
were "Death and despeyre.../ And secret poyson"
(I.viii.14); indeed, even the name "Fidelia" might be
supposed to be a cause for concern, in that it is
reminiscent of the name "Fidessa" by which that prior
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cup-bearer was first known.27
The equivocal appearances of things in the world
presented by the first book of The Faerie Queene pose a
serious problem both for the characters who inhabit this
world and for the poem's readers. Indeed, our own
difficulties as readers are, if anything, exacerbated by
the difficulties suffered by the characters, since, to a
large degree, we see the world as it appears through
their eyes, and therefore, to that degree, already
(unreliably) interpreted. Only with reference to the
absolute standard of the New Testament does it become
possible, either for them or for us, to distinguish
between true righteousness and the destructive
self-righteousness that is fostered by pride. The sooner
that they, and we, learn to rely on this standard alone,
mistrusting all the other voices in the text that seem,
superficially, to be authoritative, the sooner we will
begin to see clearly the true nature of the path that
their story follows. For Una and the Redcross knight,
this revelation must wait until the second half of their
adventures; for us, it is potentially available from the
time when they leave the wandering wood, confidently and
resolutely following the path that leads to destruction.
Important as it is that the Redcross knight's actions
be judged against the absolute standard of Scripture,
however, we should also note that, for the knight
himself, acquiring the ability to assess rightly the
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merits of his own actions is no more than an
indispensable first step in a larger process, and one
which, in isolation, leads to precisely the opposite of
the desired result: that is, to the abandonment rather
than to the completion of his quest. Thus, for example,
in his training at the House of Holiness, when he comes
to perceive truly the course his story has taken so far,
this revelation leads, by itself, only to the "anguish"
of recognizing his "sinfull guilt", and thereby to the
despairing wish that he might "end his wretched dayes"
(I.x.21). And when, subsequently, in his discussion with
the hermit Contemplation, it is revealed to him that, by
the absolute standards of heaven, his future actions no
less than his past ones -- even including his actions in
completing his quest -- themselves "can nought but sin,
and... sorrowes yield" (I.x.60) because all undertakings
in a fallen world are sinful, he once again expresses a
yearning to withdraw from action in the world, if not
through suicide then through the equally unacceptable
alternative of monastic retirement (I.x.63).
Treated as an end in itself, rather than as a step in
a larger process, such meditation on the inevitable gap
between the standards of righteousness and the standards
of one's own behaviour would lead nowhere but to a
repetition of the temptation which the knight faces at
the cave of Despair (I.ix.33ff). Actively directing the
knight beyond such a meditation -- as Una actively saves
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him from Despair -- is therefore as essential as making
him capable of such self-criticism in the first place.
The principle behind the required direction is also the
same as that which Una seizes upon in saving her knight
from Despair: namely, to refocus the knight's attention
on the fact that he has been "chosen", and to admit
consideration of the prospects of salvation or damnation
only in relation to this fact (I.ix.53). Being "chosen"
means, on one hand, being "chosen" by God for sainthood
(I.x.57). But it also means being "chosen" to perform a
task (I.ix.20), and this second sense is inseparable from
the first: for, as the Palmer will observe, in speaking
to the Redcross knight at the beginning of the second
book, it is the
...hard atchieu'ment by you donne,
For which enrolled is your glorious name
In heauenly Registers aboue the Sunne,
Where you a Saint with Saints your seat haue wonne...
(II . i . 32 ) .
In other words, it is for slaying the dragon that he will
be made a Saint -- which is to say, in effect, that God's
choosing the Redcross knight for sainthood consists in
His choosing him to be the one who will slay the dragon.
The question of salvation or damnation for Redcross is
therefore inseparable from the task of completing his
quest; and all merely human judgements as to his moral
worthiness must be subordinated to the effort to achieve
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this goal. Even after his training in charitable works
at the "holy Hospitall" (I.x.36), in which
...so perfect he became,
That from the first vnto the last degree,
His mortall life he learned had to frame
In holy righteousnesse, without rebuke or blame...
(I . x . 4 5 ) ,
the Redcross knight must still acknowledge that he is
"Vnworthy... of so great grace" as God has bestowed upon
him in preparing for him a place "emongst the Saints"
(I.x.62); Contemplation, responding to the knight's
recognition of this fact, does not deny the knight's
unworthiness, but rather observes, first, that those
others "that haue... attaind" sainthood were themselves
"in like cace" (I.x.62), and then insists, once again, on
the necessity of the knight's returning to the quest
which he has been chosen to perform (I.x.63). Salvation
itself is not ultimately explicable in terms of good works
or human desert; what is clear, however, is the task which
God requires, of this elect knight, as the condition of
his election: namely, that he complete that quest of
which Una, after his return from Contemplation's cell,
soon "gan him desire.../...mindful1 for to bee" (I.x.68).
If, as I have argued, the Redcross knight's error in
the earlier part of his story is that he does not realize
that his knighthood and his quest have a figurative
meaning pertaining to divine election and salvation, then
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the opposite error, from which he must be dissuaded
before he can proceed on his way from the House of
Holiness at the end of the tenth canto, is to suppose
that the knighthood and the quest have significance only
with respect to this figurative meaning: that is, that
he should not need to return to 1 iterally being a knight
or performing a chivalric mission now that what these
things symbolize has been revealed. Accordingly, the
hermit Contemplation, in insisting that the knight must
return "Backe to the world" and to the quest which he
has left uncompleted (I.x.63), paradoxically must
emphasize the very "earthly" nature of the task which he
is still required to perform (I.x.60). As a
spiritually-minded commentator on the poem's action,
Contemplation is precisely the sort of figure whom we
would expect to find spelling out the spiritual meanings
of the dragon and the woman for whose sake the knight
goes to slay it, as his innumerable predecessors, the
hermits and abbots who guide the Grail knights in the
Quest of the Holy Grail, might have done. But in fact,
this hermit does not even mention, much less develop, a
symbolic meaning for the Redcross knight's quest; on the
contrary, he reduces the meaning of the mission to the
most literal level possible, referring to his victory
over the dragon as an "earthly conquest" (I.x.60), and
describing the reason why he must fight the battle solely
in terms of his promise, as a knight, "To aide a virgin
182
desolate foredonne" (I.x.60 -- compare I.x.63, "ne maist
thou yit/ Forgo that royall maides bequeathed care,/ Who
did her cause into thy hand commit..."). Even the
Redcross shield which the Letter to Raleigh encourages us
to see as "the shield of faith" (Ephesians 6:16) is here
described as no more than a badge of chivalric prowess,
to be left behind "emongst all knights" before he can
take his place "emongst those Saints" who dwell in the
New Jerusalem (I.x.60-1).
The only direct connection which Contemplation
mentions between these "earthly" matters and those which
are "heauenly" lies in the queen in whose service the
knight has undertaken his mission: "For she is heauenly
borne, and heauen may iustly vaunt" (I.x.59). She,
Gloriana, is made the point of connection between
purposes mortal and divine: in her "heauenly" pedigree
lies the reason that, according to Contemplation, it
"well beseemes all knights of noble name" to "haunt" her
court in Cleopolis and "doen their seruice to that
soueraigne Dame" (I.x.59). We may know that the Redcross
knight's quest symbolizes the task of overcoming the
"infernall feend" himself (I.i.5); but what Contemplation
must emphasize is its justification as a literal and
"earthly" chivalric endeavor, a justification which lies
in its being assigned through God's delegate, the earthly
city's "heauenly" queen. Such knighthood in service of a
divinely-appointed ruler, quite apart from the symbolic
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significance of the Redcross knight's particular quest,
is quite different from mere knight-errantry; seeking
"glorie" at such a court (I.x.59) is quite different from
the mere pursuit of self-glorification. The Redcross
knight, having learned to see, in relation to the true
moral standards of heaven, the sinfulness of his own
actions and the reason for his own story's having gone
off course, must learn, next, that the way forward is
still an earthly one, and that his earthly task lies in
serving such a divinely-delegated authority and pursuing
such glory at her court -- and this in spite of the fact
that he has glimpsed a standard of life, in the heavenly
city for which he is ultimately bound, which "does far
surpas" the chivalric life of the city whose queen he
must serve in this world (I.x.58).
It is in relation to this earthly task that the
activities of interpretation and storytelling which Una
takes over from Duessa in the seventh canto of Book One
need to be understood. The end of such activities is not
the disclosure of the 'whole truth' -- which, in a fallen
world, would inevitably result in dwelling on one's own
sinfulness to the exclusion of action -- but rather to
keep events on track toward their divinely-sanctioned
end. Accordingly, a recounting of past woes, as in the
story which Una tells, at Arthur's encouragement, upon
first meeting the prince (I.vii.38-52), is justifiable
only insofar as it leads to a rectification of wrongs,
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that is, to the resumption of the abandoned quest. When,
after the knight's rescue from Orgoglio's dungeon, Una
seems inclined to speak further of "these wrongs"
(I.viii.43), Arthur intervenes, pointing out that "The
things, that grieuous were to do, or beare,/ Them to
renew, I wote, breeds no delight" (I.viii.44). It is
particularly worth noting, I think, that Arthur does not
think it necessary to establish whether or not Redcross
is responsible for his own miseries (that is, whether the
course of events that has left the knight in this state
consisted of things that were "grieuous... to do" or
merely "grieuous... to... beare"); rather, he prefers to
concentrate on exposing the true nature of "that wicked
woman", Duessa, who has been the knight's companion
through most of these events, and to name her as "The
roote of all your care, and wretched plight" (I.viii.45).
Such an assessment may be less penetratingly accurate
than that of Despair, who will justifiably tell the
knight that
Thou falsed hast thy faith with periurie,
And sold thy selfe to serue Duessa vilde,
With whom in all abuse thou hast thy selfe defilde...
(I.ix.46);
but it is also manifestly more conducive to the knight's
putting his mistakes behind him and getting on with the
important business of his quest.
The purpose of storytelling, as Arthur practises it,
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is not the indiscriminate recollection of the past, but
rather the recalling of what advances a worthy cause;
it is an activity justified by its goal. Even when the
prince himself is prevailed upon to tell his story, he
treats his own recitation as something functional, in
relation to his own quest, much as the story that he had
requested of Una has proven functional with respect to
hers: for in recounting his past and how he has come to
be in Faery Land, he stirs in himself a "fresh desire his
voyage to pursew" (I.ix.18) -- a desire upon which he
proceeds almost immediately to act (I.ix.20). Such a
pragmatic relation to storytelling epitomizes the right
use of this activity in a fallen world where there are
clear goals to be achieved in spite of the inevitable
imperfection of those who are to achieve them. After
Arthur's departure, Una follows his good example: at
the cave of Despair, and subsequently, her activity as
a storyteller is virtually synonymous with her new role
as the Redcross knight's guide, as she reminds him
repeatedly of the story which he is meant to be acting
out on her behalf (I.ix.52, I.x.68, I.xi.1-2).
Arthur's passing lightly over the Redcross knight's
own responsibility for his downfall with a clear view to
forwarding his quest must be distinguished from the mere
playing the part of the knight's apologist without any
such view to a larger goal, as was done by Una and the
poem's narrator during the course of the knight's
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straying from the proper course of his story. Giving a
generous interpretation of events is not wrong in itself:
on the contrary, devising "each... others prayse.../ How
to aduaunce with fauourable hands" is a significant part
of what knights who are "allyed.../ In braue poursuit of
cheualrous emprize" can do for one another (I.ix.l).
Indeed, there is a telling ambiguity in the notion of
'advancing one another's praises', which appears to mean
both interpreting one another's deeds favourably and
helping one another to accomplish such deeds as are
susceptible of favourable interpretation: for being
sympathetically interpreted (as is shown in Arthur's
relation with the Redcross knight) can itself help one on
one's way to the accomplishing of good deeds.
The alliance of Arthur with Una and the Redcross
knight in the ninth canto of Book One is the first of a
series of such leagues which are formed among The Faerie
Queene's principal characters in their encounters with
one another throughout the poem. Such alliances
recognize the community of interests that good people
share and that they can help one another to advance,
whether through deeds in one another's aid or (more
commonly) through reciprocally beneficial words. Una
introduces the notion of reciprocal benefit when she
requests of Arthur that, before they part ways, he should
...his name and nation tell;
Least so great good, as he for her had wrought,
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Should die vnknown, and buried be in thanklesse thought.
(I.ix.2).
Once Arthur has complied with her wish, she promptly
demonstrates the beneficial use to which she shall put
this knowledge of her benefactor, by singing the praises
of his quest for the Faery Queen, and thereby helping him
to transform the pain of recollected passion (I.ix.16)
into a renewed motivation for his undertaking (I.ix.18).
The Redcross knight promptly follows her example, by
praising both Una, for her steadfast devotion to himself,
and Arthur, for his worthiness of winning the Faery
Queen's grace (I.ix.17). The feeling, on their parting
to perform their separate missions, is that the exchange
of praise has sent them on their way with a revitalized
sense of purpose (I.ix.20).
The focal point for the various alliances of mutual
encouragement which help to spur The Faerie Oueene's
knights on their way is the court of the Faery Queen,
where individual acts of "prayse" (I.ix.l) can be
converted into a place "in th'immortall booke of fame"
(I.x.59). This "immortall booke of fame", while never
actually identified with "the boke of life" (Revelation
20:12) into which the names of God's elect are written,
seems to be closely associated with that other (in a
sense more truly "immortall") book, through the
congruence of human and divine purposes in the "heauenly"
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authority of Gloriana (I.x.59). Thus, for example, the
Palmer will wish upon the Redcross knight the
"euerlasting fame" which is conferred at "Faerie court",
apparently as an earthly correlate to what the knight has
already been granted by God, namely his having had his
"glorious name" written "In heauenly Registers aboue the
Sunne,/ Where you a Saint with Saints your seat haue
wonne" (II.i.31-2). It is, apparently, because of this
association between the "euerlasting fame" conferred at
Gloriana's court and the eternal blessedness conferred by
God, that Contemplation can speak of the former as an
appropriate "earthly" goal for those who aim ultimately
at the latter (I.x.59).
Now, if wishing to have one's name and deeds written
in "th'immortal1 booke of fame" is a legitimate spur
toward undertaking the action which God prescribes for
his elect on earth, then the kind of favourable
storytelling that can help to advance a quest while it is
in progress also has a legitimate place after the quest's
completion: for fame consists in a favourable
interpretation of one's deeds after the fact, revived by
acts of storytelling as often as is necessary to prevent
their being forgotten; and the hope of fame -- which is
what actually constitutes the spur to action in question
-- resides in the existence of a community of the
"chosen" which is committed to such favourable reception
of its members' successes.
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This, I think, is the context in which we can
understand the significance of the events in the twelfth
canto of the Legend of Holiness. As the very existence
of this final canto attests, the story has not yet been
brought to its conclusion with the knight's victory over
the dragon. Rather, just as Duessa's and Una's acts of
storytelling have had an impact on the directions that
the story itself has taken during the course of the
knight's quest, so now their respective versions of that
story must compete to determine the form in which the
completed quest will be received and enshrined in memory.
It is here, at the very end of his legend, that we
see the Redcross knight becoming involved for the first
time in telling his own story. Not only does he politely
accede to the request of Una's father that he recount his
adventures (I.xii.15), but in marked contrast to his
earlier preference for using "swords" rather than "words"
in defending himself against slander, he takes pains to
respond to the version of events offered by Archimago and
Duessa (I.xii.26-8) with his own version of the same
incidents (I.xii.31-2). Now, to this extent, the
knight's storytelling is amenable to a straightforward
interpretation, in that the capacity to explain his own
story might be seen as the prerequisite of the ability,
which he will demonstrate in the first canto of Book Two,
to act as his own guide once separated from Una, and thus
to keep himself on track despite Archimago's attempts
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once again to distract him from his course (II.i.4-5).
But there is an aspect of the knight's newfound facility
as a storyteller which is, at least superficially,
considerably more problematic. For, pressed to explain
his dalliance with Duessa, the knight seems far too
generous to himself in attributing his deception at her
hands to "her wicked arts, and wylie skill,/ Too false
and strong for earthly skill or might" (I.xii.32) -- as
if, in the event, he had displayed the kind of strength
against which only mighty sorcery could ever have
prevailed. In fact, as we have seen, Duessa did not need
to cast a spell over the knight: he was quite ready,
without her having to resort to such means, to believe
whatever story she told him, and to champion whatever
cause she named, because in the first place he had such a
poor grasp of the nature of his own proper story, and so
little clear commitment to the cause which he was
originally meant to champion. Moreover, much of his
questionable behaviour during his time with Duessa -- let
us take, for example, his obeisance to Lucifera upon
winning the duel against Sansjoy (I.v.16) -- had been at
his own initiative, and at most indirectly occasioned by
any deception on Duessa's part. (We may compare the
version of his story that he offers here to the more
honest appraisal which he makes in the House of Holiness
of his own responsibility for his woes (I.x.21ff), as
well as to Despair's pointedly accurate summary of his
191
sins (I.ix.46)). Finally, the knight offers even this
manipulated account of his truancy with Duessa only when
he is specifically required by Una's father to answer the
charges levelled against him by Archimago (I.xii.30);
prior to this, it seems (I.xii.15), he had contrived to
tell the story of his adventures without any reference to
his having taken another lady as his companion. Hamilton
suggests, with respect to the knight's "omission of any
reference to Duessa in his 'point to point' account of
his 'straunge adventures, and of perils sad'", that "Even
the memory of his sin seems to have been purged in the
house of Holiness until he is now reminded"29; but this
is as over-generous to the knight as the knight appears
to be to himself. There is nothing in this story,
(equivalent to Dante's crossing of Lethe in the
Purgatorio. which is perhaps what Hamilton has in
mind30), to suggest that the temporary forgetting of his
sin has any part in the Redcross knight's purification;
besides, had he really forgotten all his sins, as
Hamilton suggests, it is hard to imagine what he would
have had left to tell of his adventures. The fact that
those who listen to his initial account of events
...did lament his lucklesse state,
And often blame the too importune fate,
That heapd on him so many wrathfull wreakes:
For neuer gentle knight, as he of late,
So tossed was in fortunes cruell freakes...
(I.xii.16 ),
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seems to indicate that he has told them some version
of his misadventures in the House of Pride and the
dungeon of Orgoglio, but one in which he has managed to
leave out his amorous dalliance with Duessa, and in which
(as with his subsequent account of Duessa herself) he has
described himself entirely as the victim of external
evils, as if his own errors had not precipitated his
fall. As for another suggestion of Hamilton's, that the
inaccuracy of his account is indicative of the fact "that
the Knight is not yet wedded to Truth"31, this too fails
when put to the test; for after his wedding to Una
(I.xii.36-41), we find him, if anything, more prone than
ever to be more generous to himself than the objective
facts of his quest warrant. Where, for example, is the
acknowledgement of his sins in his (superficially humble)
declaration to Guyon and the Palmer that "all I did, I
did but as I ought" (II.i.33)? In sum, it seems that, in
order to defend himself against falsehood, the knight has
learned not so much to articulate the truth, as to
present a version of events which shows him in the best
possible light.
Of course, there is some truth in the versions of his
story which the Redcross knight tells about himself. But
this is hardly a ringing endorsement of the version of
events with which he combats the allegations of Archimago
and Duessa, particularly in view of the fact that these
allegations themselves are not out-and-out lies, but like
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his own story contain some truth. For example, while it
is, of course, pure hypocrisy on Duessa's part to claim
that it was the knight who forsook her (I.xii.26; for the
facts of the matter, see I.vii.14-16), nevertheless, the
substance of her charge against him, namely that "he
already plighted his right hand/ Vnto another loue"
(I.xii.26), is, if not true, at least close enough to the
truth that we cannot absolutely gainsay it -- and nor,
for that matter, does the knight himself try to gainsay
it, but rather pleads that, whatever he did, it was under
a compulsion "Too false and strong for earthly skill or
might" (I.xii.32).
Rather than a clear-cut case of truth versus
falsehood, then, the contest between the Redcross knight
and his enemies comes to look like a standoff between two
manifestly biased and self-interested versions of the
story. So the fact that the knight's version is accepted
in the end does not furnish us, as we might have
expected, with an exemplum of truth's proving itself
against falsehood. Indeed, if we look at the matter
closely, we shall see that the acceptance of the knight's
version of events has nothing at all to do with the
merits of his case, nor with the flaws of the case
presented by his rivals. It is, rather, the messenger
himself, and not the case which he presents, that is
thrown out of court: once he is recognized by Una as




experience, to be her bitter enemy (I.iii.40) -- and
denounced as "The falsest man aliue" (I.xii.34) by her,
the sole daughter and heir of the presiding judge, there
can be no further question of listening to the merits of
his version of the story. Instead, he is thrown
immediately into prison (I.xii.35-6), and the whole
debate occasioned by his appearance is set aside as if
forgotten, leaving the knight's version of events not so
much adjudged to be true as allowed, once again, to stand
uncontested.
The apparent fact that the Redcross knight is
economical with the truth in relating his own adventures
is generally not mentioned by the poem's commentators, or
if mentioned, is not allowed to disturb the general
picture which the poem presents of a knight who is now so
perfected in his virtue as to merit being called a living
saint (II.i.32). But surely we ought not to dismiss so
lightly a case in which the character whom we are led to
see as the very paragon of the virtue celebrated by the
book shows a manifest bias in his own interpretation of
his story. Crudely put, if we cannot trust the Redcross
knight, even after his purification in the House of
Holiness and his victory over the dragon, to give us a
true and objective account of the story, then whom can we
trust? Rather than passing lightly, in view of his
declared saintliness, over his unreliable rendering of
his own story, might we not equally well question, in
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turn, the reliability of the very declaration that he is
"a Saint" (II.i.32)? Or what reason could we give for
supposing that the Palmer, who makes this declaration, is
a more reliable interpreter of the world than is the
knight himself?
The reason, perhaps, why these questions are not
ordinarily pressed, is that they could easily lead to a
forced and unsatisfactory reading of the poem as morally
relativistic. We must keep in mind, after all, that this
is the story of "Saint George", the "frend/ And
Patrone.../ ...of mery England" (I.x.61), told as a moral
allegory portraying the virtue of holiness; to propose,
then, that such a plan were executed in a spirit of moral
relativism, and that the saint were not to be seen as a
saint, except in his own eyes and the eyes of his allies
from Gloriana's court, would be to posit a deeply cynical
Spenser. And however strange are these developments in
the final canto of the first book, they are not such as
to convince a reader that there is a deep authorial
cynicism at work here, undercutting the very plan of the
poem. (Some recent critics have seen a complete
authorial undercutting of the virtue of the second book,
and at least one critic, extrapolating from such a
reading of the second book, has even described such
ironic undercutting of the poem's ostensible purpose as
typical of The Faerie Queene as a whole; but no one, so
far as I am aware, has actually sustained a similar
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reading 'against the grain' of Book One and its
proclaimed celebration of the virtue of Holiness.32) But
neither should we insist, against such evidence as we see
in the final canto of Book One, upon seeing the imaginary
world of The Faerie Queene as analogous, ethically, to
the naive world of folk tale and popular legend, such as
would have characterized Spenser's sources for the story
of Saint George, wherein the question whether the good
are really good and the bad really bad is never even
raised and never needs to be contemplated. On the
contrary, as we have seen, it is the "earthly" condition
of the Redcross knight's quest, and the inevitable
failure of its protagonist to live up to an absolute
standard of good, which the poem emphasizes.
What we see, I think, in the contest over the final
interpretation of the knight's story, is not a case of
truth's proving itself against falsehood, but rather the
forcible establishment, by a virtuous community, of a
version of the truth which promotes the right interests,
against a version of the same truth which perverts those
interests and promotes the wrong ones in their place.
In agreeing to a version of the Redcross knight's story
which is substantially identical to the one which Arthur
proposed (I.viii.44-5) in order to get that story back on
track -- a version which passes lightly over the question
of the knight's own responsibility for his misadventures
in favour of an emphasis on the malicious influence of
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Duessa -- the community gathered at the end of Book One
to celebrate the knight's victory recognizes the
continuing importance, even after the quest's completion,
of focusing on the achievement of its final goal. A
sinner the Redcross knight may be: but then, which of
the saints was not "in like cace" in earthly life
(I.x.62)? If the knight's personal history is not so
unblemished as to set him above the reach of malicious
detractors, he has nevertheless proven himself, in the
end, loyal to the "virgin desolate foredonne" (I.x.60)
who "did her cause into [his] hand commit" (I.x.63), and
loyal, too, to the "heauenly borne" queen (I.x.59) under
whose authority he undertook his quest. If he is to
receive the earthly "fame" and "glorie" (I.x.59) that he
now merits, the right points must be emphasized: his
actions must be represented with a favourable emphasis,
both by himself, and by his friends -- those in the
kingdom he has delivered (I.xii.33-4), and subsequently,
those from "Faerie court" (II.i.31-2).
By the time that Una steps forward to defend her
knight from the (partially true) charges made against him
in her father's house, we have come, in a sense, full
circle from her early inclination to overlook any wrong
in her knight's behaviour, so long as he returns to her
in the end (I.iii.30); only now, her defense of her
champion is tempered with a clear critical awareness of
the difference between her friends and her enemies, and
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in particular, of the falseness of the appearances behind
which "Archimago.../ The falsest man aliue" hides his
malicious intent (I.xii.34).
Another character whose changing role in the first
book of The Faerie Queene is best understood with
reference to the legitimacy of the human desire to be
enrolled in "th'immortal1 booke of fame" is the poem's
imaginary narrator. To this point, I have spoken only
critically of this character, describing him as a
manifestly unreliable interpreter and a shameless and
increasingly ridiculous apologist for the Redcross
knight's misadventures in the first half of the Legend of
Holiness. But just as Una's initially uncritical praise
of her straying knight gives way, after their reunion, to
a praise which is based in a critical awareness of her
own interests, so too the narrator's relation to the
knight, while remaining partisan to the end, is reformed
in the second half of his rendition.
That the narrator does continue to play the part of
the knight's apologist to the very end may be seen from
the way in which he presents the events of the twelfth
canto. It is only in retrospect, after Archimago appears
to insist on the knight's blameworthiness, that we are
able to infer that the knight's own initial account of
his adventures must have omitted all mention of having
taken Duessa as his companion: for, at the time, the
narrator had glanced over this fact, telling us instead,
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quite wrongly, that Redcross "From point to point, as is
before exprest,/ Discourst his voyage long, according his
request" (I.xii.15). This appeal to his own previous
rendition is doubly disingenuous: for not only does it
conveniently ignore the fact that the knight has not told
a version in which his dalliance with Duessa figures, but
it suggests that his own narratorial account of events
has itself been the transparently objective version of
the story that a candid recitation would ideally repeat,
when we know that the narrator himself has been, at
times, as wayward as the knight himself in the
interpretation of the knight's adventures.
That there may be a legitimate purpose to the kind of
partisanship which the narrator shows toward the Redcross
knight in the twelfth canto -- if not, assuredly, to the
kind which he showed in the first six -- may be seen, I
think, if we consider the narrator's declared status as a
"Poet historical" (Letter to Raleigh). (I take the role
of "Poet historical" to characterize Spenser's fictional
persona within the poem, rather than Spenser himself,
because it is chiefly from the perspective of this
persona that the events of the poem are understood to be
historical.) The way in which the narrator of The
Faerie Oueene conceives of his role may be seen from the
fact that he explicitly presents himself, not as a
disinterested reporter of past events, but as one,
rather, who aims to revive the fame of the good knights
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and ladies of a former age (I.Pr.l). He voices the same
intention, with respect to the Redcross knight in
particular, as the knight enters into his fight with the
dragon (I.xi.5-7). What is more, in claiming that he
derives his version of events from "antique rolles" kept
in the Muse's "euerlasting scryne" (I.Pr.2), he seems to
suggest that he is using as his source the very
"immortall booke of fame" in which Gloriana's knights
"couet.../ To be eternized" (I.x.59). In reawakening
their "prayses" that have "slept in silence long"
(I.Pr.l), he is, in effect, using their own records of
their deeds for the very purpose which they were
originally intended, and so participating in the
fulfillment of that hope of "euerlasting fame" (II.i.32)
which helped to spur them toward undertaking their
virtuous actions in the first place. To this extent, his
partisan stance becomes comprehensible as a declaration
of his own participation in the community of virtuous
interests to which the characters who strive for glory at
Faery Court belong.
A further understanding of the role into which the
narrator of the Legend of Holiness matures by its twelfth
canto may be gleaned from a glance at sixteenth-century
expectations of 'historical poetry' (a broad category
which included most of the works that the Letter to
Raleigh cites as precedents for The Faerie Queene. among
them not only the classical and romance epics but also
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certain prose works such as Xenophon's Cvropaedia 33),
and of reports of the past more generally. On one hand,
the poet's approach to history was conventionally
contrasted with that of the historian proper, or what
the Letter to Raleigh calls the "Historiographer":
historiography, it was said, "helpeth not itself with any
other thing but the plaine truth", whereas poetry "doth
commonly inrich things by commending them above the
starrs and their deserving".34 On the other hand, the
stories of the poets remained significant sources for the
historiographers themselves, who had as yet no truly
distinct version of history from that of the poets, so
that while they might, for example, express skepticism
about the traditions that traced the beginnings of the
European nations to the fall of Troy, there was as yet no
clear and well-developed alternative to them;
consequently, Homer's epics themselves remained as much a
cornerstone of the historical as of the poetic
tradition.30 The resulting paradox was to be expressed
by Thomas Heywood, who observes, in his Troia Britanica
(1609), that, on one hand, the Homeric epics were the
principal source on which we rely for our knowledge of
events whose memory "else long since had perisht"
(viii.6)36, but that, on the other hand, these poems
might easily reflect nothing but the poet's own, possibly
whimsical biases:
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...had great Homer pleasd
Penelop had beene wanton, Hellen chast...
Thersites had the Imperiall Scepter ceasd,
And Agamemnon in his rancke beene plast...
(viii.7).
Heywood goes so far as to imagine what, for all we know,
the reality might have been underlying Homer's very
different account of the events:
Achilles, durst not looke on Hector when
He guld his Siluer armes in Greekish bloud,
Homer that lou'd him more then other men,
Gaue him such hart, that he gainst Hector stood...
Twas Poesy that made Achilles bold,
Stout Aiax, valiant, and Vlisses wise,
By Homer's guift the great Alcide contrould
The hoast of Greekes: all such as highly prise
The sacred Muse, their names are writ in gold,
Thersites was well featur'd, but denyes
The Muse her honor, therefore to his shame,
The Muse hath made him Stigmaticke and l'ame.
(viii.8-9).
In sum, historical poetry was thought of, on one hand, as
a kind of record of the past, but as a kind, on the other
hand, which could virtually be defined in terms of its
non-objectivity. What justified the writing and reading
of such poetry -- and, indeed, of other sorts of history
to the extent that they relied upon poetic or otherwise
suspect sources -- could not be any claim to descriptive
accuracy. Rather, the justification which was ordinarily
offered on behalf of both historical poetry and historio¬
graphy was that they encouraged virtue and discouraged
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vice, and this in two ways: first, through the lessons
and the inspiration that examples from the past could
provide for those who read about them; and second, through
the readers' consideration that they in their turn would
be lauded or vilified by future histories (poetical or
otherwise) and by the future generations who read them,
depending on whether they had lived well or badly.37
Judged, then, by the standards of the time, the
partiality of Spenser's narrator toward his heroes does
not sit strangely with his supposed role as an historical
reporter of the deeds in question, for what he ultimately
achieves through this partiality is an instance of
historical poetry's ethical function: he shows us that
the virtuous, like the Redcross knight, will be treated
generously by history, and that their legitimate desire
to be remembered well, which helps to motivate them
toward virtuous action in the first place, will be
fulfilled by the writers of later ages.
We may compare the two moral poles of the narrator's
approach to storytelling within the first book of The
Faerie Queene -- initially, as an aimless apologist for
an errant and sinful knight, and latterly, as a
purposeful apologist for the redeemed and devoted knight
-- to roles distinguished in the discussion of poetry in
Spenser's View of the Present State of Ireland. Both
speakers in this dialogue agree that, so long as it is
the genuinely virtuous whom storytellers set about
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celebrating, it is quite proper for them to use whatever
poetical devices they have at their command "to beautify
and adorn" these people's virtue; the problem arises,
according to the character Irenius, only when these same
devises are "abused", and turned improperly "to the
gracing of wickedness and vice".36 Spenser here shows
himself to be well aware that, in granting a reporter of
history 'poetic license' in expressing the facts, one
grants him also the power to make what is virtuous appear
bad and what is vicious appear good; but this leads to an
argument, not for denying this license to reporters of
history, but for reforming the practices which lead to
abuse of the license, as for example the practice whereby
(as Irenius testifies) the Irish bards will write poems
in celebration of robbers in return for a share of the
stolen goods.33 Presumably, if storytellers are weaned
from such base motives, and turned instead toward their
proper end, that of praising the truly virtuous, then the
danger of perverse and perverting representations of the
past will disappear without poets and historians having
to be denied a generous partisan interest in the good
deeds of the heroes whom they celebrate. This is
important, because, for Spenser, the proper interests of
hero and storyteller are inseparably bound up together.
The storyteller's primary goal must be -- and be seen to
be -- not objective accuracy in the reporting of events,
but the fulfilling of that legitimate desire for good
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report which is so important in motivating the hero to
undertake virtuous actions in the first place; for only
thus will the ethical aim of storytelling be fulfilled,
which is that the listeners be "stirred up to affect like
commendations, and so to strive unto the like deserts".40
It may be appropriate at this point to respond to the
readings of both The Faerie Oueene and the View of the
Present State of Ireland which have been advanced, in a
recent book, by Annabel Patterson. Patterson argues
that, in both of these works, the representation of the
Elizabethan regime as an absolute good, and of its
enemies as absolute evils, is ironic; and that, so far
as it was possible for him to do so in a state which
punished seditious writing harshly, Spenser indicates
that beneath the moral absolutes of official propaganda,
to which his texts superficially contribute, there lies a
more fundamental and less moral truth -- what Patterson
calls "the naked realities of opposed interests and
unequal power relations".41 Now, no doubt Patterson is
right in the importance which she attributes to the fact
that Spenser lived in a society where it was not
possible, or at least not safe, to publish much of what
one might have believed or suspected to be true.42 Nor,
as I think my exposition of the Redcross knight's early
adventures will have made clear (see esp. pp. 167-9),
would I argue with the claim that Spenser calls to a
sensitive reader's attention the possibility of moral
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relativism lurking behind apparent absolutes of good and
evil. Nevertheless, it seems to me that, whatever
Spenser may have believed privately, in the writings that
we have been discussing it is moral relativism, rather
than the belief in absolute standards of good and evil,
which he presents as the superficial point of view that
must be stripped away in order to apprehend truly "the
naked realities" of moral action in the world -- a
superficial point of view, moreover, which actually
serves those who would work against truly good interests.
To see what I mean by this, let us return to the
fifth canto of Book One, where, as I have observed, the
Redcross knight's self-righteous behaviour and the
narrator's interpretation of him as genuinely righteous
conceal the knight's having descended to a wretched moral
parity with his "faithlesse foe" (I.v.Arg). If there is
an episode in Book One wherein moral absolutism appears
to be the superficial doctrine and moral relativism the
underlying reality, then this is surely it, as a brief
examination of the canto will show.
The superficiality of moralization in the House of
Pride episode is indicated not only (as I have already
argued) through increasingly conspicuous irony at the
expense of the knight's and narrator's moral interpreta¬
tions of the action, but also through the presence, at
Lucifera's court, of "many Bardes, that to the trembling
chord/ Can tune their timely voyces cunningly,/ And many
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Chroniclers" who make it their business, as if in direct
rivalry with those who compose "th'immortal1 booke of
fame" at the court of Gloriana (I.x.59), to "record/ Old
loues, and warres for Ladies doen by many a Lord"(I.v.3).
No doubt the likes of these, committed as they appear to
be to the conventional values of secular knight-errantry,
would (like the narrator and the knight himself) see the
Redcross knight's battling for the sake of Duessa as a
valiant undertaking. At the very least, the presence of
these storytellers in the House of Pride indicates that,
in the world presented by the poem, history and fame are
made not only at Faery court, but in many places and in
the service of many different interests, and that one
court's fame might be another's infamy and vice versa.
Taken by itself, this fact might seem to relativize vice
and virtue, reducing them to nothing more than reputa¬
tions contingent upon the interests of the particular
poems or chronicles wherein they are enshrined; and it
might seem, on this basis, as though the knight's seeking
a good name at the House of Pride rather than, as he did
originally, at Gloriana's court (I.i.3), is no more than
a matter of his choosing to play for a good reputation
according to a somewhat different set of house rules.
Moreover, as the fifth canto continues, it begins to
seem that, not only with respect to earthly fame, but at
a cosmic level as well, the absolute distinctions between
good and evil as maintained by the poem's narrator are
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revealing themselves to be mere covers for a deeper moral
relativism. After the battle between Redcross and
Sansjoy, the narrator follows Duessa on a journey to the
underworld, undertaken for the purpose of healing the
mortally wounded pagan knight. It is the first time that
we see Duessa as part of a cause larger than herself.
She is still seen as evil, but she is no longer presented
as indiscriminately evil, that is, as having an equally
ill will to one and all. On the contrary, she treats the
goddess Night (I.v.20ff), and all "Nightes children"
(I.v.23), including the fallen Sansjoy, as her allies,
and seeks to advance their cause against "the children of
faire light" (I.v.24), who include the Redcross knight.
From the point of view of Night and her partisans, this
cause has a certain righteousness, notwithstanding it is
the cause "Of falshood" (I.v.27). In addressing Night as
"most auncient Grandmother of all/ More old then Ioue,
whom thou at first didst breede" (I.v.22), Duessa seems
to imply Night's superior claim to the throne which Jove
occupies as a usurper, and to suggest that, although Jove
may have the power to enforce his bias towards "The
sonnes of Day" (I.v.25), he has not the right to do so:
for the "eternall seat" to which is attached "the chayne
of strong necessitee" (I.v.25) should, by right, belong
to the Titanic forces from which Jove has usurped it. In
her turn, Night shows a certain self-righteousness in her
determination to rebel, as far as possible, against
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Jove's dispensation, and to see at least that "he the man
that made Sansfoy to fall,/ Shall with his owne bloud
price that he hath spilt" (I.v.26).
Now, so far, all this is not especially unsettling:
there are innumerable precedents for the forces of evil
being depicted as a united front working together against
the forces of good; and the fact that, among themselves,
they should represent their cause as a just one is
perhaps to be expected as well. What does appear
dangerous to the moral absolutism of the poem is that the
merits of their case, at least in their immediate
context, are rather surprisingly difficult to dismiss.
The idea that Jove is a usurper and a tyrant, clinging
brutally to a power that is not his by right, is at least
as old as Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound43; and Spenser's
wrathful, "thundring Ioue" (I.v.42) -- who has "thrust"
Aesculapius "vnto hell... aliue", apparently from no
better motive than fear that the man's "wondrous
science.../...that could the dead reuiue" represents a
challenge to his own authority over life and death
(I.v.40) -- looks very much the tyrant described by
Aeschylus' Prometheus. This sense of Jove's tyranny is
bolstered by Spenser's having placed this description of
hell in juxtaposition with the "dongeon deepe" beneath
the house of Pride (I.v.45), and by his strongly
suggesting their similarity in more than one respect
(imprisonment in hell is "remedilesse" (I.v.36),
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Lucifera's dungeon "mercilesse" (I.v.46), and both are
places of internment for the dead of former ages,
including, amongst their complements, many figures from
the pagan classical world (I.v.35, 49-50)); for if we ask
whose role, with respect to hell, corresponds to
v_
Lucifera's role in the House of Pride, then the answer
must be that Jove is the master of that house of which
hell is the dungeon. Indeed, Lucifera herself is pleased
to think of herself as Jove's delegate on earth, so long
as, in doing so, she aligns herself with the most
powerful party (I.iv.ll). An even more explicit analogy
is made between the hell of the fifth canto and the
"Dongeon deepe" (I.vii.15) in which the Redcross knight
is eventually imprisoned: this dungeon is actually
compared to hell (I.viii.39); and the knight's case, like
Aesculapius's (I.v.36), is described as "Remedilesse"
(I.vii.51). Once again, the figure in the analogy who
corresponds to Jove is a brutal and evil tyrant; and in
this case, the giant Orgoglio's likeness to Jove is
further suggested by a simile which compares the giant's
assault with his club to Jove's casting of the
thunderbolt (I.viii.9).
All this combines to create a very strong sense of
Jove as a tyrannical ruler, and lends credence to the
idea voiced by Duessa and by the goddess Night that their
struggle against his oppression is a just one, or at the
very least, gives the impression that Jove is no better
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than themselves. Consequently, so long as nothing enters
the poem to question the assertion made by Duessa and
Night that it is the pagan god Jove who is the patron of
the Redcross knight, a morally relativistic reading of
the action seems increasingly inevitable. The contest
between the forces of Night, who "in hell and heauen had
power equally" (I.v.34), and of Jove, "that rules both
night and day" (I.v.42), comes to look not so much like a
confrontation between good and evil as a naked power
struggle between two self-interested parties, each laying
claim to the other's territory -- or what Patterson calls
"the naked realities of opposed interests and unequal
power relations".
But the threat of a breakdown, into moral relativism,
of the distinction between good and evil, although it is
very real at this point in the legend, is overcome as the
story continues. In particular, the morally bleak
picture presented in the fifth canto improves enormously
once it begins to emerge that not the pagan Jove but the
Christian God is the Redcross knight's real patron, and
that the former is not an adequate representation of the
latter. Thus, no sooner has Una lamented that in
Orgoglio's dungeon the Redcross knight, like Aesculapius
in hell, is held "Remedilesse, for aie" (I.vii.51) than
Prince Arthur breaks the analogy by promising her that he
will "acquit your captiue knight" (I.vii.52). In the
episode that follows, there is a direct contrast between
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the association of Jove with the knight's captor
(I.viii.9), and of the Christian God with his rescuer
(I.viii.21).44 No longer are we led to imagine, as we
were in the fifth canto, that in the world of The Faerie
Oueene. Jove is identical with the Christian God; for
where Jove condemns, the Christian God can also redeem --
Christian redemption being a theme which will be
prevalent through the remainder of the legend of
holiness. When Redcross, parting from Arthur, gives him
the gift of "his Saueours testament/.../ A worke of
wondrous grace, and able soules to saue" (I.ix.19), the
distinction is clear between his God and the merciless
Jove whom Duessa and Night had regarded as his patron.
Soon afterward, an objective distinction is drawn between
the fame which can be achieved at the court of Gloriana
and that which is available in the House of Pride: for
whereas Lucifera's bards and chroniclers serve a queen
without any "heritage of natiue soueraintie", who "did
vsurpe with wrong and tyrannie/ Vpon the scepter, which
she now did hold" (I.iv.12), and even whose false claim
to legitimacy is as the daughter of "thundring Ioue"
(I.iv.ll), a god who is himself a usurper, the compilers
at Faery court of "th1 immortal1 booke of fame" are
assured of serving the true Christian God's purposes by
virtue of Gloriana's being genuinely "heauenly borne"
(I.x.59). What appeared, within the House of Pride
itself, to be merely an alternative basis of earthly
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fame, is now revealed to be a wayward one in relation to
an objective standard. The Redcross knight himself, who
previously had been content to seek fame at a court which
claimed its legitimacy from Jove, now sees, for the first
time, the absolute moral distinction between such a court
and that of a truly legitimate Christian queen.
As far as the first book is concerned, then, the
spectre of moral relativism is banished as the knight
himself is first rescued from sin by "heauenly grace"
(I.viii.l) and then taught to see the Christian God's
purposes in the fallen world. Hereafter, the narrator
will not praise the knight for his sinful behaviour, as
he so inappropriately does during the knight's adventures
in the House of Pride; nevertheless, the narration will
remain legitimately partial to the knight, as the knight
himself will prove a legitimate apologist for his own
cause.
Such a combination as I have argued for, in the first
book of The Faerie Queene. of moral absolutism with a
pragmatic recognition of the inevitable imperfection of
those who pursue good ends, seems to me a not implausible
rendering of views that Spenser might have held 'in real
life', and one 'between the lines' of which we should not
necessarily expect to find a more subversive agenda --
especially should we allow that a genuinely celebratory
intention need not be incompatible with elements of
criticism, if this criticism is loyally intended as part
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of the project of directing events toward their proper
goals.45 In particular, the Redcross knight's position
in the twelfth canto of Book One, as a loyal subject who
merits preferment at court but whose personal history is
not so unblemished as to set him above the reach of
detractors, is no doubt one which Spenser himself and his
various friends and patrons in the Elizabethan ruling
class would have found eminently familiar.
Of course, the moral absolutism of The Faerie Oueene
is not the naive morality of the fairy tale, wherein good
and evil are beyond mixture and need never be called into
question. But the moral complexity of Book One is still
compatible, I think, with a morally absolutist view of
the legitimacy of monarchical rule in general and of the
Elizabethan regime in particular. That complexity, as I
read it, resides in the fact that The Faerie Queene. as
well as giving Queen Elizabeth and Spenser's various
aristocratic patrons what might now be called 'good
press', also argues the legitimacy of good press -- and,
indeed, the positive need for good press -- in a world
wherein even those who fight for what is good are
fallen.45 The gap, to which the poem draws attention,
between the real world and its ideal poetic
representation, is meant to signify, in other words, not
a veiled subversive agenda, but (rather less dangerously)
the importance in society of the role of the storyteller;
it shows Spenser, not flirting with the consequences of
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being seen to question in print the ultimate Tightness of
Elizabethan rule, but rather promoting, with a certain
understandable partisanship toward his own interests, the
importance of the panegyrical poet to the advancing of a
good cause.47
Spenser's most succinct expression, in the first book
of The Faerie Queene. of the relationship between
storytelling and story-making is to be found in the
repeated (and, incidentally, non-symbolic) figurative use
of a sea voyage to represent the story which is told in
the Legend of Holiness. When the narrator says, "Behold
I see the hauen nigh at hand,/ To which I meane my wearie
course to bend" (I.xii.l), it is clear that it is the
telling of this story which is being represented as a sea
voyage. But when he continues, "There this faire virgin
[i.e. Una] wearie of her way/ Must landed be, now at her
iourneyes end" (ibid.), it is equally clear that it is
the narrated action -- specifically, Una's journey from
her homeland to Faery Court and back again -- which is
now being represented by the sea voyage. And yet the
voyage that has 'wearied' both narrator and heroine is
one and the same: they are aboard the same ship. There
is, then, a deliberate conflation, here, of the two
things which we can understand by a 'story': a story as
a narration of events, and a story as the series of
events narrated. Nor is it the narrator alone who uses
this allegory in this way; rather, at least one of the
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characters who takes part in the action, namely Una's
father, sees the story in precisely the same terms, as a
sea voyage which can be said to have "well arriued" at
the "shore" at the moment when both the events and the
telling of the events are complete (I.xii.17). Whether
in the narrator's hands or in the hands of Una's father,
the allegory of story as sea voyage creates the
impression that the acting out and the reporting of a
story together constitute one single movement. The
fullest expression of this integration is in the legend's
concluding canto:
Now strike your sailes ye iolly Mariners,
For we be come vnto a quiet rode,
Where we must land some of our passengers,
And light this wearie vessell of her lode.
Here she a while may make her safe abode,
Till she repaired haue her tackles spent,
And wants supplide. And then againe abroad
On the long voyage whereto she is bent:
Well may she speede and fairely finish her intent.
( I . x i i . 4 2 )
Every major element in this stanza can be understood with
reference both to the story as a thing lived and to the
story as a thing told. The "safe abode" is both the
house of Una's parents and the conclusion of the first
book; Una debarks here both in the sense that she will
remain at her parents' house and in the sense that she
will not appear in subsequent books. The voyage will
continue both in the sense that other adventures will be
performed in the same imaginary world after the
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completion of the knight's mission against the dragon,
and in the sense that there are other books of The Faerie
Oueene still to be written; the Redcross knight will
still be aboard when the ship leaves the haven, both in
the sense that he will leave Una's parents* house for
further adventures, and in the sense that he will figure
in these subsequent books of the poem. There remains,
however, one asymmetry, one way in which the stanza
refers differently to those who live the story and to the
one who tells it. Those who live the story are
"passengers" on the ship (I.xii.42); but he who tells it
is the one who can give the orders to the "iolly
Mariners" first to "Vere the maine shete, and beare vp
with the land"(I.xii.1), and then to "strike your sailes"
(I.xii.42) -- in a word, he is the ship's captain. This,
perhaps, is the most succinct and accurate way in which
to describe the relationship between storytelling and
story-making in Book One of The Faerie Queene; both are
parts of one movement, but it is the storyteller who is
in charge of guiding that movement to its proper end.
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Notes to Chapter One: The Legend of Holiness
1 These patterns of imagery and allusions are noted
by Hamilton in The Faerie Queene. loc. cit. .
2 In The Faerie Queene I.i.28.3n.
3 As is suggested by Meyer 36.
* See for example Van Dyke 253, Meyer 36.
s Compare the assessments of the knight's behaviour
in Dowden (Variorum. Vol. 1, p. 498) and Roberts 4.
s Mallette 9.
7 As for example in the adventures of Sir Melias
(Quest pp. 66-71) and in those of Sir Gawain (pp. 76-80).
As Matarasso notes in the introduction (p. 65), "The
stage is the same and so are the players, but all the
accepted values are inverted".
8 A similar point is made by Heale 36-7.
9 Compare the interpretation of Roberts 4.
10 Kermode 43.
11 Thus, for example, the Protestant educationalist
Roger Ascham's famous denunciation of the "books of
chivalry", such as Malory's "Morte Darthur. the whole
pleasure of which book standeth in two special points --
in open manslaughter and bold bawdry; in which book those
be counted the noblest knights that do kill most men
without any quarrel and commit foulest adulteries by
subtlest shifts..." (68-9). Substantially the same
suggestion is made by Tonkin 63.
12 Una's character has traditionally been a special
locus for critics' praise: see for example the Appendix
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on "The Character of Una" in Variorum 496-500. As the
ideal of the selflessly devoted woman has fallen out of
fashion, such hymns have tended to give way to complaints
that Una's character "is as one-dimensional as her name
would suggest" (Meyer 42) -- an assessment which merely
reverses earlier attitudes toward her simplicity, without
re-examining the extent to which that supposed simplicity
was itself a critical fabrication. Meyer suggests in
passing that Una's appraisal of her knight's victory over
Errour is problematic (p.36), but still, ultimately, sees
"her allegorical significance as Truth" as limiting the
amplitude of her character: "Truth is absolute, subject
to danger to be sure, but not to development" (p.43).
Mallette notices the badness of her advice on their
meeting with Archimago, but does not consider the
implications with respect to her reliability more
generally.
13 Alpers 29 argues that the celebration of the
virtue is kept distinct from the irony of the situation;
see also Dowden (Variorum Vol. 1, p. 499).
14 As noted by Heale 36-7; see also Mallette 13.
13 See Dees 559, Meyer 39-40.
16 Dees 559.





22 Matthew 7:13, 7:26-7; allusions noted by Hamilton
in The Faerie Oueene loc. cit. . See also Meyer 38.
23 Revelation 17:4 -- quoted by Hamilton in The
Faerie Oueene loc. cit. .
24 See for example Meyer 38, who argues that
"obvious" signs of the House of Pride's sinfulness are
"there for us, the readers, not for [Redcross]"; compare
Lewis (1967) 29-30. Meyer also seems to suggest that the
knight's failure to read these signs is in some sense his
own personal failing, resulting from his pride, but no
attempt is made to reconcile these two apparently
incompatible positions.
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25 See for example Kermode 39-41, Tonkin 61-2.
26 Cheney 69-70.
27 Roberts 59.
23 In The Faerie Oueene. loc. cit. .
29 In The Faerie Oueene. I.xii.31.8n.
30 Dante, Purgatorio xxxi.94ff; see also
xxviii.127-32, xxxiii.91ff.
3X In The Faerie Queene, I.xii.31.8n.
32 See Gohlke & Silberman passim; Berger (1991), who
cites both these articles, asserts that "if the narrator
and his story are working for the government, the poem is
not. Rather it is a double agent that kidnaps the
narrator and his chivalric idealism in the service of a
more subversive agenda..." (p.48).
33 Compare Sidney 24, 27.
34 Amiot (trans. North), in his preface to Plutarch's
Lives. p. 11.
35 See for example Elyot's Book Named the Governor
228-231, where a fine balance is struck between
acknowledging skepticism and upholding Homer as history.
36 This and the following passages from Heywood, and
their relevance to Renaissance conceptions of history,
were brought to my attention by a talk entitled "'The
Rape of Lucrece' and the Fall of Troy" given by
Dr. Robert Maslen of Glasgow University, 21 May 1993.
37 The combination of suspicion about the veracity of
history from early times with the assertion that the real
value of history is in its exempla of virtue and vice
appears in Livy's Preface to his history of Rome
(pp. 4-7), as well as in late medieval chronicles such as
Higden's Polvchronicon (see Levy 13-14), both influential
in the Renaissance; it is restated frequently, for
example by Thomas Elyot 231 and by Holinshed in his
Preface to the Reader (Vol. 2, A3r). Sidney voices
similar skepticism about the veracity of histories
(p. 30) but, unusually, accords the power to teach
morality to poetry alone (p. 32). The notion that the
prospect of being praised or dispraised, oneself, by
future historians inclines a person to virtue, is
advanced by Amiot in his Preface to Plutarch's Lives (and
translated into English by North -- p. 11), and by
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Spenser himself in the View of the Present State of
Ireland, p. 73; compare Hall's encomium of fame as that
which distinguishes the noble from the base, and men from
beasts (Dedication to Edward VI, p. v).
30 View 73-5; quoting 75.
39 View 74-5.
4° View 7 3.
41 Patterson 110-111.
42 Patterson passim; see esp. 7-9.
43 Passim. See for example 21ff.
44 As noted by Hamilton, in The Faerie Oueene.
loc. cit. .
4= O'Connell 11 argues (apropos of The Shepheardes
Calender) for the compatibility of the "motives of
appreciative acceptance and critical judgement" in
Spenser's poetic relationship to state power. Compare
Norbrook's reading of The Faerie Oueene as "apocalyptic,
prophetic, rather than merely panegyrical" (15) -- that
is, as goal-directed in its deployment of praise, and
therefore capable of criticism where it has often been
seen as merely celebratory (4-6). See also Tonkin 88.
46 Compare O'Connell 7: "the duty of the artist, in
terms of the celebratory motive in Spenser's poetry, is
to show to men within the fallen state the points of
connection between their actual ruler and the ideal of
which she is merely the human participation".
47 Compare Shepherd 109, writing on The Teares of the
Muses.
Chapter Two:
The Legend of Temperance -- A Question of Honour
When Guyon and the Palmer meet the Redcross knight in
the opening canto of Book Two, the Palmer states the
relationship between their respective quests as follows:
"wretched we, where ye haue left your marke,/ Must now
anew begin, like race to runne" (II.i.32). There is a
certain ambiguity to this assertion. On one hand, his
statement to the Redcross knight that their quest will
begin "where ye haue left your marke" emphasizes the
serial relationship of the two missions, and is conducive
to Alastair Fowler's view that "Each book after the first
is built upon the preceding book, and takes for granted
the spiritual territory already conquered."1 On the
other hand, the Palmer's saying that they must "anew
begin, like race to runne" emphasizes the parallel
relationship of the missions, each beginning separately
at Faery Court, and is more conducive to A. S. P.
Woodhouse's interpretation of Guyon "as having to set out
from the point at which the Redcross Knight started, not
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from the point which he reached."2 The actual
relationship between the two quests, it appears to me,
falls somewhere between these two readings: Fowler is
essentially right, in that the bulk of the second book --
particularly from the third canto onward -- will indeed
take for granted the "territory already conquered" in the
first, and move on to further concerns; but Woodhouse is
also right, in the sense that Guyon, in the opening
cantos of his legend, will first have to repeat for
himself, in miniature, the learning of the Redcross
knight's lessons, before he can proceed beyond them.
Accordingly, a brief comparison between the principal
action of Book One and Guyon's first adventures in Book
Two will serve as an introduction to the main themes
explored in the second book.
Much of the first book was taken up with the Redcross
knight's straying from his proper mission and his
acceptance of Archimago and Duessa as his guides in the
selection of alternative adventures. The movement toward
his rehabilitation began when the story in which he was
meant to be involved was brought back into view by Una's
retelling of it, and was completed when he himself could
articulate his own story and defend his version of events
against the different interpretation put forward by his
enemies. At the opening of the second book, Archimago
and Duessa in a sense reprise the roles they played in
the first; only this time it is Guyon, albeit much more
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briefly and to a much less serious extent, who is their
dupe, and who leaves behind his proper guide to pursue an
adventure announced by Archimago and to champion Duessa's
cause.3 (That Guyon rashly leaves the Palmer behind when
he rushes after Archimago with "zealous hast" (II.i.13)
is not stated directly, but is made clear enough by the
fact that the Palmer does not appear from this point
until he is seen catching up to Guyon in stanza
thirty-one.) After this one brief truancy, Guyon never
again willingly leaves the Palmer's side; and when, on
one occasion, he is parted from his guide against his
will (II.vi.20), he shows an immediate and continuing
recognition of the fact that the onus is now upon himself
to steer the right course (II.vi.21, II.vii.1-2).4
Correspondingly, after their one brief success in
misleading Guyon, Archimago and Duessa fade quickly from
the central role which they had in the first book to the
peripheral part which they will play in the remainder of
the poem. Clearly, then, in the opening action of the
second book Guyon experiences in miniature, not only the
Redcross knight's principal error of allowing his enemies
to be the storytellers who guide the course of his
story's development, but also the lesson which by the
beginning of Book Two has made the Redcross knight
invulnerable to his old enemies and to a repetition of
the same kind of mistake (II.i.4). Further evidence of
Guyon's much quicker progress to the kind of prudence and
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self-sufficiency which characterize the Redcross knight
toward the end of his story is that, by the end of the
second canto of his legend, Guyon has done what the
Redcross knight did not do until the twelfth: he has
told his own story (11 . i i . 4 Off ) . In other words, whereas
the knight of holiness became a storyteller only in
retrospect, Guyon learns to play this part while his
mission is still before him -- in time for his recitation
of his own story to play a part in keeping that story on
track, in much the same way that Una used the repetition
of her knight's mission to keep him moving toward his
goal. Thus, Guyon's explanation of his mission at
Medina's request, besides giving information to her and
to the reader, seems to be a spur to himself; for within
two stanzas of telling his story, we see him, "mindfull
of his vow yplight", setting off to fulfil it (Il.iii.l).
Similarly, in his first conversation with Arthur, Guyon's
demonstration of single-mindedness in the pursuit of his
assigned quest (II.ix.8) is closely associated with his
readiness to call to mind and to repeat once again "the
story.../ Of false Acrasia, and her wicked wiles,/ Which
to auenge, the Palmer him forth drew/ From Faery court"
(11.ix. 9) . =
From the opening cantos of the Legend of Temperance,
then, it becomes clear that the major problem posed in
Book One -- that of rival storytellers actually being
capable of diverting the knight patron into the
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performance of deeds irrelevant or counterproductive to
the story in which he should be engaged -- will not play
a significant part in Book Two: for after his brief
susceptibility to such a threat, Guyon shows himself as
immune to it by the end of the second canto of his legend
as the Redcross knight was by the very end of his own
story. Hereafter, not only will Guyon himself be aware
of the need to keep himself on track, but he will,
through most of his journey, have the Palmer at his side
to make clear to him the right path to follow by telling
him the stories that he does not know and the natures of
things whose appearance is ambiguous. On the other hand,
however, the problem which faced the Redcross knight only
at the very end of his legend -- the problem of the
interpretation of those actions which he does undertake
-- will dog Guyon throughout his adventures. He will be,
through the whole of his legend, in a position comparable
to that of the Redcross knight in the final canto of his
story: his challenge not so much in keeping to the
proper course of action, as in warding off negative
interpretations of his deeds. In this respect, he has a
distinctive challenge before him. His predecessor in the
first book had a goal which, so long as he could keep to
it, was itself virtually unambiguous: not even Duessa
and Archimago tried to demonstrate that slaying the
dragon was other than a good and glorious deed; and even
Contemplation, while pointing out that it was sinful
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relative to the standards of heaven, still saw in it
sufficient worthiness as to insist on his carrying it
out. Guyon's case is somewhat different; for as
innumerable readers' reactions testify, it is not so
immediately and indubitably clear that Guyon does a good
and glorious thing in binding Acrasia and razing the
Bower of Bliss.® What is more, along the way to this
final goal, comparable difficulties will beset him in
virtually all his actions: the danger not one of going
astray, but of being interpreted unfavourably, either by
the other characters with whom he interacts, or by the
readers of the historical record (that is, The Faerie
Oueene) by means of which his deeds will be known to
future generations (the poem's readers). More generally
still, the question of interpretation of deeds -- the
question of what is praiseworthy, and what shameful --
will be posed by almost every episode in the legend of
temperance; and it will be seen to have consequences, not
only for the characters within the story, but for the
queen to whom the poem is dedicated as well. In the
second book, then, there is a kind of reversal of
emphasis with respect to the issues raised by the first:
on one hand, the problem which dominated that book is run
through quickly at the opening of this one; but on the
other hand, the problem which was raised only at the very
end of that book will dominate this one.
The evaluation of deeds as praiseworthy or shameful
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is a continually recurring theme in the legend of
temperance; and in virtually every instance in which such
an evaluation occurs, there is confusion or conflict over
what merits praise and what shame. In the opening action
of the book, Guyon is confronted by this problem in its
bluntest form: on one hand, he knows Redcross for a
praiseworthy knight, and has heard reports that "he hath
great glorie wonne" (II.i.19); on the other hand, he is
now told that this same knight has committed a shameful
and inexcusable crime, and is shown what seems to be
proof of this fact. Here the confusion over
praiseworthiness and shamefulness is the result of
outright lies: Archimago and Duessa say that the knight
has done something which he has not done in fact. (As
usual with Archimago, there is an element of truth
in his account, for Redcross has indeed participated in
'shaming' Duessa (I.viii.45-50); but the specific charge
of rape is, of course, pure fabrication.) The confusion
will be resolved when the liars are no longer believed,
and when the shame which they imputed to the knight is
felt instead by Guyon himself for believing them, and
then finally wished upon themselves (II.i.30). In later
episodes, the problem will generally be more subtle: not
a question, simply, of whether allegations are outright
lies, but of such matters as whether a given deed was in
accord with the code of virtuous conduct; or if it was
not, whether it was done intentionally; or if
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intentionally, whether it was done from proper or
improper motives. Such debates have to do with the
question of the poem's figurative meaning insofar as its
allegory is exemplary in nature. In other cases, the
debate will have to do not with exemplification but with
personification, and will turn on the question of whether
characters and their actions are interpreted literally,
according to their nature as human beings, or
symbolically, according to abstract figurative meanings
which they possess within the poem's imaginary world. In
either case, the question will be twofold: first, what
is the proper interpretation of a given character or
action? and second, how can this proper interpretation be
established against the claims of those who insist on
interpreting that character or action otherwise?
The proem to the Legend of Temperance introduces that
most basic problem besetting reports (which, as I have
said, is to be explored narratively in the opening
episode of the first canto), namely the problem that
accounts which are said to be true can sometimes be mere
inventions. But in the proem this theme is introduced in
essentially the opposite form: for whereas, in the
action that follows, Guyon's problem is resolved when he
concludes that Archimago and Duessa have shamefully
invented the story which defames the Redcross knight, in
the proem the problem begins with the allegation that the
narrator has shamefully invented the stories which he
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reports as "antique history" and "matter of iust memory"
(II.Pr.1). Apparently, doubts about the veracity of
reports can, like reports themselves, work for both good
and ill. Interestingly, the narrator does not directly
answer the imagined charges of his detractors that he has
made up his "history", but rather, in effect, pursues his
opponents' skepticism to a reductio ad absurdum by
opening up comparable room for doubt on the other side of
the argument. Against those who would note that
something's being reported does not prove that it is true
(11 .Pr.1.6-9), he points out in return that, equally,
something's not being reported does not prove that it is
not true (II.Pr.2-3). (These points would gain a certain
resonance, we might suppose, by being made apropos of the
New World, whose nature and even whose existence the vast
majority of Spenser's readers -- including the queen
herself -- would know only by report.) With doubt thus
sown effectively on both sides, and the possibilities
either of proving or of disproving the truth of his
stories equally out of reach, he shifts onto more
pragmatic ground, saying, in effect, that regardless of
whether the history is true, Queen Elizabeth ought to
accept it because it serves as a vehicle for displaying
her "glory" to her subjects (II.Pr.4-5). He argues, in
other words, that in the absence of any possibility of
proof, it is better to accept a story that is favourable
to one's own interests.
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The same principle can be seen at work in the
subsequent episode wherein Guyon must decide what report
of the Redcross knight to believe. The tenuous
relationship between claims to truth and truth itself is
emphasized from Guyon's opening exchange with Archimago,
who paradoxically uses an appeal to this tenuousness to
bolster his false claim to be telling the truth, by
appearing to be tormented by his inability to prove the
truth of his report:
Deare Lady how shall I declare thy cace,
Whom late I left in langourous constraint?
Would God thy selfe now present were in place,
To tell this ruefull tale; thy sight could win thee grace.
(II.i. 9)
Again, a few lines later, Archimago seems to wish
that his declaration of what has happened could carry the
same conviction as the "sight" itself:
None but that saw (quoth he) would weene for troth,
How shamefully that Maid he did torment.
(II . i . 11)
Part of Archimago's and Duessa's trick, in the following
stanzas, is to make it seem to Guyon as though he is
getting closer to the act itself from which the report
springs. For Archimago, having called attention to the
tenuousness of his own claim to be telling the truth,
does not himself venture to say that the Redcross knight
is the perpetrator of the crime: rather, by bringing
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Guyon to Duessa, and letting her make the accusation
herself, he appears to fulfil his own wish that the
wronged maiden herself "now present were in place,/ To
tell this ruefull tale". Now, it seems, Guyon has not
only the report, but the "sight" to back it up. But of
course, what he really has is only another report, albeit
from the supposed injured party herself (II.i.18), and
consequently he has no more certain a hold on truth than
he had before.
In spite of his amazement that the Redcross knight
could ever do such a shameful thing -- an amazement
itself based partly on the report he has heard of the
knight (II.i.19) -- Guyon agrees to champion the lady's
cause. But in the event he does not fulfil his promise
to her that Redcross
...shortly shall againe be tryde,
And fairely quite him of th'imputed blame,
Else be ye sure he dearely shall abyde,
Or make you good amendment for the same...
(11.i . 20).
For when the two knights meet, Guyon puts Redcross to
trial neither verbally nor by force of arms. On the
contrary, he turns away from the trial of strength at the
last moment (II.i.26), suddenly concluding, without any
apparent new evidence, that all the stories he has been
told to this point have been fabrications, and that
Archimago himself is "A false infamous faitour"
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(II.i.30). It appears that this strange outcome is the
result of conflicting ideas of what is shameful: for
Guyon goes to avenge Duessa's apparent "shame" (II.i.20),
only to turn aside because of the "shame" which, he
fears, will blot his own honour if he attacks the
Redcross knight (II.i.27). Hamilton's explanation of why
Guyon concludes that attacking Redcross would be
shameful, namely that "S[penser]'s chivalric code does
not encourage unprovoked aggression"7 will not do: for
in remarkably similar circumstances at the opening of
Book Three, Britomart carries through an attack on Guyon
without any provocation whatsoever, and no hint comes
from any quarter that the deed shames her (III.i.4ff).
Rather, what nearly shamed Guyon, as he himself explains,
was that
...cursed Steele against that badge I bent,
The sacred badge of my Redeemers death,
Which on your shield is set for ornament...
(II . i .27) .
Now, this is not a recognition scene for Guyon; he
already knows that it is the Redcross knight against whom
he means to champion Duessa's cause (II.i.19).8 Nor is
the scene, broadly speaking, about religious error; for
we must take into account the other knight's response, in
which he recognizes that it was an "error" on his own
part that his
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...hastie hand so farre from reason strayd,
That almost it did haynous violence
On that faire image of that heauenly Mayd,
That decks and armes your shield with faire defence...
(II . i . 28 ) .
The point of the exchange is that the knights form the
basis for a reconciliation between themselves by
acknowledging the importance of one another's principal
virtues -- Guyon apologizing for nearly having performed
an unholy action, and Redcross, an intemperate one --
just as, in the opening encounter of the third book,
Guyon and Britomart will be reconciled "Through goodly
temperance, and affection chaste" (III.i.12). For the
knights themselves, the situation is conceived in terms
of their mutual allegiances to what is symbolized on
their respective shields, as may be seen from the fact
that the common factor in their apologies is each one's
recognition that he has been wrong to turn against a
symbol of something to which he himself owes allegiance.
It appears, then, that what Guyon recognizes as shameful
is that he would have turned against an ally on the basis
of a stranger's report. The lesson seems to be that,
given the uncertainty of report, one ought not to turn,
on the basis of hearsay, against one's own. On the
contrary, the appropriate way to behave is that
demonstrated by the Palmer, who reappears on the scene at
this point: one ought to reinforce, not undermine, the
good report of one's allies, by repeating again the
235
praiseworthiness of their deeds (II.i.32). As in the
proem, the conclusion appears to be that in the absence
of any possibility of proof, it is better to accept a
story that is favourable to one's own interests.
The action which develops in the remainder of the
first canto shows certain remarkable similarities to this
opening episode. Once again, Guyon comes upon a woman
who appears to have been grievously wronged (II.i.35ff);
once again, he coaxes her into telling him who is
responsible for her injury (compare II.i.14-18,
II.i.46-48); and once again, on the basis of her report,
he swears to revenge her wrong (compare II.i.20,
II.i.60-1). The principal differences between the two
situations appear to be in the extent of the injury which
the woman has suffered, and in the degree to which Guyon
binds himself to vengeance, both of them much greater in
this second episode. Of course, there is also the
essential difference that whereas Duessa's allegation
against the Redcross knight is false, Amavia's allegation
against Acrasia is true; but the question must be, by
what sign does Guyon know that Amavia's allegation is
true? That is, how can he be certain, as he swears an
oath to avenge her death, that he is not in the wrong a
second time? In fact, it is only in the second canto
that a fully satisfactory answer to this question is
provided: the reason why Guyon can bind himself to
vengeance against Acrasia on behalf of Amavia without
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fear of incurring the same shame which he nearly brought
upon himself by attacking the Redcross knight is that he
already knows that Acrasia is an enemy of Gloriana's
court, whose destruction at his hands is already
sanctioned by Gloriana herself (11 . ii . 43ff ) . The
withholding of this information for a full canto seems,
on the face of it, very strange: one would have imagined
that Amavia's revelation that it was Acrasia who was
responsible for her woes would have occasioned some
reminiscence, on the part of Guyon or the Palmer, of the
fact that they were already on a mission against this
Acrasia -- indeed, that this mission was the very reason
for their journeying together. (Perhaps the difficult
fit of these episodes is what prompted Spenser to tell
the story somewhat differently when he came to write the
Letter to Raleigh.9) But the suspension of this
information, however improbable it seems, does achieve
another purpose: by first showing us the personal motive
of Guyon's quest and its basis in a report which he
himself hears and decides to act upon, and only some time
later revealing his impersonal motive under the orders of
his queen, it reveals just how much more secure is the
latter than the former. Up until the time when Guyon
explains his mission to Medina at the end of the second
canto, his position seems perilous, in that the
circumstances of his action do not appear to be clearly
distinct from those of the book's opening episode in
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which he was the dupe of Archimago and Duessa. If we add
to this Medina's condemnation of "mortall vengeaunce" as
a response "to crime abhord" (II.ii.30), Guyon's
impassioned oath to avenge himself on Acrasia for the
wrongs reported by Amavia begins to look ill-considered
indeed. But when he explains his mission as a quest
authorized by Gloriana, we see him at once moving from
what appeared to be a dangerous reliance upon random
report and personal vengeance, to a more secure basis in
the institution of the court and its system of mediating
report and vengeance so as to remove the responsibility
for both from the individual knight. Such a system does
not, in itself, guarantee the detection of false reports
or the appropriateness of every act of vengeance
(although the "heauenly" authority of the queen who
presides over that court may do so (I.x.59 — see Chapter
One, pp. 182-3)); but it does at least ensure the smooth
working together of the knights of the court, and
prevents them from being turned one against another
through the efforts of malicious slanderers. To this
extent, it solves the first and most radical problem
posed by reports, namely the threat that dissension will
be brought about by the deliberate purveyors of
falsehood. Hereafter, the practitioners of the all-out
lie accomplish very little: Duessa disappears from the
action, and Archimago slips unwittingly into a parodic
subplot wherein he trades lies with Trompart and
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Braggadocchio with the end result that everyone is
deceived and nothing accomplished (II.iii.llff).
Meanwhile Guyon himself, having grounded his action in
the authority of the court, addresses himself "Vnto the
iourney which he had behight" with a new clarity of
purpose (II.iii-1), and we, along with him, move on to an
exploration of some of the more subtle problems of
interpretation.
In the following cantos, and particularly in his
encounters with the brothers Pyrochles and Cymochles,
Guyon is repeatedly embroiled in a debate, not over what
to do or over what has happened, but over whether his
deeds, such as they are, are praiseworthy or shameful.
At the same time, corresponding to praise and shame, a
second dichotomy is introduced, between nobility and
baseness of character -- the relationship being, of
course, that praiseworthy and shameful actions pertain,
respectively, to noble and base characters. Because of
the ambiguity of the Renaissance notion of nobility, the
relationship works both ways: characters noble by birth
are inclined naturally to praiseworthy action, and those
born basely to shameful deeds (see for example the
discussion of horsemanship in Il.iv.l); but at the same
time, regardless of whether one is high- or low-born,
praiseworthy action ennobles one's character and shameful
action abases it.10
The first story in which these interrelations are
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explored is relatively straightforward. Braggadocchio is
both base-born (a "Peasant" (II.iii.43) and a "bastard"
to boot (II.iii.42)), and a performer of shameful deeds.
The only complication to his case is that he has
pretensions to the opposite, that is, to nobility and
praiseworthiness. All his values are inverted: so that,
for example, where a truly noble knight would make a
virtue of defending the helpless, he tries to establish
his nobility by bullying and terrifying them (e.g.
II.iii.6-8); and whereas everyone else speaks of rape as
a shameful act, he seems to feel that it is his failure
to rape Belphoebe which is shameful (II.iii.43). The
narrator succinctly summarizes the inversion of his
values :
To thinke without desert of gentle deed,
And noble worth to be aduaunced hye:
Such prayse is shame...
(II.iii.10 ) .
Braggadoccio's ignoble desire for undeserved honour
involves him, from the beginning, in thoughts of the
court (II.iii.5); and soon we find him in the odd
position of defending the life of the court -- in which
he has never taken part -- against Belphoebe, who is its
detractor (11 . iii . 39-42 ). Belphoebe's response to his
fatuous argument in favour of court life repeats, in
essence, the point already made by the narrator, that
praise without praiseworthiness amounts to nothing: that
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"without desert", being in the public eye (II.iii.39) is
no better than "darke obscuritee" (II.iii.40). But her
insistence on the importance of being removed from court
in order to perform deeds of merit adds something new.
Previously, we have seen that good deeds, unless they are
publicized and made famous at court, are at the mercy of
detractors (Chapter One, pp. 196-8); now we see the
opposite side of the equation, namely that the life of
the court, without a basis in the action that merits fame
and publicity, degenerates into a vain mutual admiration
society. Good deeds and good report, then, are
inseparable, for each needs the other.
The second episode in which questions of nobility and
baseness play a part is that reported by Phedon. As he
explains, it was his fortune "To loue a Ladie faire of
great degree,/ The which was borne of noble parentage"
(II.iv.19) and to win her love in return; but he was
tricked by his false friend Philemon into believing that
she had given herself to "a groome of base degree"
(II.iv.24). Phedon's deception, as he watches Philemon
courting his lady's maid and believes it to be the groom
courting his lady herself (II.iv.28), is among other
things a confusion of nobility and baseness: he thinks
that what he sees is a man of low degree courting a noble
woman, when in fact it is a noble man courting a woman of
low degree. More fundamentally, he fails to see that it
is his supposed friend, rather than his lady, whose
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nobility and "honorable blood" is "distaind" by base
deeds (II.iv.22). This episode also shows, once again,
the consequences of betraying trusts (as Philemon betrays
Phedon and Phedon his beloved), and turning against one's
own on the basis of report; once more, we see that even
the evidence of one's own eyes should be treated as
insufficiently certain grounds for such a betrayal.
It is when we come to Pyrochles and Cymochles that
the questions of nobility and baseness, and of the
associated praise and shame, begin to touch Guyon
himself. Pyrochles' herald Atin introduces this pair of
characters into the poem with an account that blazons
both their noble blood and their noble deeds, and which
implies that the latter spring from the former:
Pyrochles is his name, renowmed farre
For his bold feats and hardy confidence,
Full oft approu'd in many a cruell warre,
The brother of Cymochles, both which arre
The sonnes of old Aerates and Despight,
Aerates sonne of Phlegeton and Jarre;
But Phlegeton is sonne of Herebus and Night;
But Herebus sonne of Aeternitie is hight.
So from immortall race he does proceede,
That mortall hands may not withstand his might...
(II.iv.41-2).
This genealogy, of course, while impressive enough in a
certain sense, in another respect damns the brothers
before they can even appear. It is all a matter of where
one lays the emphasis: whether, with Atin, on
"Aeternitie" (a fairly lofty-sounding forebear), or upon
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some of the others, whose ignoble and even infernal names
Atin lets pass without specific commentary.11
The deeds of these brothers will prove as
questionable as their pedigree. On one hand, Atin is no
mere Trompart, and Pyrochles no mere Braggadocchio: this
herald's claims as to his knight's martial prowess, even
if somewhat exaggerated, are far from wholly unfounded.
But on the other hand, even if Pyrochles and Cymochles
have actually performed mighty deeds, there remains the
question of whether these deeds, such as they are, are as
praiseworthy as they are made out to be. Thus, for
example, the Palmer responds disparagingly to Atin's
boast that his knight has sent him out "To seeke
Occasion" for a fight, maintaining that such an action is
foolish rather than brave and deserves rebuke rather than
praise (II.iv.43-4). Cymochles also compromises his
martial prowess, but in different ways: he is "Famous
throughout the world for warlike prayse,/ And glorious
spoiles, purchast in perilous fight", but seeks to
augment his fame by the apparently shameful act of giving
the carcasses of his victims to wild animals; what is
more, he dedicates his victories in war to Acrasia, a
lady whose whole business is to shame warriors like
himself and bring their praises to nought (II.v.26).
What makes the episodes involving Pyrochles and
Cymochles complex in the challenge they pose for Guyon is
that, at the same time that the brothers have reference
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to questionable standards in accounting themselves noble
and praiseworthy, they and their associate Atin busily
call into question Guyon's own praiseworthiness by
casting doubt on the standards according to which his own
actions are performed. Thus Pyrochles turns against
Guyon his accidental killing of Pyrochles' horse as if he
has done it on purpose:
Disleall knight, whose coward courage chose
To wreake it selfe on beast all innocent,
And shund the marke, at which it should be ment,
Thereby thine armes seeme strong, but manhood fraile...
(II.v.5).
Indeed, Pyrochles makes as much as he possibly can of
this happenstance, going so far as to claim that such an
action reveals the general course of Guyon's behaviour by
suggesting to him, "So hast thou oft with guile thine
honour blent" (II.v.5). Guyon, wounded by the stroke
that follows these charges, seems as "much ashamd" at
having been susceptible to the verbal as to the physical
blow (II.v.7). Only when Pyrochles himself has been
forced to acknowledge the power of "fortunes doome
vniust" (II.v.12) -- the only real culprit in the chance
death of his horse -- can Guyon feel satisfied that he is
acquitted of this shameful charge. Nevertheless, he will
be subjected to other, similar misrepresentations. In
the following canto, Atin interprets Guyon's temperate
decision to break off his fight with Cymochles and to
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depart from Phaedria's island as his having "foully fled
from famous enemie" (II.vi.39). Then, two cantos later,
when Guyon lies unconscious, exhausted by his ordeal in
the cave of Mammon, Pyrochles and Cymochles interpret
what appears to be his death as a sign that he lived
shamefully (II.viii.12ff). As Cymochles states the case:
...gold all is not, that doth golden seeme,
Ne all good knights, that shake well speare and shield:
The worth of all men by their end esteeme,
And then due praise, or due reproch them yield;
Bad therefore I him deeme, that thus lies dead on field.
(II.viii.14)
Spenser's putting this distinction between mere martial
prowess and true praiseworthiness into the mouth of
Cymochles exemplifies how, in these central cantos of
Book Two, evil characters make it exceedingly difficult
for their virtuous adversaries like Guyon and the Palmer
to establish their claim to being in the right, by laying
claim, themselves, to the very standards of judgement
which would justly condemn them. Thus, for example, the
battle that develops over Guyon's body is as much a
contest over who has the right to judge the other party's
behaviour as of force of arms, with Arthur and the pagan
brothers trading accusations of criminal behaviour
(II.viii.28-31).
One final episode in which the significance of
Guyon's actions is contested by these persistent
troublemakers is that wherein both Atin and Pyrochles
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accuse Guyon of having behaved shamefully in binding
Occasion in chains (II.iv.45, II.v.17). This instance is
especially significant, for two reasons: first, because
this episode involves the characters themselves in the
interpretation of the symbolic nature of things in their
world; second, because the charge which they make, namely
that Guyon has acted dishonourably in attacking and
binding a helpless woman, would seem to have consequences
not only for the episode at hand, but also for Guyon's
ultimate intention of serving similar treatment to the
enchantress Acrasia.12
When Guyon first encounters Occasion and Furor
assaulting Phedon, he responds to the situation in
entirely literal terms, without any idea that these
characters might have symbolic significance (II.iv.3ff).
Nevertheless, the symbolic significance which they do
have is very real in his world: it renders wholly
useless, even counterproductive, the means of dealing
with the situation which would have been effective had
Guyon's literal interpretation been an adequate one
(II.iv.8-9); and only when the Palmer stays Guyon from
his ineffective course of action and explains to him that
his opponents have figurative meanings which govern the
outcome of any attempt to deal with them (II.iv.10-11)
does Guyon come to grips with the situation. In this
episode, Guyon is very like any of the knights in The
Quest of the Holy Grail who fail to recognize that the
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people and things that they encounter have symbolic
dimensions which entirely dictate the effectiveness of
all responses to them; the Palmer, in turn, plays a part
like that of any of the helpful monks in the Grail story
who explain to such knights the symbolic meanings of
which they would otherwise be ignorant.13 Guyon
immediately gets into the allegorical spirit of things,
finding as if magically all manner of props suitable to
the figurative meanings which the Palmer has attributed
to the old woman and her son: "chaines", "fetters", and
"an yron racke" with which to bind Furor (11.iv.14-5), a
"stake" to which to tie Occasion (II.iv.13) and even "an
yron lock" which he contrives to "fasten" to "her
vngratious tong" (II.iv.12) -- something which would have
seemed horrible indeed if much attention were being paid
to her literal meaning. But this, of course, is
precisely what Atin and Pyrochles will both do, the one
reviling him for choosing "With silly weake old woman
thus to fight" (II.iv.45), the other accusing him of
having
...done great tort
Vnto an aged woman, poore and bare,
And thralled her in chaines with strong effort,
Voide of all succour and needfull comfort...
(II.v.17).
Of the two, Pyrochles seems genuinely ignorant of
Occasion's figurative meaning, as Guyon was when he first
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encountered her (although Pyrochles does at least know
her name (II.v.17)); for he brings upon himself the same
kind of trouble which Guyon, out of his own ignorance,
very nearly ran into before the Palmer explained to him
her symbolic nature (II.v.20ff). Atin, on the other
hand, seems to know her figurative meaning, for he
immediately recognizes her as that "Occasion" for a fight
which he has been seeking on behalf of his master
(II.iv.43): the ironic point is that it is precisely by
pretending not to understand her nature, and accordingly
speaking of her as if she is nothing more than a "silly
weake old woman", that he is able to make her, quite
literally, the occasion that he is seeking for issuing a
challenge to Guyon.
The traditional suspicion among critics that, at
this point in the poem, Spenser's use of allegory is
degenerating into something dull and workmanlike in
contrast to the sophistication of the first book, has at
last begun to give way to attempts to engage with the
real cleverness of what Spenser is doing in such an
episode as Guyon's encounter with Furor and Occasion.14
As we have begun to see, far from simply making a dull
point about the temperate man having to stop the occasion
for furor before he can control his furor itself (Guyon
does learn this lesson here, but that is far from all
that happens) Spenser is actually putting to work the
very symbolic structure of meaning in the imaginary world
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created by his poem. There is, however, another passage
in Book Two which is still regularly cited -- equally
wrongly, I think -- as an example of Spenser's allegory
at its least sophisticated: namely the episode wherein
Arthur and Guyon visit the House of Alma. Critics have
long condemned this episode on the charges that the whole
conceit is hackneyed, and that its figurative meaning is
dull and its literal meaning silly; among more recent
detractors, most have been content with disparaging the
relation between literal and figurative meaning in the
episode as "mechanical".15 What all such assessments
fail to notice, however, is the cleverness and wit with
which Spenser constructs the relationship between these
two meanings, and the significant way in which this
relationship develops the themes of the book as a whole.
Now, admittedly, one could be forgiven for thinking
that the allegory has sunk about as low as it can go by
the time we follow the waste from the castle's kitchen to
"Port Esquiline, whereby/ It was auoided quite, and
throwne out priuily" (II.ix.32); but it is at just this
point when, brought back to the point of view of Guyon
and Arthur, we start to see in the scene something more
sophisticated than privy humour. The knights have just
completed their tour of what (deliberately conflating the
literal and figurative) we might call the castle's
digestive tract:
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Which goodly order, and great workmans skill
Whenas those knights beheld, with rare delight,
And gazing wonder they their minds did fill;
For neuer had they seene so straunge a sight.
(II.ix.33).
There is a trickiness to the humour of this passage which
can take one unawares. Is the joke on Arthur and Guyon,
as we might at first suppose, because what so awes them
is 'really' nothing more than an ordinary human body,
rather ingloriously involved in digesting food and
eliminating waste? Or is it on us, for smugly assuming
that, because we have spotted the figurative meaning of
the passage, we have thereby understood the whole working
of the allegory? A moment's consideration ought to
convince us that, in fact, the sight of such a bizarre
house, a hybrid of castle and human body, would probably
occasion the very sort of response that it receives from
Guyon and Arthur. By placing that response before us,
Spenser reminds us that, however "straunge a sight" we
may be confronted with as a result, we are not to assume
that we can separate the scene's literal and figurative
meanings; for the strange fact, in the imaginary world
inhabited by Arthur and Guyon, is that the objects of
their experience have both meanings at once.
At the next stage in the knights' tour, the poem once
again, and even more pointedly, draws attention to the
symbolic nature of its imaginary world, and forces both
the knights themselves and us as readers to grapple with
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its strangeness. Among those whom the visitors meet in
"the Parlour" (II.ix.33) is a maiden so reticent
That Guyon meruayld at her uncouth cace:
Till Alma him bespake, Why wonder yee
Faire Sir at that, which ye so much embrace?
She is the fountaine of your modestee;
You shamefast are, but Shamefastnesse it selfe is shee.
(II.ix.43)
Just as was the case with Occasion and Furor, there are
two possible ways for an inhabitant of The Faerie
Queene's imaginary world to interpret this character:
on one hand, she is a woman to whom Guyon can make social
overtures; on the other hand, she is shamefacedness
itself, the abstract quality which inclines Guyon to
temperance. Similarly, Arthur meets Prays-desire, who is
both a lady and the abstract quality which inspires him
(II.x.36-9). But whereas, in the episode surrounding
Guyon's binding of Occasion, the two different
interpretations lead to two different responses and are
made the issue of an argument, here the two
interpretations are held simultaneously. Hence the
knights can continue to treat Shamefastnesse and
Prays-desire just as they would any ordinary court ladies
of particularly congenial dispositions, even after they
know their symbolic significance: "Thus they awhile with
court and goodly game,/ Themselues did solace each one
with his Dame" (II.ix.44).
In both these episodes in the House of Temperance, as
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well as in Guyon's dealings with Occasion and Furor, the
principal way in which the experiences of characters
within The Faerie Queene's imaginary world defy the logic
of our own experience (except, perhaps, of our dreams) is
that there is no clear distinction to be made between
what is inside and what is outside. Shamefastnesse is
both a person who exists outside Guyon, to whom he can
speak, and a quality which exists inside his own heart.1®
More generally, when Guyon and Arthur tour the House of
Temperance, what they see around them is, at the same
time, that which is physically inside them. And again,
the same strange identity of inside and outside is at
work in Guyon's initial fight with Furor, which --
without ever ceasing to be a fight against an external
opponent -- seems to be, at the same time, a fight
against himself (II.iv.8).
This lack of a clear distinction between inside and
outside appears not only with respect to the symbolic
nature of the things encountered by the poem's
characters, but in other ways as well in the description
of the House of Alma. The castle is beset by external
invaders who seek to destroy it, and against which it
keeps itself firmly locked (11.ix.10-12); the deformity
of these invaders is emphasized (II.ix.13, II.xi.8, etc.)
in contrast to the exquisite proportions and good order
of the building to which they lay siege (II.ix.22, etc.).
But it turns out that, in spite of all attempts to keep
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what is ugly and deformed outside, the castle itself
already has, within it, an intrinsic imperfection of its
own: it consists of two parts, one "immortall, perfect,
masculine", but the other "imperfect, mortall, foeminine"
(II.ix.22). Indeed, the structure of the castle so
incorporates imperfection that, quite apart from the
siege laid by its enemies, its destruction is made
inevitable by the very corruptible, earthy material from
which it is built (II.ix.21). Even the emphasis, in the
description of the castle/body, upon the processes of
digestion occasions a repetition of the same principle:
for although care is taken not to allow anything noxious,
hostile, or disorderly to enter (11.ix.23-26 ),
nevertheless "noyous" substances appear inside which have
to be "auoided" (11.ix.31-2). The fact that, regardless
of what care is taken to keep imperfection outside, it
turns out to exist inside as well, makes the whole castle
intrinsically susceptible to the attackers: "Their force
is fiercer through infirmitie/ Of the fraile flesh,
relenting to their rage" (Il.xi.l); each external
attacker corresponds to something intrinsic to the house,
and attacks "his proper part,/ And his contrary obiect"
(11.xi . 6 ) .
The internal division of the castle into two parts,
one "imperfect" but the other "perfect", suggests, as it
were, a second line of defense, that is, a second
division defining the point beyond which imperfection
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does not invade the castle's structure.17 But what the
knights see when they ascend to the supposedly "perfect"
part of the castle reveals that once again, what is meant
to be outside turns out to be inside as well: for
nothing within the castle so closely resembles the
deformed rout that besieges it as the disordered shapes
which are seen in Phantastes' chamber (11.ix.50-1)1S;
and even in the chamber of the more sober Eumnestes, the
supposedly "incorrupted" scrolls kept in his "immortall
serine" turn out to "all worme-eaten, and full of canker
holes" (II.ix.56-7).
The attempts of the castle's defenders to keep
outside what, in fact, is already and intrinsically
inside, have parallels in the knights' reactions to those
things outside themselves which symbolize things inside
them. Thus Arthur admonishes Prays-desire for what seems
to him too solemn a demeanor, oblivious to the fact that
he himself "may vnwares be blotted with the same", only
to have it pointed out to him that the demeanor he
admonishes is his very own (II.ix.37-9); Guyon, too,
thinks his own temperament "vncouth" when he sees it
externalized, failing to recognize that all the time it
remains within him as well (II.ix.43).
In all these instances in which the knights reckon
with the symbolic nature of their world, attention is
drawn to the persistence of the literal meaning in spite
of figurative significance. Sometimes, so long as the
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symbolic nature of a thing is understood, this continued
existence of the literal meaning causes no problems, as
when Arthur and Guyon continue to chat with the ladies of
the parlour after they know them also to be abstract
qualities within their own hearts. But more often, it is
a source of wonder -- as when the knights are shown the
castle's kitchen -- if not of trouble, as when Guyon is
repeatedly reminded of the fact that, in binding
Occasion, he has also bound an old woman. This
persistent doubleness of meaning, which is characteristic
of symbols, seems also to be explored in the poem in
another way, namely in Spenser's strange and bold use of
allusion in the Legend of Temperance.
Again and again in the second book of The Faerie
Queene, Spenser alludes to passages in other works whose
original meanings jar markedly with the meanings to which
he bends them -- in contrast, for example, to the pattern
of Biblical allusions in Book One which form a reliable
basis for evaluating the Redcross knight's adventures
(see Chapter One, pp. 170-77). Thus, in his encounter
with Belphoebe (11 . i i i . 32-33 ), Trompart is like Virgil's
Aeneas encountering Venus (Aeneid 1.314-328), the heroic
original being turned to burlesque.3-9 Even more
daringly, on Phaedria's island the sacred is transformed
into the immoral, the island itself being very like the
garden of Eden (II.vi.12), and Phaedria's defense of
idleness (II.vi.16) strikingly like verses from the
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Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 6 :28f f) -- a use of allusion
which some readers of earlier generations found unworthy
of a Christian poet.20 All these allusions are so
manifest that an educated reader of Spenser's day could
not easily have missed them, nor have failed to feel the
clash between the originals and the uses to which they
are put. It seems that such passages have something in
common with the strange symbols that populate Spenser's
imaginary world, in that they, too, in their own fashion,
bring to our attention the way in which things that have
one meaning, but are subsequently given another, retain
with great persistence their original associations. The
critic who objects to Spenser's putting a reminiscence of
Christ's words into Phaedria's argument for indolence is,
in this respect, very like Atin and Pyrochles, objecting
to Guyon's having bound what they insist on interpreting
as an old woman.
All these matters which we have been considering
-- those of distinguishing the inside from the outside,
the figurative from the literal, and the allusion from
the original -- have this in common, that they are
explorations of the problems which beset attempts to
separate things from their original meanings and
associations. This theme appears once again in the
narrator's address to the queen in the tenth canto of
Book Two, this time cast in terms of the difficulty of
separating that which is lofty from earthly origins.21
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The problem, as first introduced, appears to be chiefly
the narrator's own, as he asks,
...who shall lend me wings, with which from ground
My lowly verse may loftily arise,
And lift it selfe vnto the highest skies?
(II.x.1).
But such a movement from earth to the sky, it soon turns
out, is not only required of the narrator, but needs also
to be attributed to the object of his intended
description, the queen herself, in order to establish her
own loftiness:
Liues ought, that to her linage may compaire,
Which though from earth it be deriued right,
Yet doth it selfe stretch forth to heauens hight...[?]
(II.x.2).
The theme of the difficulty of separating things from
their original associations, then, has brought us back to
the problem of distinguishing nobility from baseness. It
is not suggested that Elizabeth will have any difficulty
comparable to the narrator's in exalting herself above
her earthly origins; indeed, her loftiness is presented
as an established fact.22 Nevertheless, the two upward
movements -- that of verse, and that of lineage -- cannot
really be separated from one another so easily as this;
for a lineage is a kind of story, and like any story
consists of two essential parts which cannot be separated
from one another: a series of deeds which is recounted
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in words, and the series of words which recounts these
deeds. As the narrator himself says, it is precisely in
order to "recount" the queen's lineage, or what he
otherwise calls "the famous auncestries/ Of my most
dreaded Soueraigne" (II.x.l), that he needs a lofty means
of expression. The problem of exalting the queen's
lineage, of setting her above her earthly origins, is the
problem of the one who tells her story.23 As the early
cantos of Book Two established, good deeds and good
report are indispensable to one another.
The earthliness of the queen's lineage, like the
lineage itself, is a twofold thing: on one hand, there
is the earthliness of the deeds which are the basis of
report; on the other hand, there is the earthliness of
report itself. It is for help in transcending the
earthliness of report that the narrator petitions the
Muses (II.x.1-3). The ideal report would be such as is
kept by the gods themselves to celebrate their own deeds;
it is with "some relish of that heauenly lay" that the
narrator hopes to be graced (II.x.3). It is claimed
several times in The Faerie Oueene that such a heavenly
record does exist of the stories which the poem relates.
Thus, for example, it is said on one occasion that "aboue
the Northerne starre/ Immortall fame for euer hath
enrold" the "noble deedes" of Queen Elizabeth's "fathers
and great Grandfathers of old" (II.x.4), and on another,
that the divine Muses have an "euerlasting scryne" in
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which they keep records of all the deeds recounted in the
poem (I.Pr.2). At the same time, however, it is
emphasized that it is human beings, not the gods, who are
responsible for building up and preserving that record of
their own deeds which gives them a kind of immortality:
for "Immortall fame... hath enrold" the "noble deedes" of
ages past only "As in that old mans booke they were in
order told" (II.x.4), that is, only as they have survived
in human memory, with its reliance upon "old records from
auncient times deriu'd" (II.ix.57); and that which is
recorded "aboue the Northerne starre" (II.x.4) is only
that which human beings themselves have managed to
"lift... vnto the highest skies" (II.x.l). Consequently,
the very fame which is said to be "Immortall" (II.x.4)
and "euerlasting" (I.xi.5, II.i.32) turns out to be
dependent upon the temporal conditions of its historical
transmission, and therefore subject to every kind of
corruption that besets the world of mortality, be it
partiality or error or outright forgetting. Hence the
contradictory descriptions of Eumnestes' records on one
hand as "incorrupted" and "laid... vp in [an] immortall
serine", but on the other as "all worme-eaten, and full
of canker holes" (11.ix.56-7): the one states the ideal
to which history aspires, of eternally preserving the memory
of "noble deedes"; the other reminds us of the sobering
fact that mortality infects all things human, even the
very devices by means of which we seek to overcome our
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mortality. Hence, too, the fact that, however the
narrator may aspire to "some relish of that heauenly lay"
sung by the gods (II.x.3), he will in practice only
repeat what is written in the "antique Registers"
(II.ix.59) of history, in spite of the great uncertainty
(II.x.5) and even the "monstrous error" (II.x.8) that has
crept into these chronicles over time.
The earthly conditions upon which all knowledge of
the queen's lineage depends brings us to the other half
of the problem which faces the one who seeks to glorify
her through a presentation of her "great auncestry"
(II.Pr.4). Built up from a great number of sources
representing a whole spectrum of political and religious
allegiances, and compounded almost indistinguishably of
fact, opinion, and invention, the chronicles available in
Spenser's day present a messy and deeply ambivalent
account of history, and one which, in spite of
superficial rationalizations on the part of their
compilers, generally does not lift the reader, through
the kind of hindsight which we expect historians to
exercise, either above the limited perspectives of those
who lived through the events or above the conflicting
biases of those who have reported them; such an account,
beginning from the way in which "events... would have
appeared in the year when they happened", and then
obscuring more than clarifying this limited perspective
through the process of transmission, rather accentuates
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than diminishes a sense of the chaos and brutality of
Britain's royal past.24 It was by no means a
straightforward matter to find, in a record of this kind,
a legacy of "noble deedes" which clearly contributed to
the greater glory of their inheritor.
One point in particular required careful handling,
namely the derivation of the queen's right to rule. As
Spenser expresses it, the basis of any right to rule is
conquest, or lineal descent from a conqueror: "For all
is the conqueror's, as Tully to Brutus saith".25 Hence
Elizabeth's right to rule is "descended.../ From mightie
kings and conquerours in warre" (II.x.4). But a great
deal of flexibility was needed in interpreting this
principle. On one hand, the Tudors' claim to the throne
by lineal descent from William the Conqueror was anything
but straightforward; indeed, this was one of the reasons
why the additional claim was so often made, as it is in
The Faerie Queene. for their derivation from "this
renowmed Prince", Arthur (II.x.4). On the other hand,
among conquests themselves not all could be seen as
equally legitimate. Thus, for example, while Spenser
argues that Henry II's conquest of Ireland established
the right of English monarches to rule there, the notion
is not to be contemplated that any of the subsequent
Irish successes in regaining control of some of their
land might have returned that right to themselves.25
Similarly, Elizabeth was called, among other things, the
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queen of France (as, for example, in the dedications to
both the 1590 and the 1596 editions of The Faerie
Queene). in spite of the fact that she had come to the
throne after the last vestige of English conquest in
France had been reconquered by the French (namely Calais,
during her sister Mary's reign). In short, an appeal to
the rights of rulership conferred by conquest had to be
made in spite of all prior and subsequent history, most
especially in spite of any prior or subsequent conquests
of that land by one's enemies, and in spite of the rival
claims to the right of rulership which these enemies made
in virtue of their own conquests. Here, if there ever
was one, was a principle where everything lay in the
interpretation, and where interpretation followed one's
loyalties; indeed, one could say that a certain amount of
cleverness was needed in order to make it seem a
principle at all.
In spite of their delicacy, both of these topics --
the ambivalence of the right of conquest, and the
problems besetting lineal descent -- had to be dealt with
repeatedly in recounting the early royal history of
Britain as it was reported in the chronicles; and often
the two topics were closely intertwined with one another.
It required skill on Spenser's part to create, in the
tenth canto of Book Two, the general impression that, in
the first place, the Trojan Brutus was the conqueror of
Britain par excellence, from whom the right to rule the
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land was ultimately derived, and in the second place,
that Elizabeth was his rightful inheritor. More than a
general impression of these things, it may not have been
possible even for Spenser to create without abandoning
his sources altogether.2"7
Clearly enough, Brutus was not the most recent
conqueror of England; what made the matter more difficult
was that, according to many historians, including
Holinshed, neither was he the first. In fact, he was not
even the first eponymous conqueror of the whole island,
for that distinction went to the giant Albion.28 Nor was
Elizabeth, or for that matter even Arthur, Brutus's
lineal descendent, for there were at least two complete
breaks in the bloodline before Arthur's time.29 Spenser
solves the first problem by adopting Geoffrey of
Monmouth's version of Brutus's arrival (which Holinshed
rejects), which says that "At this time the island of
Britain... was uninhabited except for a few giants" --
and by so stressing the "beastlinesse" (II.x.9) and
uncertain lineage (II.x.8) of these giants that he can
dismiss their inhabitation of the island as an "vniust
possession" of the land (II.x.9).30 (Holinshed, in
contrast, takes Albion and the other so-called giants to
be human beings, of a lineage as clear and at least as
noble as Brutus's own, and makes both the giants and the
Trojans, in turn, lords over a native Celtic population
which had lived there since shortly after the flood.31)
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Furthermore, Spenser ignores the eponymous nature of the
giant Albion (whom he mentions at II.x.ll) and follows,
instead, the tradition which derives "Albion", the
pre-Trojan name of Britain, from its white cliffs
(II.x.6), thus rendering apparently unique the Trojans'
affixing of their names to the island and its regions
(II.x.12) and so making more convincing the perpetual
claim which they thereby stake in it.32 Indeed, Brutus'
conquest of the land is given such primacy of place, and
his predecessors are so deprecated, that the very fact of
his conquest can be conveniently forgotten, and his
descendants' claim to the land treated as if it were
aboriginal and therefore incontestable. Thus Spenser can
describe the island as "neuer conquered" before the
coming of the Romans (II.x.47), which is most convenient
in enabling him to deride the Roman conquest -- "(0
hideous hunger of dominion)" (II.x.47) -- without this
condemnation reflecting badly upon the earlier conquest
by the Trojans. (Presumably the Roman conquest had to be
derided lest the Roman empire's would-be successor, the
Roman Catholic church, should claim rights of conquest in
Britain.33) Such are the manoeuvres necessary for the
storyteller who needs to maintain, within the space of a
few stanzas, both that the conquests made by one's own
ancestors were glorious and bestowed upon them the rights
to the lands which they conquered, and that the conquests
made by one's ancestor's enemies were wicked and
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conferred upon them nothing but shame.
Somewhat similar techniques are needed for overcoming
the second problem with Britain's royal history, namely
the breaks in the bloodline. When, after the death of
Gorbuduc's sons, which "ended Brutus sacred progenie"
(II.x.36), "this sad Realme" was "cut into sundry
shaires/ By such, as claymd themselues Brutes rightfull
haires" (II.x.37), some means is needed for suggesting
the legitimacy of the warlord who emerges victorious, in
order for the subsequent lineage to seem to be a
legitimate continuation of the prior one. This Spenser
achieves not by trying to show that Donwallo's claim to
being Brutus's heir is better than those of his rivals,
but by removing from the story all mention of Donwallo's
claim to royalty -- (according to Geoffrey he was "The
son of Cloten king of Cornwall"34) -- and emphasizing his
opposition to the other, "miscreate" kings (II.x.38).
Thus Donwallo, in fact one pretender among others, seems
to rise above the illegitimacy which he opposes in the
rest, just as Brutus, one conqueror among others, is set
above conquest altogether. In fact, Donwallo's case is
very like that of Brutus (as, indeed, Henry VII's was
like William I's): for both are, in effect, conquerors
of the island, notwithstanding that Donwallo's conquest
is from within. In either case, the problem is to
derive, from historical instances of de facto rulership,
the appearance of a rulership de jure, which can then be
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claimed on behalf of one's own party.
It is this conversion of the de facto — ephemeral,
contestable, and founded in strife and bloodshed -- into
the eternal and incontestable de jure, grounded in peace
and law, which, if it is successful, can make the queen's
"linage.../ ...though from earth it be deriued right"
seem to "stretch forth to heauens hight" (II.x.2). There
is, however, a great difficulty involved in deriving an
eternal right to rule from the temporal history of
rulership. Just as we saw that, after Guyon binds
Occasion, his detractors can always find a basis for
shameful allegations against him by drawing attention
away from Occasion's symbolism and placing emphasis
instead on the literal fact that he has bound a helpless
old woman, so, however skillfully the impression of an
eternal right to rule is drawn from the chronicle history
of Britain, there remains in the same history, for
would-be detractors, the basis for a quite different
interpretation: one which emphasizes the current
monarch's entanglement in the problems of conquest and
succession rather than setting her above them. For
despite the general impression that this canto gives of
Elizabeth's right to the throne, its presentation of
Britain's royal past remains such that a skeptical reader
could readily use it to call into question the very
notion that the claim to rule rightfully over England
could ever be more than an ex post facto rationalization,
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such as was made after the failure of Brutus' bloodline
by all those who subsequently "claymd themselves Brutes
rightfull haires" (II.x.37). As with the supposedly
noble lineage of Pyrochles and Cymochles, it is all a
matter of where an interpreter places the emphasis.
In spite, then, of the narrator's avowed intention to
set the queen's lineage above its temporal and earthly
origins, both the historical events and the historical
record of those events remain connected to their
problematic beginnings. This seems to be the reason why
the "auncient booke, hight Briton moniments", needs to be
supplemented by "another booke,/ That hight Antiquitie
of Faerie lond" (11.ix.59-60 ). Harry Berger has observed
that the Faery history differs from its British
equivalent chiefly in that "all difficulties are left
out, and the good works are made much better".35 The
difficulties that are left out, it may be observed, are
principally those concerned with conquest and with lineal
descent: for in "Faerie lond", conquest is absent, and
so are breaks in and contests over the royal lineage
(II.x.72ff); even the complications of Elizabeth's
inheritance of her father's kingdom have no echo in
Gloriana's apparently direct inheritance of the Faerie
throne from her father King Oberon, who had, so far as we
are told, only one wife and one child (II.x.76).3e
Instead, over "seuen hundred Princes" reign, "in their
dew descents", from the dawn of the Elfin civilization
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until the time of Gloriana, so that, as if in spite of
time and history, their governance attains to a kind of
eternity, and the record of their "mightie deedes" to
"infinite contents" (II.x.74).37 Meanwhile, the errors
and uncertainties that beset human historiography, and
which impede its attempts to immortalize its heroes, also
appear to be absent from the Faery chronicle, which
unlike its British counterpart makes no mention of any
disagreements or lacunae in its sources.
Certainly the account of the Faery Queen's lineage
shows how, ideally, that which has earthly beginnings
would "it selfe stretch forth to heauens hight" (II.x.2).
However, at the same time that the Faery chronicle
presents a perfected version of the British one, it
throws into stark relief the many imperfections of
Elizabeth's lineage, and so furthers the polarization of
interpretations of royal history into glorious and
inglorious versions. As in the Legend of Temperance
generally, the problem is continually before us as we
read the queen's lineage whether we are reading of noble
or ignoble personages, and of praiseworthy or of shameful
deeds. The real difficulty of establishing the
praiseworthiness and nobility of Elizabeth's "famous
auncestries" is underlined by the ironic fact that even
"that heauenly lay" of which the narrator hopes to be
granted "some relish" by the Muses in recounting her
ancestry, namely the royal history of Olympian Jove
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(II.x.3), is fraught with ambiguity on the subjects of
conquest and lineage. If there
Liues ought, that to her linage may compaire
Which though from earth it be deriued right
Yet doth it selfe stretch forth to heauens hight,
(II.x.2)
it is certainly the lineage of Jupiter, which quite
literally is derived "from earth" (for not only was he
born on the earth, but from the race of the Titans whose
mother is the earth), and which nevertheless literally
"doth it selfe stretch forth to heauens hight" (the
heavens being the seat of his throne). But while, on one
hand, it was possible to treat Jove's achievement of
heavenly dominion as a glorious conquest, and one which
bestowed on him the eternal right to rule over the whole
universe, it was equally possible to see him as but one
in a series of usurpers, displacing his tyrannical father
only to show an equally tyrannical determination not to
be displaced in turn by a son; and, while it was common
to contrast Jove and the other celestial gods with the
chthonic Titans and Giants against whom they had battled
for universal supremacy, it was also possible to point
out that the Olympians were themselves but a junior
branch of the chthonic family of deities, distinguished
not by primacy of birth but only by the fact of their
present power.38 By invoking Phoebus's rendition of
Jove's conquest over the Giants as a paradigmatic episode
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in royal history making (II.x.3), and then beginning his
own royal history with an account of Brutus's similar
victory over earth-born giants (II.x.9ff), the narrator
draws attention to the essential difficulty of his own
task: like those who celebrate Jove as the rightful and
eternal king of the universe, he must conjure the
unambiguous right to rule from an ambivalent history of
seizing and clinging to power. Any success which may be
had in such a task will not be of the kind to convince
the skeptics; rather, it will be contingent upon a
community of interests, and upon a willingness, within
this community, to accept a story favourable to its
interests wherever real proof is impossible.39 For like
the other distinctions which are thematic in the Legend
of Temperance -- the distinctions of inside from outside,
figurative from literal, allusion from original — the
distinctions of the heavenly from the earthly, and the
noble from the base, are never clear-cut.
However difficult it may be to achieve this
separation from earthly origins, a literal or figurative
act of rising above the earth is portrayed repeatedly
toward the end of the Legend of Temperance as an
essential prerequisite to attaining virtue and
praiseworthiness.40 Thus the twelfth canto opens,
Now gins this goodly frame of Temperance
Fairely to rise, and her adorned hed
To pricke of highest praise forth to aduance...
(Il.xii.l)
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In the eleventh canto, the necessity of achieving a
separation from the earth occurs more concretely, when
Arthur, in order to defeat his opponent, Malaeger, must
quite literally separate him from his earthly origins:
He then remembred well, that had bene sayd,
How th'Earth his mother was, and first him bore;
She eke so often, as his life decayd,
Did life with vsury to him restore,
And raysd him vp much stronger then before,
So soone as he vnto her wombe did fall;
Therefore to ground he would him cast no more,
Ne him commit to graue terrestriall,
But beare him farre from hope of succour vsuall.
(II.xi.45)
Towards the end of the Legend of Temperance, then,
the separation from the earth, whether brought about by
Arthur or by the narrator, and whether on behalf of Alma
or Guyon or Queen Elizabeth, seems to be the necessary
condition for the victory of the virtuous. What is less
clear, however, is whether the specific type of virtue
which thereby emerges victorious is a satisfactory one.41
For the crowning act performed under the rubric of this
virtue, namely Guyon's capture of Acrasia and his
concomitant destruction of the Bower of Bliss, has
occasioned a long-running debate among Spenser critics.
It is widely agreed that these actions on the part of the
knight of temperance at the end of his legend come as a
shock to the reader, and that one's inclination is not
readily to sympathize with Guyon's "rigour pittilesse" as
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he smashes and burns his way through the bower
(II.xii.83); there has been persistent disagreement,
however, as to whether a reaction of shock and dismay is
consistent with an authorial intention of celebrating the
virtue of temperance which Guyon represents (in that, by
forcing readers to see themselves in the position of
Acrasia's victims, who "stared ghastly, some for inward
shame,/ And some for wrath, to see their captiue Dame"
(II.xii.86), it compels them to confront their own
intemperance), or whether, on the contrary, it indicates
either a failure on the poet's part to conceive of
temperance as something distinct from mere priggishness
(or at any rate imaginatively to exemplify this
temperance in such a way as to attract the reader's
sympathy), or his actual rejection of the virtue of
temperance as exemplified by Guyon's actions.42 I hope,
by referring once more to some of the themes which I have
been exploring in the second book of The Faerie Queene.
to illuminate some of the underlying reasons why the
Bower-of-B1iss episode generates this critical dissent.
It seems to me that there are two main reasons why a
reader might look unsympathetically upon Guyon's violent
response to the Bower of Bliss. The first is that the
Bower itself may not seem so thoroughly bad as to warrant
the complete and indiscriminate destruction that he
wreaks upon it; the second, that Guyon himself seems
unsuitable for the role of judge and instrument of
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vengeance upon the Bower, in view of his own apparent
culpability in what he so harshly condemns. I shall
examine this second point first.
Although the sheer scale of Guyon's violence at the
end of the twelfth canto is without precedent, violence
itself is not a new feature of his response to the Bower.
Rather, physical destructiveness has been one of three
responses among which he has oscillated since arriving at
the entrance to the place (II.xii.49; see also
II.xii.57), the other two being the same kind of passive
resistance to its charms as characterized his defense
against the temptations of Mammon (II.xii.53), and -- at
moments -- an apparent willingness to succumb to the
Bower's delights (II.xii.69). It seems artificial, then,
to treat the final and comprehensive act of destruction
in isolation, as if it represents a clear departure from
his prior responses.43 On the contrary, physical
suppression of what he finds in the Bower has been part
of Guyon's reaction to the Bower from the beginning,
alongside the psychological suppression of his desire to
indulge in it.
The close relation of Guyon's physical and
psychological resistance as he moves through the Bower is
greatly accentuated by the symbolic nature of the place
and of its inhabitants, particularly of its mistress
Acrasia. Just as self-commentary within the poem
periodically identifies the maiden Una with the abstract
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quality of "Truth" (I.ii.Arg.), the wizard Archimago with
"Hypocrisie" (I.i.Arg.), and so on, so, in the same way,
Acrasia is twice referred to as "Pleasure" (Il.xii.l,
II.xii.48). Like these other characters, then, Acrasia
is a personification. Literally, she is the seductress
whom Guyon must capture in order to fulfil his mission on
behalf of the Faery Queen and to avenge the death of
Amavia; figuratively, she is the pleasure toward which he
is naturally inclined as a human being and which he must
learn to restrain, within himself, in order to fulfil his
moral potential and so to become the truly temperate
man.44 Because she is both a person and a psychological
state, the challenge which she poses is both an external
and an internal one: she exemplifies temptation in the
sense in which one person tempts another, and personifies
it in the sense in which a person feels tempted from
within. But unlike, for example, the episode in which
Guyon binds Occasion, no clear distinction is made in the
Bower-of-B1iss scene between the literal and figurative
significance of Guyon's actions. On one hand, there is
no Atin or Pyrochles to call attention to the literal
fact that he binds an unarmed woman, or to deride the act
as unchivalrous. But, on the other hand, neither does
the Palmer, as he did in that earlier scene, spell out
for Guyon the figurative meaning of this encounter; so it
is not clear whether Guyon, or even the Palmer, is aware
of Acrasia's figurative significance, or, if they are
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aware of it, whether their actions are directed against
her qua pleasure, in the way that their previous actions
were directed against their opponents qua occasion and
furor. Accordingly, in reading the twelfth canto, we
hover undecidedly between seeing Guyon's actions as the
response to an external and to an internal enemy; and
both the scenery of the Bower, and Guyon's reactions to
it, come across as indeterminately either physical or
psychological. For the characters involved in this
scene, and particularly for Guyon himself, there seems to
be no clear distinction between the literal and the
figurative meanings of their actions: for him, it
appears, binding Acrasia is the act of restraining his
own sensual appetite. His attack upon her is a
suppressing both of his own desires, and of their
physical objects.45 Meanwhile, the rational restraint
upon Guyon's inclinations seems also to stem
indeterminately from an internal and an external source;
for, during his passage through the Bower, he can at one
time exercise self-governance, "Bridling his will, and
maistering his might" (II.xii.53), but at another time,
needs to be governed by the Palmer (II.xii.69), as if we
were passing back and forth, without warning, between an
external landscape in which Guyon is a whole man complete
with both appetites and reason, and an internal one in
which Guyon and the Palmer represent Appetite and Reason
respectively in the manner of a psychomachia. In two
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different respects, then, we are presented, in the Bower,
with a scenery wherein the respective meanings of
psychological and physical restraint cannot be kept
separate, because the distinctions between inside and
outside cannot be clearly established.
This lack of a firm boundary between the inside and
outside of things, a familiar feature of Spenser's
imaginary world in the Legend of Temperance, particularly
in relation to the continence of the body, is thematic
also in the imagery of the Bower of Bliss. The "fence"
by the which the Bower is "enclosed round about" turns
out to be "but weake and thin", and its "gate",
similarly, to be "wrought of substaunce light,/ Rather
for pleasure, then for battery or fight" (II.xii.43);
indeed, it "euer open stood to all" (II.xii.46).
Similarly, a second "gate", apparently dividing the Bower
into inner and outer enclosures, turns out to be "No
gate" at all, but only "like one", being no more, in
reality, than a cleverly shaped hedge (II.xii.53). More
hedges, or "couert groues, and thickets close", interpose
themselves between Guyon and Acrasia, but these too
present no real barrier to one willing to go "creeping"
through them (II.xii.76). Such false barriers in the
landscaping of the Bower, which make no more than a
pretense of denying Guyon entry, have an analogy, in the
realm of vision, in the various types of veils sported by
some of its female inhabitants, which only pretend to
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conceal their wearers' bodies from Guyon's sight. Thus,
through the waters of the fountain, "as through a vele",
the "snowy limbes" of the damsels who play in it
"appeared plaine" (II.xii.64), and the one damsel's
subsequent use of her hair as a "mantle" is calculated
not to prevent but to encourage his ogling of her
(11.xii.67-8) : as the song says, "the Virgin Rose...
fairer seemes, the lesse ye see her may" (II.xii.74).
A short while later, Acrasia herself is seen
...arayd, or rather disarayd,
All in a vele of silke and siluer thin,
That hid no whit her alablaster skin...
(II .xii.77).
Such false barriers to sight have for Guyon the same
effect that Cymochles achieved for himself, when he was
dallying in the Bower, by pretending to close his own
eyelids: by stealing glimpses of what, in fact, was
freely revealed, he made the sight of the damsels more
enticing (II.v.34). The notion, which Cymochles
cultivates, that the Bower's pleasures are forbidden, is
a third type of false barrier which recurs in the
depiction of the place. Thus, for example, the song
which is sung at the appearance of Acrasia describes love
as a "crime" not in order to dissuade would-be lovers
but, rather, further to encourage them to "Gather the
Rose of loue" (11.xii.75).46
All these false boundaries to desire, which actually
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serve only to encourage their own breaching, seem
analogous to the false boundary, in the scene as a whole,
between the psychological and the physical realms, which
similarly encourages a failure to separate desire from
action, and, for that matter, to separate the restraint
of desire from the physical restraint of the object of
desire. From this perspective, it might indeed be argued
that Guyon is implicated in that which he condemns to
destruction.
I return now to the other reason why a reader might
look unsympathetically upon Guyon's violent response to
the Bower of Bliss, namely, that the Bower itself may not
seem so thoroughly bad as to warrant the complete and
indiscriminate destruction that he wreaks upon it. Such
a judgement may be made on a variety of bases. One of
these -- and one which I shall leave aside because it is
not a criticism of the poem per se, but of the man or the
period that produced it -- is that it might be thought
that Spenser's conception of temperance amounts to
priggishness by the standards of another age, be it
Romantic or modern, and that he ought rather to have
celebrated the kind of sensuality which he condemns in
his account of the Bower of Bliss. But there are other
possible bases, as well, for feeling aggrieved at Guyon's
razing of the Bower, and ones which are grounded in the
description of the place itself. First, the symbolic
identification of Acrasia with Pleasure (11.xii.1,48)
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does riot clearly establish her as evil. Pleasure,
including sensual pleasure, is not an unqualified evil
for Spenser, as his celebration of it in the Garden of
Adonis passage (III.vi.50-1) amply demonstrates, and as
might well have been brought to an Elizabethan reader's
attention in the account of the Bower itself through its
being compared to the Garden of Eden, since the name Eden
had long been identified with the Greek hedone,
'pleasure', and had even been translated as such in the
Vulgate's "paradisium voluptatis" (Genesis 2. 8). 47
Second, while the Bower does display several notable
examples of the intemperate and the over-wrought, some of
its most appealing features are described in terms of the
virtue of temperance itself; for example, "the milde
aire" (II.xii.51) and the harmonious music (II.xii.71)
which fill the place are both carefully "attempred", and
indeed, everything "intemperate" is excluded from the
climate of the place (II.xii.51).
With regard to the temperance apparently exemplified
by such features of the garden, various attempts have
been made to explain it away, and to show that such
temperance is not really temperance, or, at any rate, is
not temperance in the moral sense.48 But even climactic
temperance cannot be clearly distinguished from its moral
namesake in a garden wherein the boundary between
physical and psychological is itself ultimately
indistinguishable. Any attempt to see the descriptions
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of the temperateness of the Bower, such as it is, as
beside the moral point, presumes, it seems to me, that
the narrative voice describing the bower is unreliable in
much the way that Atin and the brothers Pyrochles and
Cymochles were unreliable in repeatedly claiming for
themselves the chivalric virtues to which they were in
fact opposed. If this is the case, then the
Bower-of-B1iss episode marks a new development in the
legend's exploration of the involvement of interpretation
in perceptions of the praiseworthiness and shamefulness
of deeds; for here it is the narrator himself who
misinterprets the shameful as praiseworthy. Such a
misrepresentation of the intemperate as temperate would
be comparable to the narrator's gross error in the fifth
canto of the first book, where he misrepresented the
faithless as faithful (see Chapter One, pp. 167-9).49
If this is so, then it seems to me an illuminating piece
of information with respect to the theory that Spenser
deliberately shocks readers with Guyon's destruction of
the Bower in order to reveal their own complicity in the
intemperance of the place; for it would suggest that the
reader's culpability is, in fact, actively cultivated
through the coloured perception of the place which we
receive through the narrator's description.
With regard to the moral ambivalence of pleasure, the
general means of establishing the culpability of the
pleasure condemned in the Bower is to contrast it with
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the pleasure celebrated in the Garden of Adonis. The
main difference between the two places, it is noted, is
the lack of a generative principle in the Bower, which in
contrast to the fecundity of the Garden of Adonis, is
essentially sterile.50 Thus, for example, the Genius of
the Bower bears a cup and staff, but only "for more
formalitee" (II.xii.48), not as genuine symbols of sexual
potency, and whereas his counterpart in the Garden of
Adonis is a hermaphrodite in the genuine sense of having
both sexes (III.vi.31), he is a hermaphrodite only in the
euphemistic sense of being effeminate (II.xii.46). To
take another example, Acrasia's transforming of men into
beasts and expelling them from the bower is but a pale
prefiguration of the generative symbolism of Venus'
continual transformations of Adonis, and of the sending
of babies out of the garden into the world
(111.vi.47, 32-33 ) . But the basis of the Garden's
fertility, it ought to be noted, is its grounding in the
chthonic energy of "An huge eternall Chaos, which
supplyes/ The substances of natures fruitfull progenyes"
(III.vi.36). There is no mention of such a corresponding
chthonic energy at work in the Bower of Bliss. This, it
would seem, is a strange basis on which to distinguish
the goodness of the Garden from the badness of the Bower:
for to this point in the poem, the deities associated
with the earth have been the ultimate champions not of
good, but of evil (as recently as the Malaeger episode --
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II.xi.45); and in this book in particular, the separation
from the earthly has been one of the major goals of the
virtuous, and has been an insistent theme in its closing
cantos, in particular. Now, it would appear, the basis
on which we deem the pleasures of the Bower to be bad is
precisely their disconnection from the earthly forces
from which the virtue of temperance has been at such
pains to detach itself. In this respect, the Bower-of-
Bliss episode seems to stand, as it were, on a fault line
between the values which have been built up through the
Legend of Temperance and those which will emerge to
topple them, quite suddenly and quite to Guyon's surprise
(III.i.6-7), at the opening of the Legend of Chastity.
The rough transition, in the first canto of Book
Three, from the story of the knight of temperance to that
of the knight of chastity, provides one more important
reason why a reader of The Faerie Queene might be dubious
about the virtue of temperance as exemplified by Guyon.
Whereas the meeting between Guyon and Redcross in the
opening canto of Book Two is an occasion for praise which
reinforces and re-emphasizes the value of the Redcross
knight's accomplishment, the comparable meeting of Guyon
and Britomart is marked by the opposite: not by Guyon's
praise but by his "shame" (III.i.7), a shame which is
actually given added emphasis by the commentary of the
narrator (III.i.8). This is a remarkable way to be
displaced from the centre of the poem's action for a hero
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to whom the interpretation of his deeds as praiseworthy
or shameful has been so important. Critics who have been
prompted, by Guyon's "fall" (III.i.6), and by the
apparent intemperance with which he is prepared to
respond to it (III.i.9), to wonder just how secure was
the "goodly frame of Temperance" which was so recently
seen "to rise" (Il.xii.l), have taken this opening action
of the third book as a reason to cast a critical glance
backward over Guyon's deeds, particularly at the way in
which he fulfils his mission in the Bower of Bliss.51
These deeds, as we have seen, then turn out to be
susceptible to the negative interpretation which such
critics proceed to make of them, for some of the reasons
that I have been discussing. What I want to emphasize at
this point, though, is something else, namely the very
fact that the poem sends readers of the third book back
to the events of the second, to review the significance
of these events in the light of Guyon's subsequent
"shame". Such a response on the part of readers enacts
the very theme which, I have argued, is central to the
Legend of Temperance, namely the troubling susceptibility
of deeds to radically different interpretations, on one
hand as praiseworthy, on the other as shameful. The
point, I think, is not that Guyon's actions in the Bower
of Bliss are necessarily shameful -- for as a lively
critical debate has shown, the opposite interpretation is
also defensible 52 -- but that they are susceptible to
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shameful interpretation. At the root of this
susceptibility is the fact that his deeds do not receive
the same kind of endorsement from his fellow knights as
do the deeds of his predecessor in the legend of
holiness. Instead, by delaying his return to Faery
Court, where the praiseworthiness of his deeds could be
ratified, in order "To make more triall of his
hardiment,/ And seeke aduentures" (III.i.2), he shows
that he has lost sight of the indispensabi1ity of good
report to good deeds, and ends up winning, through the
further "triall" of his prowess, not further praise, but
unaccustomed "shame": "For neuer yet, sith warlike armes
he bore/.../ He found himselfe dishonored so sore"
(III.i.7). Guyon's failure to learn the lesson so often
stressed by the events of his book has a large part to
play in making the legend portraying the virtue of
temperance among the most ambiguous in The Faerie Queene.
This ambiguity, for all the furor it occasions among
critics over whether Guyon's actions are meant to be
construed as praiseworthy or shameful, may itself be the
thematic point.
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Chapter Three:
The Legend of Chastity -- Crossing the Line
In the third book of The Faerie Queene. there is a
new relationship between reports and the characters whose
deeds are reported: in one case after another, the
report itself either actually precedes, or else in some
other significant way takes precedence over, the
characters or the deeds that are the subjects of the
report. The clearest examples of this, though by no
means the only ones, are the actual instances of
prophecy, as when Proteus predicts the future woes that
will befall Marinell (III.iv.25), or when Merlin gives
Britomart a detailed account of a career that she has not
yet had (111 . iii . 28), and a history of her descendents
who have not yet lived (III.iii.29-50). There are, in
addition, several cases where reports are not presented
as prophecies per se, but which nevertheless have a
certain prophetic character, in that the things reported
are not yet true, but will be true at some later point in
time -- as when Britomart declares an intention literally
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to do battle with Arthegall (111 . i i . 8,16 ), long before
there is any prospect of such a literal confrontation
coming to pass (as finally happens in the 1596
installment of the poem, IV.vi.llff), or when Florimell
hears that Marinell has been gravely injured or killed,
days before his injury can actually have taken place
(III.v.10). Finally, there are the cases in which the
way that something is reported takes a kind of precedence
over the thing itself, as when Britomart's false
description of herself as having been "trained vp in
warlike stowre" (III.ii.6) accounts better for her
current martial prowess than the more conventional facts
of her feminine upbringing (indicated by 111. i i i . 53, 57 ),
or when Britomart's quest seems to have a more worthy
goal in the reports and images that she encounters of
Arthegall than in the character himself whom they
supposedly reflect (see Introduction (2), pp. 127-9).1
Even in these cases, there tends to be a sense in which
the report takes temporal precedence over what is
reported: thus, for readers, Britomart's false report of
her upbringing (III.ii.6) precedes the revelation of the
truth (111.iii.53), and the reports and images which draw
her toward Arthegall (111 . ii.9-14,24-5, 111 . i i i . 24-7)
long precede his appearance in the poem's action
(IV.iv.39).
There is another sense, too, in which the usual
relationship between events and reports is reversed in
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the Legend of Chastity. In all the cases that I have
cited, the report, because it comes in advance of the
event itself, can actually influence the event, and so,
to a degree, becomes the cause and original of what it
purports merely to describe. Cymoent, misinterpreting
Proteus' prophecy as an indication that it is love,
rather than war, which poses a danger to Marinell's life,
cautions her son "womens loue to hate", but relaxes her
earlier warnings to him "to forbeare/ The bloudie
battell", and so leaves him exposed to the very fate which
she has tried to avert (111.iv.24-7). Florimell's hearing
about the injury to Marinell prompts her to leave Faery
Court (III.v.10), and so, by making possible the
encounter which separates Britomart from Guyon and Arthur
(111 . i . 15-19), contributes to the course of events which
leaves Britomart alone on the strand to encounter
Marinell and deliver the fated blow (111.iv.12-18).
Britomart's advance knowledge of her own destiny leads to
her decision to go abroad disguised in armour
(III.iii.51ff), and to this degree makes possible not
only the foretold marriage to Arthegall but her
prophesied chivalric career as well. Her description of
herself as a practised warrior and her account in martial
terms of her relationship with Arthegall contribute to
the development of her own sense, and of the reader's,
that she is a female knight in fact rather than merely a
maiden disguised in armour, and so help to make possible
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their eventual encounter in chivalric combat. Finally,
the glowing reports which Britomart receives of Arthe-
gall's character affect all subsequent perceptions of
him, by herself (IV.vi.26,29) and by the reader, and so
lead to her acceptance of his marriage suit (IV.vi.41),
in spite of the apparent deficiencies of character that
he displays once he has appeared in propria persona.
If, as I have argued, advance reports of this kind
can actually have an effect upon the subsequent
development of the characters and events upon which they
comment, then the issuing of such a report has to be seen
as an act of considerable power and influence.
Accordingly, the question of who reports on events, and
consequently whose interest is reflected in the version
of events reported, takes on a greater importance than
ever. I shall argue that, in the third book of The
Faerie Queene. Britomart herself, in spite of the extent
to which fate initially appears to prescribe the course
of her future, assumes an ever-increasing power over the
advance reporting of her own character and deeds,
together with an ever-increasing ability to live up to
the report that she gives of herself, and thereby
ultimately surpasses the "streight" bounds of the
"heauenly destiny" (III.iii.24) to which it seems at
first that she can only submit (111 . i ii.25); her control
over this kind of advance reporting will reach its zenith
at the end of Book Three and will be sustained into the
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opening episode of Book Four. I shall show, too, how
this power which Britomart assumes is closely bound up
with her control over the doubleness of meaning within a
world replete with symbols.
The beginning of Britomart's story is marked by a
comprehensive loss of control over her own life. Not
only has she "no powre/ Nor guidance of her selfe" by
which to resist the sway of her newly felt love for
Arthegall (III.ii.49), but even the apparent chance which
has brought about her plight turns out to have been no
chance at all, "But the streight course of heauenly
destiny" (111 . i i i . 24 ) . The sense of Britomart's own
powerlessness is augmented by the cooperation, amongst
themselves, of the forces which control her. In the
version of her life propounded by Merlin, what might seem
to be the distinct influences of "fortune" (III.ii.44),
"Imperious Loue" (III.ii.23), and "eternall prouidence"
(111 . iii . 24 ), are resolved into a coherent set of forces;
while Merlin himself, upon whom she relies for his
privileged access to knowledge of her future, and who
assumes as well a position of moral authority in advising
her to "submit" to the fate that he describes
(111 . i ii . 24 ), is also, himself, one of the agents of the
destiny which he describes to her and exalts: for he is
the one who made, and who gave to Britomart's father, the
"glassie globe" which was instrumentally responsible for
Britomart's falling in love in the first place
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(III.ii.21). Even her very decision to consult the
magician can be cited as an instance of her "having fate
obayd", and the failure of her attempt to disguise
herself held up, by implication, as an instance of the
futility of trying to evade her destiny (111 . i i i . 19) .
Against this dauntingly united front, it seems that
Britomart must indeed be powerless to resist.
Britomart is, of course, offered a consolation for
her lack of choice, namely that the destiny which the
"heauens have ordaynd" for her (III.iii.26) is, if
inescapable, at any rate not "ill" (III.iii.24) -- at
least by Merlin's reckoning. On the contrary, the man
whom she is compelled "To loue", and eventually to be
married to, is, according to the wizard, "the prowest
knight, that euer was" (111 . ii i . 24 ) , "And for his warlike
feates renowmed is,/ From where the day out of the sea
doth spring,/ Vntill the closure of the Euening"
(111 . i i i . 27 ) . Furthermore, she is told, "from thy wombe
a famous Progenie/ Shall spring," of "Renowmed kings, and
sacred Emperours" (111 . ii i . 22-3 ) . Indeed, Britomart does
take some "hope of comfort glad" (III.iii.51) from all of
this, particularly when she hears Arthegall's reputation
reaffirmed from another quarter (III.ii.ll). But there
is, at the same time, a sense in which this emphasis on
the qualities of her husband- and children-to-be only
emphasizes further the comprehensiveness of her own
subordination: for as mother of kings, her role is
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pictured as passive -- she is conceived of as the earth
in which "that Tree" must be "enrooted" which will bring
forth her "fruitfull Ofspring" (111 . iii.22-3) -- while
even in her more active role as a knight who "in armes
shall beare great sway" (III.iii.28), her place will be
merely to lend "aid" to Arthegall's "mighty puissance",
and with her own "prow valiaunce/ ...t'increase [her]
louers pray" (111 . iii.28 ) . Ultimately, like all the
forces that delineate her destiny, Arthegall is presented
as a more worthy cause and a superior power, to whose
"will" she must learn to "submit" (111 . iii . 24 ) .
The subordination of a woman's destiny to that of her
husband is perhaps to be expected in an Elizabethan poem
(although the alternative is by no means unthinkable, as
Britomart's own adventures will demonstrate); what is
perhaps more striking about Merlin's prophecy is that it
is far from clear that either Arthegall himself or the
future history of their offspring is to be genuinely
worthy of Merlin's superlatives. This becomes clear very
quickly, even to Britomart herself, of the "Famous
progenie" in whom she is told to take comfort. Not only
is their status as "kings" and "Emperours" to be
dubiously established by an opportunistic act of
usurpation (111 . iii . 29 ), but the glory of their rule will
be marred by Norwegian invasions which will leave the
"sad people" of Britain "vtterly fordonne" and cowering
in the mountains (111 . i i i . 34 ), and their power finally
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consumed by "plagues and murrins pestilent" (III.iii.40)
and given over to the Saxons (111. iii . 41), not to be
restored until they have endured centuries of "thraldome"
(111 . i i i . 44 ) . In short, it is to be no more
straightforwardly glorious a history than that of the
prior British succession, up to the time of Arthur (see
Chapter Two, pp.259-69).2 Arthegall himself seems
equally to be overpraised in Merlin's sweeping assessment
of him, although Britomart herself is not yet in a
position to know this. Indeed, it seems that the reports
which Britomart hears of Arthegall, both from Merlin and
from the Redcross knight, have less to do with the
reality which she (and we) will eventually encounter than
with feeding the stuff of wish fulfillment to her own
"feigning fancie" (III.iv.5). Even the figure which she
sees in Merlin's mirror seems to be less an image of the
real Arthegall than what Glauce astutely calls "the
semblant pleasing most your mind" (111 . ii.40).3 In sum,
any consolation which she derives from these
representations must be dubiously founded. At worst,
what Merlin offers to Britomart as a consolation might be
seen, not as a genuine attempt to appraise the
desirability for her of the future that he predicts, but
rather as a calculated supplement to his already
formidable exercise of control over her: for by telling
her, not the truth, but what will be most pleasing for
her to hear, he encourages Britomart actively to pursue
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the very destiny which he has described as inescapable,
and so exerts an influence in favour of the outcome which
he has predicted, much as other advance reports in the
Legend of Chastity (such as Proteus's prophecy concerning
Marinell) can be seen actively to contribute to things'
eventually turning out as foretold.
Even apart from the question of the reliability of
the reports which Britomart is given of her future, it
will be allowed, I think, that a life which is so
thoroughly determined in advance that the only real
choice left to the one who must live it is between
submission and futile resistance, might seem an
oppressive prospect even if its content is apparently
enviable. The motive, then, would be understandable if
Britomart, as soon as she departs from Merlin's presence,
where knowledge of her is comprehensive, intrusive, and
wholly integrated into a determinate plan, were to begin
pursuing means to evade being known, and devices which
would allow her to multiply hex. meanings as a character
-- if she sought, in short, a degree of power over her
own affairs.4 The first sign that Britomart is not ready
to "submit" to "the streight course of heauenly destiny"
(III.ii.24) is her immediate recourse to "secret
counsell" with her nurse, so that they can discuss plans
"to maske in strange disguise" (III.iii.51) in their
journey to Faerie Land; this, in spite of the
chastisement which they have already suffered at Merlin's
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hands (III.iii.19) for supposing that they would be
capable of "disguising" themselves from him by means of
"straunge/ And base attyre" (III.iii.7). For Britomart
and Glauce, the lesson appears to have been, not that
disguises or other means of evading being known are
futile, but that a better disguise is needed than the one
which they tried on Merlin (111 . i ii.52-3) .
The key to this better disguise turns out to lie in
history, and more specifically, in an alternative view of
history to the one which Merlin has propounded: one
which focuses upon women, rather than upon men, as the
prime source of inspiration to action. Glauce's brief
catalogue of female warriors, culminating in the "Faire
Angela", eponymous leader of the Anglo-Saxons
(111 . i i i . 54-7), subtly subverts a number of the
established norms of historical report in The Faerie
Queene. and in doing so establishes a quite different
basis for action than the one that Merlin has insisted
upon.
Glauce's main point -- that, in history, there have
been women as well as men who have performed "feats
aduenturous" (III.iii.54) -- is not, in itself, liable to
seem striking to a reader of The Faerie Queene: for not
only is the point a conventional one, which Ariosto, for
example, had developed at considerable length in the
Orlando Furioso (xxxvii.1-23; Harington's translation,
xxxvii.1-15), but it has also been anticipated, and quite
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recently, by the narrator of The Faerie Oueene itself
(111. ii.1-2). But Glauce, in pressing women's martial
history into active service within the story, as an
example for the would-be heroine of Book Three to
emulate, does something that the narrator of the poem
cannot; and in this sense, Glauce realizes a subversive
potential which the narrator can only indicate.
Glauce's appeal to women's martial history begins
relatively innocuously, with a general description of
women as having performed martial deeds "in paragone of
proudest men" (III.iii.54): women who take up arms are
portrayed as assuming a role that does not properly
belong to them, in imitation of the male sex, to whom the
role is presumably natural. By implication, Britomart
herself, should she "disguize" herself "in feigned armes"
as Glauce suggests (111. iii.53), would likewise be doing
so "in paragone of... men". But after enumerating a few
conventional historical instances of "women valorous"
(111 . i i i . 54), Glauce passes on to a detailed report of a
single female warrior whose deeds she claims to have
witnessed at first hand, and to whom any attempts to
equal the prowess of male knights would clearly be
irrelevant: on the contrary, faced with the Saxon queen
Angela, it is all that the male contingent ranged against
her can do to equal her (111.iii.55); while she herself
not only "hath the leading of a Martiall/ And mighty
people", but is herself the object of this people's
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emulation, in that they "do for her sake/ And loue,
themselues of her name Angles call" (III.iii.56). As
Angela's example looms larger in Glauce's story, so the
notion that Britomart might take up arms "in paragone
of... men" gives way to the more radical idea that she
might take "Aduent'rous knighthood on her selfe" in
imitation of Angela herself (111 . iii.56-7); and no sooner
has this happened than Angela's own armour turns out,
conveniently enough, to be available for the purpose
(III.iii.58).
The Anglo-Saxon Queen can serve as a better role
model for Britomart than any man, not only by virtue of
her superior skill at arms, but also because she displays
this supposedly masculine skill without compromising to
any degree the specifically feminine excellence of her
beauty: she is, as Glauce puts it, "No whit lesse faire
than terrible in fight" (111. iii . 56 ) . Learning to
emulate this ability to claim the traditionally male
powers without relinquishing the traditionally female
ones will be a crucial part of Britomart's acquisition of
control over events in the third book of The Faerie
Queene (see especially 111.ix.21ff, IV.i.9-15 -- both to
be discussed in more detail a little later).
Another part of Angela's legacy which Britomart
inherits -- and the one which is potentially the most
subversive of all -- is her ability to erase the signs of
prior conquests. In the chronicles of British history
300
that we encountered in Alma's castle (11.ix.59-x.69),
conquest is treated as an act which confers a permanent
claim to a land, a claim which survives, most
graphically, in the names attached to the land by its
eponymous conquerors: in this case, by Brutus, his
lieutenants, and his sons (II.x.12-14). Care is taken,
in these chronicles, not to allow the uniqueness (and
hence the permanency and the incontestability) of the
rights of conquest to come into question, as for example
by allowing the name Albion, which had been Britain's
name prior to Brutus' conquest, to be derived from its
prior possessors, or by speaking of these prior
possessors as earlier conquerors (II.x.6-11; see Chapter
Two, pp. 262-3). But in Glauce's appeal to history, such
caution is thrown to the wind. Angela, the eponymous
leader of the Angles -- that is to say, of the original
•English'3 -- is, by implication, responsible for the
superseding by the modern name 'England' of the earlier
place-name, "Logris", derived from the name of Brutus's
son "Locrine" (II.x.13-14), and so for erasing one of the
principal signs, not only of the Trojans' conquest, but
also of their descendents* claim to the land. So
Britomart, in choosing to emulate Angela's "ensample"
(111.iii.56 ), associates herself with an important enemy
of the British succession, the propagation of which (so
she has been told by Merlin) is the very cause to which
"eternall prouidence" (III.iii.24) has preordained her
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life. What is more, she begins, immediately, to imitate
the very kind of subversion that makes Angela's
"ensample" so dangerous: for in taking Angela's armour
down from the wall where her father, King Ryence, has
displayed it in order to commemorate the success of a
recent British "forray" against the Saxons (111 . iii . 58 ),
she erases a sign whose function is very similar to that
intended by the conquerors who give their names to the
lands that they win -- that is, to stand "for endlesse
moniments/ Of his successe and gladfull victory"
(111.iii . 59) . Britomart, in pressing this armour back
into service, "vnweeting to her Sire" (111.iii.57 ),
converts it from the sign of a man's control over a
female warrior into precisely the opposite: a sign of a
woman's evasion of a man's control. If Britomart can put
back into action what her father had intended as
"endlesse moniments" of his own superiority, then what
sign or story is so fixed that it cannot be turned to a
new purpose? Or who is to say, now, that even the story
of Britomart's future as told by Merlin cannot be
similarly subverted to her own ends?
Once Britomart has donned Angela's armour, and Glauce
"Another harnesse, which did hang thereby" (III.iii.61),
they must depart in secret, "through back wayes, that
none might them espy,/ Couered with secret cloud of
silent night" (III.iii.61) -- for her father, it is
assumed, would not approve of Britomart's going abroad
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without protection, particularly as she is "his onely
daughter and his hayre" (III.ii.22), and the one,
therefore, whom he, as much as Merlin, counts upon for
the propagation of a royal line. Their successful
evasion of King Ryence's detection, in spite of his
having at his disposal Merlin's "looking glasse", which
is supposed to reveal to him "What euer foe had wrought,
or frend had faynd" (111 . i i . 18-19), is the first of many
incidents in Book Three in which a man's attempt to
govern the movements of women is thwarted, and the
boundaries that he has tried to establish for them
crossed -- the first, that is, unless we apply these
terms figuratively, and speak of Britomart's already
having begun, with her taking on of the armour and the
"ensample" of the Saxon gueen Angela, to cross the
boundaries set up for her by the destiny that Merlin
declared for her. It is also the first time in The
Faerie Queene that "night", with its quality of rendering
things "secret" and unknown, has been quite so clearly
propitious to one of the poem's heroes.6 (Even in the
Redcross Knight's three-day battle with the dragon, in
which the hours of darkness serve as time for healing,
the emphasis is upon the revival brought about at dawn,
and so upon the reappearance of "ioyous day" rather than
upon the "noyous night" through which he lies unconscious
and hidden from Una's sight (I.xi.50-1) . ) The
helpfulness of night in facilitating Britomart's secret
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departure initiates a kind of debate, running through the
third book of the poem, over the relative merits of night
and day, and more particularly, over the merits of their
respective qualities of fostering ambiguity and clarity.
As we watch Britomart and Glauce escape the detection
of King Ryence, so too we realize that they have escaped
ours. For it is only here, at the very end of the
retrospective account of the start of Britomart's quest,
that we can see fully the truth behind the way in which
they have presented themselves to the heroes of the
previous books: only at this point do we know for
certain that, in spite of her account of herself to
Redcross, Britomart is not a trained knight; and only at
this point can we gather that the "aged Squire" who
accompanies her (III.i.4) is really her aged nurse in
disguise. The poem's narrator, whom we already know to
have been complicit, briefly, in Britomart's hiding of
her identity from Guyon and Arthur (III.i.4-7), now turns
out to have been complicit in a much more subtle and
prolonged act of concealment as well. There are, in
effect, two layers to Britomart's disguise. The first,
consisting in the armour itself, cultivates the
assumption that Guyon and Arthur make, and which we make
briefly along with them, that she is a man. The second
layer, maintained verbally when this first assumption
breaks down, is that she is, although a woman,
nonetheless a trained knight whose reason for being
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abroad can be understood purely in chivalric terms; it is
this second layer of the disguise which continues to
delude Redcross, and which, to a large degree, continues
to delude us as readers, until the end of the third
canto.
As was the case at the end of Book One with respect
to the Redcross knight himself (see Chapter One,
pp. 198-9), the liberties that Britomart takes with the
truth as she establishes her reputation in Faerie Land
are silently approved of, and at times actively abetted,
by The Faerie Oueene's narrator. In Britomart's case,
however, these liberties are considerably more prominent,
and more pervasive of her legend: for whereas Redcross
retells and revises his story only in the final canto of
Book One, after his quest is completed, she begins the
work of revising her story from the very outset, from the
first occasion when she is called upon to give an account
of herself (111 . ii.6-9). Oddly, though, the promptness
with which Britomart takes to reinventing herself does
not make her seem, ultimately, a less honest character
than Redcross. For whereas his revising of his story
after the fact can have no effect upon the events
themselves but only upon the way in which they will be
reported, her accounts of her character and aims, however
false at the time of their telling, have the opportunity
to become true in the course of her quest -- and this is
precisely what happens: lie as she may, she invariably
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lives up to the account that she gives of herself, so
that whatever may seem to be an outright falsehood
proves, in the end, to have been merely an anticipation
of some future truth. Thus, for example, even by the
time that Britomart backs up her physical "disguize" as a
"mayd Martiall" (III.iii.53) with a false account of a
martial upbringing (III.ii.6), the disguise has already
largely ceased to be a disguise: for while, in her
encounters with Guyon (III.i.6) and with the mounted
knights outside Malecasta's castle (III.i.28-9), she
could be interpreted as an unpractised (if bold) maiden,
whose victories are to be attributed entirely to her
magical spear, the same excuse is not available for
explaining away her impressive swordplay when she meets
Malecasta's knights on foot (III.i.66); by this time, if
not sooner, she has acquired the "skill" at arms required
for her to be in fact the "mayd Martiall" which Glauce
correctly supposed that "practize small" would make her
(111.iii.53). So, too, when she pretends to Redcross
that her quest for Arthegall is one of vengeance rather
than of love (111.ii.8 ff), this lie will turn out to be
prophetic: for when she finally meets and recognizes her
destined husband (IV.vi.26), it will be in the very
literal kind of combat that she has unwittingly foretold
(III.ii.16). Britomart shows a remarkable propensity,
not only for establishing the reputation that she wants,
but also for living up to the reputation that she
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establishes. The narrator is helpfully partisan, not
only in reconfirming Britomart's having achieved the goal
that Glauce set for her of becoming a "mayd Martiall" by
himself referring to her as a "martiall Mayd"
(III.iv.18), but even in abetting her tendency to give
reports of herself that are not yet true by doing
something similar himself -- as when, at her first
appearance in Faerie Land, he refers to her as "the
famous Britomart" (III.i.8), a description that she will
earn, but which she certainly has not earned as yet.
There is another respect, as well, in which
Britomart's liberties with the truth tend to fall short
of outright falsehood, namely that the words which she
uses are often sufficiently ambiguous that a true
interpretation of them is possible even though she
intends that a false interpretation should be made.
Thus, for example, when she describes her relationship
with Arthegall in terms of enmity and violence, she is
not merely lying to the Redcross knight, nor is she
merely anticipating, unintentionally, something that will
become literally true: she is, at the same time, making
use of the conventional figurative representation of love
as a war between the sexes.7 Thus, the injury that she
claims Arthegall has done to her (111.ii.8,12 ) can be
interpreted as the "wound" which she has suffered from
the "arrow" of love (III.ii.26), and her insistence that,
when they meet, "one shall other slay, or daunt"
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(III.ii.16) can be taken as a reference to the
conventional theme of "maisterie" in love, which appears
repeatedly in the course of her adventures
(III.i.25, etc.). So she is not simply telling a lie,
even if she intends that Redcross should assume (as he
does) that her figurative expressions are meant
literally. This kind of manipulation of the doubleness
of meaning extends also to her use of her physical
appearance in armour: at least in Book Three, it is not
so much that she actively pretends to be a man as that
she allows others to make the assumption that a person in
armour must be male.
Such control over double meanings is a talent that
Britomart must develop over the course of her quest. The
assumption that she is a man on the part of those whom
she meets serves her purpose straightforwardly enough in
her encounter with Guyon and Arthur, but turns against
her in Malecasta's castle, where her insistence on
sticking to her disguise even when it is backfiring
(III.i. 52) gets her into a very awkward situation with
her hostess. Britomart's trouble with Malecasta starts
even before she enters the Castle Joyous, when, at the
entrance, she is presented with a 'Catch-22', according
to which, regardless of what she does, she must have a
liaison with Malecasta: if she has "no Ladie, nor no
loue", or if she fails to prove in combat that her love
is fairer than the lady of the castle, then she must
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grant herself to Malecasta; but if she should be
victorious in combat, she must claim Malecasta's love as
her reward (111 . i . 26-7) . Britomart tries to take control
of the situation by playing on her challengers' ignorance
of her sex in such as way as to imply that her case
cannot be fit into the categories offered:
Loue haue I sure, (quoth she) but Lady none;
Yet will I not fro mine owne loue remoue,
Ne to your Lady will I seruice done...
(III . i . 28 ) .
But in spite of this gesture of defiance, and her success
in the combat which it provokes, she does not escape,
after all, from the paradox of the offered terms; for her
victory merely results in her opponents' beseeching her
"To enter in" and claim the stipulated "reward" of
Malecasta's love (III.i.30) -- a request to which "She
graunted", apparently not realizing that, in doing so,
she is submitting herself to the very thing to which the
law of the castle has committed her from the beginning,
and which she has attempted to resist, namely an amorous
encounter with their mistress. Her quibble over the
distinction, in her case, between "a Ladie" and "a Loue",
in the end gains her nothing, just as her persistence in
disguising herself, once inside the castle, fails to
protect her from Malecasta's amorous attentions
(III.i.42ff).
Britomart's difficulties at the Castle Joyous prompt
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her into an important sophistication of her
self-presentation: for it is at this point, faced with
having been seen without her armour, and with the
Redcross Knight's consequent interest in knowing "what
inquest/ Made her dissemble her disguised kind"
(III.ii.4), that she manages to contrive her verbal
substitute for the physical disguise that has momentarily
failed. Rather than revealing that her taking up of arms
is a recent expedient, she claims
...that from the howre
I taken was from nourses tender pap,
I haue beene trained vp in warlike stowre,
To tossen speare and shield, and to affrap
The warlike ryder to his most mishap...
(III . i i . 6 ) ,
or in other words, that she has always been the "mayd
Martiall" which in fact recent "practize" has been making
her (111.iii.53). The Redcross knight is satisfied with
this explanation; and Britomart herself does not forget
the lesson that it is possible to obtain respect for
herself as a woman without foregoing the respect that she
has won as a knight. In her next meeting with knights of
Faery Court (in this case, with Satyrane and Paridell),
having established her martial credentials, she does not
shy from revealing her womanhood, and in so doing, she
redoubles her good report with them (111.ix.21ff) . By
this point, the Redcross knight's opinion of her —"Faire
Lady she him seemd, like Lady drest,/ But fairest knight
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aliue, when armed was her brest" (III.ii.4) -- is
becoming a general chorus: "euery one her likte, and
euery one her loued" (III.ix.24).
As her adventures continue, Britomart herself appears
to be increasingly in control of her own reputation,
using both the presumption that she is male and the
revelation that she is female to her own best advantage.
This control goes on increasing throughout Book Three,
and will culminate in the trick that she plays in the
first canto of Book Four, wherein she uses, successively,
both her male and female personae, in order to claim,
simultaneously, both a woman and a man for her paramours,
and so to gain entry for them both to a castle whose
custom is to refuse admission to anyone unaccompanied by
a "loue" (IV.i.9-15). The contrast between this episode
and that at Malecasta's castle one book earlier is
telling: in every detail, from the terms on which she
fulfils the custom and enters the castle (III.i.26ff,
IV.i.9ff) to the terms on which she shares a bed with
another woman (III.i.61, IV.i.15), Britomart now controls
exactly the kinds of action which previously had swept
her along, all on the basis of her increased control over
the point at which the line is crossed between one
interpretation of her ambiguous appearance and another.
To Britomart's increasing control over the crossing
of the figurative line that separates one interpretation
of her words and actions from another, there corresponds
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an increasing control over the terms on which she herself
crosses such literal boundaries as the walls of castles.
Thus, after her faltering management of her entrance into
Malecasta's castle, she is increasingly successful at the
entrances to the castles of Malbecco (III.ix.18) and
Busyrane (III.xi.25), and finally at the entrance to the
castle that she visits with Amoret in the first canto of
Book Four. Indeed, as we have seen in the contrasting
examples offered by the first cantos respectively of
Books Three and Four, the degree of her control over the
crossing of a particular literal boundary regularly
depends upon the degree of control that she can exercise
over her crossing of the figurative ones.
Britomart is by no means alone in Book Three in
crossing the lines that ordinarily keep opposites such as
knight and lady, war and love, distinct from one another.
On the contrary, as we shall see, the world in which the
action of the Legend of Chastity takes place is rife with
people, things, and events of ambiguous significance, all
liable to be interpreted in one way at one moment, and in
quite another way a short time later; the chief basis for
this ambiguity is Spenser's dual use of warfare (and that
other domain of arms, hunting) on one hand as the
figurative representative of love, on the other as the
literal opposite of love. But unlike Britomart, most of
the characters who figure significantly in the action of
Book Three do not learn to control the interpretation of
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the events in which they are involved in such a way as to
determine, to their own advantage, the points at which
the semantic lines are crossed. On the contrary, a
number of characters confront the semantic ambiguity of
their world by trying to secure and make inviolable
precisely the kinds of boundaries which Britomart
intentionally transgresses. But this strategy, unlike
Britomart's, is largely ineffective: for just as, in
Book Three, characters such as Malbecco and Busyrane
erect physical barriers only to see them breached, so a
number of other characters attempt to create absolute
distinctions on the order of meaning, only to see them
transgressed to their own disadvantage or discomfiture.
One character who particularly invites comparison
with the Briton Princess Britomart is, of course, the
Briton Prince Arthur. Like Britomart, Arthur has
undertaken his quest out of love, and seeks a spouse in
Faery Land whom he knows only through image and report;
as in her case, his falling in love is described as the
result of a sneak attack by a conventional personalized
Love with his bow and arrows, an attack which reduced
him, at one blow, from "libertie" to complete subjection
(I.ix.12), and took from him all power to control the
course of his own life (I.ix.7).
Prior to his falling in love, Arthur had the kind of
chivalric upbringing to which Britomart can only pretend
(I.ix.3ffj. Central to this upbringing, as he describes
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it, was an ethical training, based on a loosely Platonic
psychology according to which reason must exercise
sovereignty and "subdew" the "creeping flames" of the
passions, amongst which "loue" is ranked (I.ix.9). The
passions, although conceived of as "kindly", or intrinsic
to the human makeup (I.ix.9), are pictured as being in
open war against the governing faculty, as armies
besieging a "fort...//...with battrie long" (I.ix.ll).
This psychology is very similar to, if not identical
with, the one propounded in Book Two by Guyon's Palmer,
according to which the "affections" -- which include the
"monster fell" called "loue" -- will, if given the
opportunity, make "Strong warres... and cruell battry
bend/ Gainst fort of Reason, it to ouerthrow"
(11.iv.34-5). For knights such as Arthur and Guyon who
have been "vpbrought" in such "vertuous lore" (I.ix.3-4),
the task of remaining morally "vpright" (II. i.6) is
conceived of entirely as a matter of defending the
figurative "fort" of the well-ordered rational self
against the insurrection of the passions, and
particularly of love.8 So long as they are governed by
such a chivalric ethic, the figurative task of personal
morality is precisely congruent with the literal task of
defending the order of society against uprisings and
invasions -- so much so, that the two can become one, as
in the defense of the symbolic castle of Alma. Both are
battles which one fights to win: for to lose would be,
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quite simply, to be subjected to the forces of evil, to
one's unending grief and shame, if not literally to one's
destruction.
With the victory of love, all this must come
radically into question, as a kind of subjection is
discovered which, if it still brings grief, need bring
neither shame nor literal destruction. What has been
taken for granted up to this point, that love is an
inferior drive relative to the rational faculty from
which it threatens to usurp the will, is now contested by
love's claim to being a superior force which exceeds
"reasons reach" (III.ii.36). Under the governorship of
love, rational distinctions can be (and regularly are)
violated -- so that, for example, in the logic of love,
one's enemy does not necessarily mean one harm, nor is
being defeated by and subjected to such an enemy
necessarily shameful or bad for oneself; thus, for
example, Una and Redcross see Arthur's bondage to love
not as a compromise to his chivalric "prowess" but as its
worthy complement (I.ix.16-17).9 For Arthur, once love
has won the internal 'battle', the congruency breaks down
between the significance of the martial metaphors which
describe his internal state and that of the literal
martial engagements which make up his chivalric career,
with respect to which the old, 'rational' rules still
apply-
Since Arthur has already fallen in love by the time
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he appears in the first book of the poem, there are,
already, two very different sets of rules in operation
for (on one hand) the literal battles in which he engages
against the likes of Orgoglio, Pyrochles and Cymochles,
and Haleger, and (on the other hand) for the figurative,
internal battle in which he has been wounded and
conquered by love. But, at least in Books One and Two,
this situation does not become confusing, either for the
reader or for Arthur himself, because his erotically-
motivated quest is kept strictly in the background -- it
is what we learn about from his reports of himself, and
what we understand him to be engaged in when he is not
taking part in the action that is reported to us directly
(I.ix.7-20, II.ix.5-7) -- while his participation in the
foreground action, as for example to rescue Redcross or
Guyon, always constitutes an adventure distinct from this
background quest, motivated not by the paradoxical logic
of love but by the straightforward chivalric logic of his
upbringing, which disdains subjection and strives always
for victory.
All this changes, however, in the first canto of Book
Three. With the knights' entry into the forest, and the
sudden appearance, there, of Florimell (111 . i.14-15), the
foregrounded chivalric action itself suddenly enters the
realm of the erotic, and at once the neat distinctions
break down which Arthur, to this point, has successfully
maintained between action and report, the martial and the
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venerean, the literal and the figurative. We may see
this most clearly by comparing his encounter with
Florimell to his encounter with Una two books earlier.
The situations of the two women, at the point when he
meets them, are similar in a number of respects: both
are noble and beautiful ladies riding unarmed and
unprotected in search of their beloved knights who, they
have heard, have suffered grievous defeats, if not death,
in battle (I.vii.26-8; III.v.8-10). But Arthur's
response to each is very different. Although Una is,
like Florimell, an exceptionally beautiful woman, who is
liable unintentionally to arouse male passions -- we
might compare, for example, Sans Loy's "lawlesse lust"
for her (I.vi.Arg.) to the "beastly lust" with which the
foster pursues Florimell (III.i.17) -- Arthur relates to
Una purely in a chivalric capacity, without erotic
intentions toward her. (We may note, for example, that
he does not respond at the level of the double-entendre
to Una's innocent question, "What hath poore Virgin.../
Wherewith you to reward?" or to her offer of her "simple
selfe" to her rescuer (I.viii.27).) There is no
confusion between the adventure which Arthur undertakes
on Una's behalf and the quest for Gloriana which he
interrupts in order to undertake it; the only connection
between the two engagements is that, in helping Una, he
may contribute to his reputation as a knight and so to
his eventually being deemed worthy of Gloriana's hand.
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In contrast, Arthur's pursuit of Florimell becomes deeply
confused with his quest for Gloriana. He himself
conflates Florimell with Gloriana in his mind, wishing
that
...that Lady faire mote bee
His Faery Queene, for whom he did complaine:
Or that his Faery Queene were such, as shee...
(Ill.iv.54 ) ;
and this conflation extends to his hoping to win
Florimell's love (III. i. 18, 111.iv.46-7), and to his
pining for her when she is absent (III.v.7), just as if
she actually were his beloved. What is more, to the
close association of the two women in Arthur's mind there
corresponds a close resemblance between his immediate,
literal situation with respect to Florimell and his more
general, figurative situation with respect to Gloriana:
just as he has, quite literally, "pursewd" Florimell
through the woods (III.i.18), so, figuratively,
throughout his quest, he has been engaged in the
"poursuit" of the Faery Queen (III.v.2). The narrator
reinforces our sense of this resemblance by embellishing
the description of Arthur's progress in his literal
attempt to catch Florimell with similes which
conventionally are used for describing the progress of a
lover in his figurative attempt to catch his beloved: he
pursues her as a hunter his quarry (III.iv.46)1°, and
loses sight of her like a ship's pilot losing sight of
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the star that guides him (111.iv.53).11 In the end,
unlike the recollection of his love for Gloriana in Book
One, which encourages him to part from Una "With fresh
desire his voyage to pursew" (I.ix.18), Arthur's thoughts
of Gloriana in Book Three, although they call him back
"to his first poursuit" (III.v.2), fail in doing so to
call him away from his pursuit of Florimell. Rather,
just as his quest for the Faery Queen has become
conflated with the adventure that distracted him from it,
so his attempt to get out of the forest in order to
resume his quest (III.v.3) becomes entangled in a renewed
attempt to locate Florimell (III.v.11-12). It is in this
state of confused intentions that he wanders out of the
action of Book Three.
The source of Arthur's difficulties in his encounter
with Florimell is that a congruency is re-established
there, which has not existed since he fell in love,
between the literal actions in which he engages and the
figurative actions by means of which he represents his
inner experience. As a result, the distinctions between
the literal and the figurative, between the outer and the
inner, and between his quest for Gloriana and the
adventures which interrupt it, all of which remained
intact throughout his involvement in Books One and Two,
suddenly become unclear, leaving the Prince with a kind
of semantic double vision. In this state, he wanders "to
and fro at disauenture" (III.iv.53), unwittingly courting
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accusations of infidelity, and worse: for in failing to
distinguish between the hunt as a figurative
representation of wooing and the literal chasing of a
helpless woman through the forest, he becomes, in his
chivalric actions, scarcely distinguishable from the
"wicked foster" whom he succeeds as the prime reason for
Florimell's continued flight (111.iv.47ff). "To reskew
her" from the "foule foster" (III.i.18) was a laudable
enough goal -- precisely the kind of thing, in fact, that
might have further advanced his reputation, and thereby
brought him another step closer to winning Gloriana's
love -- if only, in setting off on the adventure, he had
been able clearly to distinguish the Faery Queen from
Florimell as the object of his "hope to win thereby/...
the fairest Dame aliue" (III.i.18). As things are,
however, Florimell seems fully justified in continuing to
flee from so confused a knight, however well-intentioned
he may be (III.iv.50).
To his credit, Arthur seems at least dimly to sense
that the lack of clear vision, brought about by the
encroachment of night, which forces him to give up the
pursuit of Florimell "when her wayes he could no more
descry" (III.iv.53), has itself a figurative analogy --
the lack of mental acuity that I have called his semantic
double vision. For he blames the night not only for
taking from him the "goodly scope" of Florimell
(III.iv.52), but also for the paradoxical "visions" which
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visit "an heauy hart" like his own instead of sleep, in
which even complete opposites like life and death can be
confused (III.iv.57). Amongst the confused visions that
trouble his own sleepless mind are those thoughts in
which Florimell and Gloriana are consciously conflated
(III.iv.54) -- a conflation which seems the likely
antecedent for his double-pronged vilification of Night
as a "Breeder of new, renewer of old smarts" (III.iv.57).
What Arthur fails to see, however, is that the loss of
his mental acuity came on long before the physical
encroachment of darkness, and that the effect of
nightfall was merely to bring about, literally, what had
been true figuratively from the moment when he undertook
the pursuit of Florimell. For just as, with the coming
of night, he lost sight of the woman whom he was pursuing
and "to and fro at disauenture strayd", so his pursuit of
Florimell was, from the beginning, a "disauenture" in
which he "strayd" from his quest for Gloriana for lack of
a clear mental picture of which woman he was meant to be
pursuing. And just as, when he laid himself down to pass
the hours of darkness, a "thousand fancies" in which he
conflated Florimell and Gloriana "bet his idle braine"
(III.iv.54), so, from the moment when he conceived the
intention of winning Florimell for himself, he confused
Florimell with Gloriana as the proper object of his
"suit" (III.iv.52). However Arthur may blame the night
for his troubles, then, its real effect has been merely
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to complete the analogy between his literal external
situation and his already figuratively benighted internal
state.
In casting Night as the source of all visual and
semantic unclarity, and praying for its defeat at the
hands of Day, which "sheweth each thing, as it is indeed"
(111.iv.59-60), Arthur is trying to redraw the lines
which distinguished good from evil, truth from duplicity,
in the straightforward martial engagements which made up
the chivalric action in which he was involved in previous
books. The personalized Night whom he deprecates is
recognizably the chthonic patron of evil whom Duessa
visits in the fifth canto of Book One: an intractable
deity who, although she has already been vanquished by
the Olympian gods and is doomed to see her own children
defeated by "The sonnes of Day", nevertheless, to the
extent of her powers, contrives to work evil and
falsehood in the world (compare I.v.20-6, III.iv.55-9).
Arthur himself, as he appeared in that book, armed with a
sunlike shield that could confound with its beams "all
that was not such, as seemd in sight" (I.vii.34-5), was
himself clearly among the superior forces of Day, able to
"chase away... too long lingring night" (III.iv.60) and
all the ambiguity associated with it. But things have
become more complicated since then: as love has entered
chivalric action, so the distinction between friend and
foe has become less clear. Even after the foster rushes
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off in a different direction, Arthur thinks of his
pursuit of Florimell as an attempt "to reskew" her
(111.iv.46-7), and he denounces night, who foils this
"reskew", as belonging among "the damned spirits" who
live in "hell" (III.iv.60); but from Florimell's
perspective, it is Arthur himself, in pursuing her, who
is like a "feend of hell" (III.iv.47), while night, in
causing him to lose her trail, is in effect her rescuer.
And if night provides the occasion for the troubling
visions in which Arthur conflates his desire for
Florimell with his love for Gloriana (III.iv.54), then it
has provided, equally, the occasion for the dream (if it
was a dream) which led to his falling in love with
Gloriana in the first place (I.ix.13-14) -- making his
insistence, at this point in the poem, on the clear moral
scheme which associates Night solely with evil and Day
solely with good, virtual heresy against his love for the
Faery Queen. Nor will the return of day, for which
Arthur so fervently prays, restore semantic clarity to
his world as he seems to hope: on the contrary, with the
coming of dawn, he will continue to lament his having
failed to catch Florimell with all the passion that he
might more duly express as an unrequited lover of the
Faery Queen (III.v.7), and soon let his faltering attempt
to return to his search for Gloriana be diverted into the
taking up of a search for Florimell. Indeed, the
association of clarity of meaning with the benevolence of
323
the bright heavenly powers, and of ambiguity and
duplicity solely with the malign chthonic forces, has
already been disrupted, in Book Three, by the narrator's
assertion that "eternall fate" -- which is regularly
identified in this book with the will of heaven
(III.iii.24,etc.) -- works its "vnknowen purpose" through
"subtle sophismes" and "double senses" (III.iv.28). Even
the language with which Arthur attempts to state the
subordinate role in the cosmos of Night and her children
is beset by ambiguity: for when he prophecies that
Dayes dearest children be the blessed seed,
Which darknesse shall subdew, and heauen win...
(III.iv.59),
the forces of "darknesse" threaten to supplant "Dayes
dearest children" as the subject of his sentence. In all
these respects, Arthur's belated attempt to redraw the
familiar lines that once divided good from evil, clarity
from ambiguity, and light from darkness, and which
narrowly circumscribed the latter camp within a
subordinate position in the world, cannot succeed now
that the external field of martial action has followed
the internal battlefield of his soul in giving way to the
darkened woods of venerean intrigue.
The kinds of semantic lines that Arthur straddles
unintentionally, in his adventures in the Legend of
Chastity, are precisely those which Britomart is in the
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process of learning to cross deliberately. Whereas he
loses the ability that he showed in his earlier
adventures to keep distinct the martial and the erotic
domains of experience, and their use, literal and
figurative respectively, of the concepts and imagery of
violence, she gains an increasing control over the points
at which these distinctions are broken down. He suffers
from a collapse in the distinction, which had existed
throughout his involvement in the first two books of the
poem, between his respective roles as a knight and a
lover; she profits by intentionally conflating these two
roles in her own person. He finds himself pursuing a
second love more or less by mistake, and fails to control
or even to become fully aware of the implications of
having done so; in contrast, she learns, by the first
canto of Book Four, to lay claim, deliberately, to two
loves at once, while exercising full and conscious
control over the terms on which she does so.
Two other episodes in the Legend of Chastity which
are, in a sense, complementary to Arthur's unhappy
experience in pursuing Florimell are those in which
Cymoent and Belphoebe attempt, respectively, to prepare
for the wounding of Marinell and to respond to the
wounding of Timias. Whereas Arthur's difficulties in
Book Three stem from his conflation of two essentially
distinct situations -- on one hand, his attempt to gain
Gloriana's favour, which is figuratively referred to as a
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"poursuit", and on the other, his quite literal pursuit
of Florimell -- Cymoent and Belphoebe run into
difficulties for the opposite reason that they try to
render unambiguous words or situations in which, in fact,
literal and figurative meanings are inextricably
conflated.
Cymoent wrongly assumes that the prophecy of Proteus,
that "A virgin strange and stout... should dismay, or
kill" Marinell (III.iv.25), has only one meaning, namely
the conventional figurative one which the ladies whom
Marinell spurns invoke when they "complaine,/ That they
for loue of him would algates dy" (III.iv.26).12 In
fact, the prophecy does have this meaning, as will
eventually be revealed when Marinell falls in love with
Florimell (IV.xii.27-28); but it also has the entirely
literal meaning which is fulfilled "Through heauy stroke
of Britomartis hond" (III.iv.28-9). Cymoent fails to
give Marinell adequate advice, not because she gets the
sense of the prophecy wrong13, but because she
acknowledges only one of the "double senses" (III.iv.28)
that it contains. Because "she of womans force did feare
no harme" (III.iv.27), she ignores the possibility that
the "deadly wound" which will strike Marinell down might
be a literal one.
Belphoebe, attempting to restore Timias to health
after his relapse into critical illness, ignores the
opposite possibility: that the wound from which he is
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suffering might be the conventional, figurative wound of
love (III.v.48-50).14 The reason that she is able to
make this mistake is that the illness which results from
this wound is not merely figurative, even if the "dart"
that caused it (III.v.42) apparently was: on the
contrary, while his being mortally ill clearly does have
the conventional figurative meaning that he is suffering
grievous emotional distress as a result of his unrequited
love (111.v.43ff), it also is sufficiently a literal
condition that Belphoebe can confuse his symptoms with
those that would have appeared had the closed-over wound
in his thigh become infected (III.v.49). The fact that
this illness will not respond to the "Restoratiues.../
And costly Cordialles" (III.v.50) which are ordinarily
effectual in treating such symptoms does not make the
condition any less literally real; rather, it indicates
that the literal illness is a symbol, whose figurative
meaning determines the success or failure of any attempt
to cure it. Just as Guyon found it impossible to deal
effectively with the symbolic characters Occasion and
Furor so long as he engaged only with their literal
meanings (Chapter Two, pp.245-6), so Belphoebe wastes all
her care so long as she engages only with the literal
facts of Timias' sickness.
The literal reality of the effects that Timias
suffers from the 'arrow-wound' in his heart distinguishes
his affliction from the one from which Arthur reports
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himself to be suffering in Book One. Although Arthur
describes himself as afflicted with a "fresh bleeding
wound, which day and night/ Whilome doth rancle in my
riuen brest" (I.ix.7), a reader is unlikely to wonder why
the earlier detailed description of the prince
(I.vii.29-36) failed to mention his horrible injury, or
why it has not left him bedridden; for this love-injury,
unlike Timias's, follows convention in describing only
figuratively the experience of the lover.13 Like his
love-quest itself, Arthur's love-sickness is kept
strictly in the background in the first book of the poem:
it is something that he reports to the other characters,
not something that impinges on the action. But as, in
Book Three, Arthur's love quest emerges from the
background of report to become confused with the
foregrounded chivalric action, so, at the same time, the
conventionally wounded heart of the lover ceases (at
least in Timias' case) to be something that he merely
talks about, becoming instead something whose full-blown
physical effects he literally suffers, and which
consequently overtakes his very capacity for chivalric
action.16
Because it is the conventional figurative meaning of
Timias' symbolic illness which governs the results of all
attempts to treat it, the only treatment which is capable
of curing him is itself the conventional one: namely,
Belphoebe's granting to him her love in return, and
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surrendering to him her "chastity and vertue virginall"
(III.v.53).17 This cure -- that is, her love, or her
virginity, depending on where one wants to place the
emphasis -- following the tradition which springs from
the thirteenth-century Romance of the Rose, is described
figuratively as her "dainty Rose" (III.v.51).10 The
narrator makes the figurative significance of "this
flowre" clear once he attributes it to the "bounteous
race/ Of woman" generally, by describing it as growing
"in stocke of earthly flesh" and "In gentle Ladies brest"
(III.v.52) -- a context which more or less demands the
flower's non-literal interpretation. But insofar as the
description of the flower is particular to Belphoebe, the
"dainty Rose", like the illness which it is capable of
curing, is given an unusually literal existence alongside
what it figuratively represents. The description of her
careful protection of the rose against inclement weather
(III.v.51), while of course it suggests her equally
careful guarding of her chastity, also confirms that the
flower is something which has a literal existence for
her: it is, literally, one of her medicinal herbs,
albeit it differs from all the others in also being a
symbol of something else.19
It is clear enough, I think, that one reason why
Belphoebe fails to cure Timias is that she will not
contemplate granting to him what her rose figuratively
represents; what perhaps needs more emphasis is another
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reason, namely that she will not contemplate the quite
literal act of making a "Cordiall" of her favourite
flower (III.v.50). Of course, the one act represents the
other; but this fact does not diminish the significance,
for Belphoebe, of the literal flower which (as it
happens) symbolizes her chastity. Her unwillingness to
pluck a rose for which she has cared as for a "daughter"
(III.v.51), even for the sake of saving another human
being, itself contributes to our sense of her character
as one who prefers nature and the fruits of her own
endeavors to human company; it even, I think, lends a
certain unexpected pathos to the scene. More
importantly, locating the doubleness of the flower's
meaning inside the world experienced by the characters
allows us to observe Belphoebe's relationship to this
doubleness itself. Her unwillingness to resort to a
medicine which symbolizes something else may be nearly as
significant for our understanding of the episode as what
precisely that medicine symbolizes. Just as she insists
on interpreting Timias's symptoms purely in their literal
sense, as the effects of a festering wound, so she
insists on responding to them with medicines which
themselves have only literal meanings. Her refusal to
treat him with her rose is not only a refusal to
surrender her virginity to him: it is also a part of her
refusal to have to do with the semantic doubleness of the
situation in which she has found herself involved. In
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her dealings with Timias, Belphoebe ensures that she
keeps her virginity intact principally by keeping her
1iteral-mindedness intact.20
In that Belphoebe retains her virginity, this
strategy of hers is a successful one; but in another
sense, her refusal to acknowledge the symbolic dimension
of the situation blocks any possibility of progress
toward a mutual understanding with the afflicted squire.
Meanwhile, Timias himself, it should be said, does not
contribute toward a resolution of the problem, and for a
related reason. He insists on seeing his own love for
Belphoebe in terms of the martial ethic which
characterized the training of Arthur and Guyon -- the
ethic according to which love is a base "passion" which
"reason" must "subdew" (III.v.44) -- rather than
acknowledging, as Arthur has done, that the victory of
love in one's soul requires a suspension of the martial
logic which says that defeat and subjection are always
shameful. Like Belphoebe, although in a different way,
Timias persists in interpreting his wound according to a
martial logic which is inadequate to the semantics of
love.
To this point, I have concentrated on the extent to
which Cymoent's and Belphoebe's troubles are the
opposites of Arthur's. Ultimately, however, all these
characters have something in common. Whether the
semantic ambiguity of their experience arises through
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their conflating of two essentially distinct things (as
in Arthur's case) or, conversely, through their
encountering some one thing whose meaning is irreducibly
double (as happens, in different ways, to Cymoent and
Belphoebe), they all respond to this ambiguity in the
same way: by insisting on the boundary between the
literal and the figurative which in fact has already
broken down.
So much, for the moment, for the relationship of the
characters in the Legend of Chastity to the distinction
(or the lack thereof) between the literal and figurative
meanings of imagery conventionally associated with love.
Another of the semantic lines which, as we have seen,
Arthur tries belatedly and unsuccessfully to redraw, in
his attempt to extricate himself from his unhappy
experience in Book Three, is that which had previously
distinguished good from evil: the Olympian forces of
daylight and clarity from the chthonic powers of darkness
and confusion. In this respect, too, Arthur's experience
is complemented by that of other characters in the third
book.
As I have already suggested (see Introduction (2),
pp. 91-3), the character from whose perspective the
apparent breakdown in the distinction between good and
evil appears most forcefully is Florimell, for whom the
difference between would-be rescuer and would-be rapist
effectively collapses. Every one of the would-be
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rescuers of Florimell who actually encounters either her
or her simulacrum in the action of the third book --
including Prince Arthur -- reveals his intention to claim
her for himself as the reward for his pains, and so
becomes in turn the threat to her from which he had
'saved' her but a moment before. In view of this
continually repeated experience, the revelation of the
fact that "after her are gone/ All the braue knights,
that doen in armes excell" seems calculated (and this in
spite of assurances that their intention is "To sauegard
her" from harm) not so much to inspire our hope that she
might yet be rescued, as positively to multiply the
number of quarters from which we feel her to be
threatened (III.viii.46). If we do sense a threat to her
in the fact "That all the noble knights of Maydenhead,/
Which her ador'd" (III.viii.47) -- all of whose suits of
love, we might remember, she has disdained (III.v.8) --
have set out in the hope of becoming her rescuer, then it
may seem less surprising to us that Paridell, who
announces the search and who counts himself among those
"knights of Maydenhead" who have undertaken it, should
turn out, in spite of his gallant words, not to be a
preserver of maidenheads but a habitual predator upon
them (see for example III.x.35).
Florimell is victimized not only by the ambiguity
that besets the motives even of her best-intentioned
pursuers, but also by an ambiguity from which, despite
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her chaste intentions, she cannot seem to free her own
words and actions. The most striking example of this is
the unintentional string of double-entendres with which
she addresses the old fisherman who subsequently tries to
rape her (III . viii.24)23-; but it becomes clear as well,
from the juxtaposition of her misadventures with the
story of the False Florimell, that even the fear which
she shows of being violated, and her resistance to her
would-be violators, can be construed by them, perversely,
as an enticement to their pursuit -- for it is precisely
these aspects of Florimell's behaviour which her demon
simulacrum most closely imitates, in order to be as
enticing as possible to the succession of men who lay
claim to the image. Thus, for example, when the witch's
son takes 'her' in his arms, "she.../ Coyly rebutted his
embracement light", knowing that by keeping herself
unavailable she will be able continuously "to hold a
foole in vaine delight" (III.viii.10); and when she falls
into Braggadochio's possession, she likewise responds
unfavorably to his lustful advances,
As seeming sory, that she euer came
Into his powre, that vsed her so hard,
To reaue her honor, which she more then life prefard.
(Ill.viii.14).
As the Squire of Dames observes in his misogynist tale,
there can be other reasons for a woman to put on the
appearance of chastity than her having a chaste heart
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(111.vii.58-60 ); what he and the False Florimell both
know is that the appearance of chastity can contribute
significantly to making a woman attractive to men, for
each would like to feel that his 'prize* is not lightly
won, nor likely to be lightly lost again to another. The
unpleasant corollary of this, for a woman like Florimell
who is genuinely chaste, is that she finds that it is
precisely her fleeing from her pursuers and resisting
their advances which is interpreted as a sign of her
desirability and which therefore, paradoxically,
encourages their pursuit.32
A number of the characters who, in pursuing
Florimell, see themselves as benignly attempting to win
her affections, seek unsuccessfully to persuade her that
their intentions differ from those of her more brutish
pursuers, and in this respect to reestablish the
distinction between good and evil which she does not
recognize in their behaviour. But as her story
progresses, such attempts to win her trust are more and
more openly revealed to be unreliable, apparently
vindicating the disbelief with which, from the beginning,
she has greeted them.
The first such attempt to distinguish good intentions
from bad is Arthur's. Riding after her in hot pursuit,
Aloud to her he oftentimes did call,
To doe away vaine doubt, and needlesse dreed:
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Full myld to her he spake, and oft let fall
Many meeke wordes, to stay and comfort her withall.
(III.iv.48).
But Florimell, although she is aware "that it was a
knight, which now her sewd", refuses to distinguish
between the meaning of his pursuit and that of the base
foster's: "she no lesse the knight feard, then that
villein rude" (III.iv.50).
In her next encounter, with the witch and her son,
the situation is in many respects reversed: rather than
a noble character who chases her through the forest like
a "villein rude", Florimell is confronted with a base
villain who manages to woo her with gentleness and
courtesy (111.vii.16-7). Once again, Florimell is
unconvinced, and plans
In secret wize her selfe thence to withdraw,
For feare of mischiefe, which she did forecast
Might be by the witch or that her sonne compast...
(III.vii.18).
This time, her suspicion is fully supported by the
narrator, who declares that the witch's son, however he
may suppose himself "to loue her", in fact is capable of
nothing "but brutish lust" (III.vii.15-6). It appears that
merely to suppose that one's intentions are noble and to
represent them as such does not guarantee that they are
so in fact -- a judgement which might be supposed to
reflect badly on Arthur, in the evidently confused state
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of mind in which he pursues Florimell.
The last of the characters who attempts to persuade
Florimell of his good intentions toward her is Proteus:
...he endeuoured with speeches milde
Her to recomfort, and accourage bold,
Bidding her feare no more her foeman vilde,
Nor doubt himselfe...
(III.viii.34).
Both the situation -- his having rescued her from
immediate danger at the hands of a base lecher -- and the
concern that he expresses to distinguish his intentions
from those of the villain from whose clutches he has
delivered her, are reminiscent of her earlier encounter
with Arthur. Once again, Florimell is unpersuaded; and
soon it becomes clear that her suspicion is justified.
Proteus's initially fatherly attentions (III.viii.35)
soon give way to a wooing, by means of gifts and gentle
entertainment, which is strongly reminiscent of the
persuasions attempted by the witch's son (111.viii.37) ;
and when this fails, he presently resorts to "sharpe
threates" (111.viii.40) and finally to casting her into
"a Dongeon deepe.../ ...to make her his eternall thrall"
(111.viii.41). Within the space of a few stanzas,
Proteus (as befits his changeable nature) has run through
the whole range of male behaviour which Florimell has
experienced in her flight, revealing clearly what she has
always suspected, namely, just how tenuous is the
distinction which her would-be rescuers have tried to
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draw between themselves and the would-be predators upon
her chastity.
Proteus's descent from reassurance through courteous
wooing into bullying and finally imprisoning Florimell is
followed almost immediately by an episode which further
emphasizes the potential for fair words and gentle
behaviour to be mere veils for more vicious intentions.
Paridell and Satyrane, who have only just presented
themselves as among the would-be defenders of Florimell's
chastity, debate what to do about the fact that Malbecco
admits no guests to his castle for fear that they will
deprive him of his money or his wife. Paridell demands
to know why they should not immediately "ransack all, and
him selfe kill" (III.ix.8); Satyrane, while apparently
agreeing with the sentiment, suggests a more subtle
strategy, which Paridell promptly adopts:
Nay let vs first (said Satyrane) entreat
The man by gentle meanes, to let vs in,
And afterwardes affray with cruell threat,
Ere that we to efforce it do begin:
Then if all fayle, we will by force it win,
And eke reward the wretch for his mesprise...
(III.ix.9).
It becomes clear that, for these knights, to "entreat/...
by gentle meanes" is no more than a technique for getting
what they want, one which they know they can always
abandon in favour of the violent coercion which they have
already declared themselves to be ready to practise. For
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them, the passage from mild entreaty to open force is not
only quick, as it was for Proteus; it is also cynically
premeditated.
Paridell further confirms his cynical attitude toward
courteous persuasion by the way in which he pursues his
next objective, the seducing of Hellenore (III.x.7-9).
Indeed, the narrator strongly associates the hypocritical
parade of courtly love conventions by means of which
Paridell pursues Halbecco's wife with the prior display
of hypocrisy by means of which he sought entry to
Malbecco's castle, by describing the seduction according
to the convention which figuratively represents the woman
herself as a castle to be besieged (III.x.10). Paridell,
like Proteus before him, shows that he knows well the
arts of the "fawning... flatterer" (111.viii.38 ) from
which Florimell retreats in well-warranted mistrust. But,
as it happens, Hellenore is no Florimell. Far from
withdrawing from Paridell's attempt to victimize her, she
actually embraces it as an opportunity to pursue her own
advantage, so that, in the end, where Florimell is cast
into prison by the lecher whose advances she refuses,
Hellenore sets herself free from a domestic imprisonment
by means of the lecher whose advances she encourages.
The reason that Hellenore is able to do this is that she
herself fully controls the semantics of her situation, in
a way that Florimell never does. In the first place, she
shows that she is as capable as Paridell of recommending
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herself through a disingenuous show of courtesy:
She came in presence with right comely grace,
And fairely them saluted, as became,
And shewd her selfe in all a gentle curteous Dame.
(Ill.ix.26).
Second, she clearly understands well the Ovidian irony
with which Paridell deploys the courtly love conventions,
and is able to respond in kind (III.ix.28).23 Finally,
she herself actively controls and utilizes the ambiguous
relationship between rape and rescue, which Florimell
recognizes but to which she relates only as its victim.
Thus, the tenth canto's argument, which declares that
"Paridell rapeth Hellenore", turns out, in the event, to
refer not to her unwilling abduction, as the words
suggest, but rather to her assisted escape, which she
herself disguises as an abduction by calling out to
Malbecco, as she goes,
...for helpe, ere helpe were past;
For loe that Guest would beare her forcibly,
And meant to rauish her, that rather had to dy.
(Ill.x.13).
Paridell himself, in what constitutes yet another
disconcerting shift of moral perspective for the reader,
emerges at the end of this episode as at least a
relatively sympathetic figure next to the cuckolded
Malbecco whom he has persistently abused; for Paridell,
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at least, has the virtue, which Malbecco (along with
virtually every other male character in Book Three)
notably has not, of not being possessive of the woman
whom he makes the object of his attentions, and of
acknowledging, in fact, that she has a will of her own
(III.x.35-38).
Through these dizzying changes in the apparent moral
status of characters -- Proteus transforming himself from
rescuer to persecutor, and Paridell from would-be rescuer
to persecutor and finally to rescuer again -- the
narrator is not so much a helpful guide as a habitual
source of misguidance, in that his chief occupation in
these cantos seems to be to insist upon precisely the
kind of moral absolutes which will be demolished in the
action. Like Arthur after his failure to catch
Florimell, the narrator insists on the old, black and
white morality within a world that the dynamics of eros
have rendered morally far more complex. Thus, for
example, the straightforwardly moralistic tone which
marks his introductory description of Hellenore as a
"wanton Lady" (III.ix.1) fails entirely to anticipate the
extent to which her decision to cuckold her husband
(III.x.11) will seem, in its context, to be an
understandable, even a justifiable response to a marriage
which amounts to little better than solitary confinement;
while his subsequent treatment of her as just another of
the women with "weake harts" who have passively fallen
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victim to Paridell's Ovidian wiliness (III. x.9-11)
entirely misses -- as did the argument to the canto, with
its naive declaration that "Paridell rapeth Hellenore"
(III.x.Arg.) -- the intelligence and ironic distance with
which Hellenore assumes the conventional role of
passivity in order to engineer her escape from Malbecco.
More strikingly still, in hailing Proteus's arrival on
the scene in the eighth canto as an example of "how the
heauens of voluntary grace" send "succour" to the
virtuous in the hour of their greatest need
(111.viii.29), the narrator not only fails to anticipate
or to account for a significant part of the highly
ambivalent role that Proteus will play in Florimell's
story, but actually cultivates, in the reader, the very
interpretation of Proteus's appearance which Proteus
himself tries in vain (III.viii.34) to cultivate in
Florimell: namely, that he is the answer to her prayers
(III.viii.27), and that here, at last, is a return to the
straightforwardly benevolent kind of rescue -- unsullied
by selfish interests or ulterior motives, and entirely
distinct, therefore, from the evil that necessitates the
rescue in the first place -- which marked the
intervention of divine grace in the eighth cantos of the
previous books (compare, especially, the language of
I.viii.l, 11.viii.1).24 In both these episodes, it is as
if the narrator bases his interpretation of events on an
uncritical acceptance of a character's self-
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representation -- Hellenore as morally weak victim of
Paridell's seduction, and Proteus as trustworthy and
charitable rescuer -- at the expense of the larger
context which reveals clearly the disingenuousness of
these self-descriptions.
In fact, there will be no instances, in Book Three
(with one possible exception, which I shall come to at
the end of this chapter), of the straightforward kind of
rescue which was effected by the intervention of divine
grace in the action of Books One and Two. Florimell's
rescue by Proteus, which relieves her of the immediate
danger to her chastity only to place her in the same
danger again at the hands of her deliverer, is typical
not only of the ready transformation of would-be rescuer
to would-be rapist which marks her whole story, but also
of the new and more morally complex relationship, in Book
Three generally, between the courses of events in which
virtuous characters find themselves inescapably engaged,
and the heavenly powers which are said to exercise
providential care over these characters' lives.
In the first book of The Faerie Queene. the effect of
divine intervention in human affairs is unequivocal and
dramatic: namely, to convert what would be the defeat of
the virtuous into their victory over the powers that
oppress them, by manipulating apparent chance events, at
the moments of greatest danger, to the resounding
advantage of the good. Thus, for example, it appears,
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superficially, to be mere good fortune (I.xi.29) or freak
chance (I.xi.45) that the Redcross knight, at the moments
when he seems most certain to be overcome by the dragon,
falls not on the open field where he would be slain, but
in places where he will be protected, and his powers
restored, first by the well, then by the tree, of life;
but a parenthetical remark makes clear to the reader what
Una apparently knows when she praises God for the
knight's eventual victory (I.xi.55), namely, that
"eternall God that chaunce did guide" (I.xi.45).
Similarly, when a blow from Orgoglio's club lays Arthur
on the ground and puts him in immediate danger of defeat,
the fact that "in his fall his shield, that couered was,/
Did loose his vele" is superficially attributed to
"chaunce" (I.viii.19), but the beams that blaze forth
from the "sunshiny shield" (I.viii.20) and render the
giant defenseless are associated with divine intervention
through an analogy drawn between their effects and those
of "th'Almighties lightning brond" (I.viii.21).
In the third book, divine intervention in human
affairs operates rather differently: although, as
before, it intervenes, through what appears to be the
operation of mere good fortune, at the moment of the
virtuous characters' greatest need, unlike in Book One it
does not dramatically convert apparent defeat into
unequivocal victory, but rather only averts irrecoverable
disaster -- repeatedly, if necessary -- without radically
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transforming the general situation, much less bringing
events to an immediate favourable conclusion. Thus, when
Florimell, on the verge of being caught and devoured by a
Hyena-like beast, and ready to leap suicidally into the
sea in her desperation to avoid that fate, finds a little
boat lying on the beach, this means of escape is
attributed superficially to fortune, but parenthetically
to "high God" who "did... ordaine" that it should be
there (111.vii.27); but this boat, far from solving her
problems once and for all, turns out to contain a brutal
old man who tries to rape her, requiring another, similar
intervention in the form of what seems to be the mere
chance arrival of Proteus ("It fortuned, whilest thus she
stifly stroue,/ And the wide sea importuned long space/
With shrilling shriekes, Proteus abroad did roue") but
which is ultimately ascribed, once again, to the "high
God" who is said to bring that apparent chance to pass
(III.viii.29). Yet once more, the divinely-ordained
means of deliverance turns out to be the source of yet
more persecution, in what seems -- at least for the
duration of Florimell's adventures in Book Three -- to be
an endlessly repeating pattern from which there is no
ultimate escape.
This sort of divine intervention can leave a rather
ambivalent impression upon the reader, in comparison to
the effect of the clear reversals of fortune brought
about by acts of God in Book One. For it gives the sense
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that, in delivering the beleaguered character out of one
danger only by delivering her into another instance of
the same or a similar danger, providence is as
responsible for perpetuating the agonizing misadventure
-- for endlessly deferring its resolution -- as for
ensuring that the trials of the virtuous never end in
unmitigated disaster. This sense of ambivalence is
further aggravated if we observe that Florimell's
seemingly endless string of misadventures is not merely
perpetuated by these peculiarly indecisive interventions
on the part of God, but was actually initiated by
heavenly design as well: for as we are told, it was
actually a part of "the vnknowen purpose of eternall
fate" that the ambiguity of Proteus's prophecy should
deceive Cymoent, and so lead to Marinell's grievous
injury and hence to Florimell's leaving Faery Court in
search of him, thus exposing herself, unwittingly, to the
dangers that soon convert her quest into a desperate
flight. It is, we may conclude, the whole apparently
endless cycle of immediate threat and narrow escape for
which the divine power that both provokes Florimell's
flight and drives it on from one episode to the next is
responsible. In this respect, the moral ambiguity which
Florimell perceives in all her would-be rescuers may seem
to belong also, or even primarily, to the "high God" who
is, throughout the 1590 installment of The Faerie Queene.
the ultimate rescuer of virtuous characters in distress,
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but who seems, in Florimell's case, to be, like all those
who come ostensibly to give her "succour" (III.viii.29),
a persecutor as much as a deliverer.
Nor is Florimell's problematic relationship with the
divine will an isolated phenomenon. Just as, in her
case, the effect of providence is not (as it was for
Redcross and Arthur in Book One) to bring about, once and
for all, a decisive victory in the face of apparent
defeat, but rather to propel her into a kind of perpetual
motion in which she oscillates continually between the
brink of final disaster and the prospect of genuine
relief, so, in Book Three generally, the divine purpose
in human history is expressed not as the promise of a
final, apocalyptic victory of good over evil, but rather
as the promise of the perpetuation of the Trojan
bloodline, whose fortunes have varied, and will vary,
from generation to generation, from the brink of
extermination -- as at the sack of Troy itself
(III.ix.39), and again at the Saxon conquest of Britain
(III.iii.41-42) -- to the moments of glory, themselves
inevitably fleeting, represented by the imperial dominion
first of Troy, then of Rome, and one day of Elizabethan
England's "Troynouant" (111.ix.44-45). The disasters
which punctuate this history, as much as the moments of
glory, are attributed, unequivocally, to the divine will:
just as it was the direct result of divine intervention
that Troy fell (III.ix.34), so too, says Merlin, it shall
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be because "th'heauens haue decreed, to displace/ The
Britons" that they will, in turn, perforce, "to the
Saxons ouer-giue their gouernment" (111 . i i i . 41) . Like
Florimell, who is driven ever onwards, over land and sea,
in what seems an endless flight, by a divine will
apparently as intent on continually renewing her trials
as on sparing her from irremediable catastrophe, so too
the sons of Troy are driven, by land and sea, from trial
to trial, by the "fatall course" (III.ix.49) of that same
equivocal destiny which ensures that the bloodline,
however decimated, is never wholly extinguished. It is
in this context that we must place Britomart's love for
Arthegall -- itself apparently caused by "fortune" but
actually brought to pass by "the streight course of
heauenly destiny,/ Led with eternall prouidence"
(III.iii.24) -- in order to comprehend why its
consequences, in spite of Merlin's assurances, refuse so
persistently to seem wholly innocuous. Divine
intervention in the course of her life, like divine
intervention in the Legend of Chastity generally, is to
lead not to one decisive outcome but to a whole
continuing history of consequences, which in the case of
Merlin's prophecy to Britomart include Arthegall's
premature death as well as the promise of their fertile
marriage (111.iii.28), and centuries of oppressive
foreign domination as well as a period of imperial rule
for their offspring ( 111 . i i i . 42 ) . Even the words with
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which Merlin ends his prophecy to Britomart, "But yet the
end is not" (III.iii.50), are strongly charged with the
ambivalence that marks the history of the Trojan people
at large: on one hand, they promise that the passing of
the Elizabethan moment will not mark the end of the
history of Britomart's progeny (which may seem
counterfactual, given the certainty, by 1590, of the
extinction of the house of Tudor, but we should recall
that Elizabeth was, after all, to be succeeded by a blood
relative, albeit not by her own descendent); on the other
hand -- as is intimated by the narrator's suggestion that
Merlin may have fallen silent at this point upon
beholding some "ghastly spectacle.../ That secretly he
saw, yet note discoure" (III.iii.50) -- they are a
sobering reminder that so long as her descendents'
history continues, so too must their trials and
tribulations.
The kind of divine intervention in the course of
history which characterizes the third book of The Faerie
Oueene is essentially classical in conception, as is the
particular strand of history, namely the fate of the
Trojans after the fall of Troy, to which Book Three
continually refers: both are derived, at least in large
part, either directly or through the intermediary of the
British chronicle tradition from Virgil's Aeneid.
Although it is (apparently) the Christian God to whom the
divine interventions in the lives of Britomart and
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Florimell are ascribed, His role in the Legend of
Chastity is never clearly distinguished from that of the
pagan gods, to whom Spenser continues to give their
conventional function of intervening in the same way and
even in the same story. In particular, His role is
conflated with that of the classical gods of love: of
Venus, who is described as intervening in the history of
the Trojans by initiating the love affair of Paris and
Helen (III.ix.34), and especially of Cupid, who in Book
Three is described, and generally treated, as the source
of all chivalric virtue and the agent through whom "the
fatall purpose of diuine foresight" is brought to pass
(111.iii.1-2 ) . Nor is it simply that Venus and Cupid are
introduced into the action as merely the agents of a
higher Christian deity, whose deeper and specifically
Christian purpose is seen to work through them; rather,
His use, in the Legend of Chastity, of classical, erotic
love as a vehicle for His intervention in the world
renders Christian providence, in practice, indistinguish¬
able from the classical force of "fate" (III.iii.24 etc.)
which had itself frequently been represented, from Homer
onwards, as a power superior to the will of the
individual pagan gods. Indeed, it is inevitable that the
substitution of eros for Christian charity, as the agent
of the divine will in human affairs, changes the very
nature and impact of God's influence in the world. For
eros, as opposed to charity, is intrinsically a worldly
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force -- the power of natural reproduction, as opposed to
the power of spiritual regeneration -- and as such it
drives events laterally, along the repetitious and
morally ambiguous ground of secular history, rather than
vertically, toward a final, otherworldly goal. Eros is
worldly, too, in that it partakes of, and contributes to,
the morally ambiguous nature of worldly events: thus,
for example, it is the motivation both of the chase that
propels Florimell in her flight and of the rescues that
intervene periodically to defer her being caught; and as
such, it is the underlying explanation of the fact that,
in Book Three, chase and rescue, evil and good, often
collapse, in practice, into a single, morally ambivalent
event.
One important consequence of the fact that the
Christian God's involvement in the Legend of Chastity is
essentially of the same kind as that associated with the
pagan gods is that He is no longer available, as He was,
for example, in the Legend of Holiness, as a point of
refuge from the moral relativism that threatens the
Spenserian cosmos when it seems to be presided over by
the Olympian and chthonic deities of the classical
pantheon. In Book One, as the Redcross knight stooped to
behaving no better than his faithless adversary in a
duel, so too the Olympian gods themselves — who were
described, at least by his opponents, as the knight's
divine patrons -- began to seem no better than their own
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cosmic adversaries; but as Redcross emerged from his
morally relativistic behaviour, so too the threat of
cosmic relativism was swept aside, as a distinction was
revealed between the merciless Olympians and the
redeeming Christian God who (it now emerged) was the
knight's proper patron (see Chapter One, pp. 207-13).
In Book Three, there is a similar correspondence between
events human and divine: as love obtrudes suddenly upon
the main chivalric action of the poem, blurring the
boundaries which had previously distinguished virtue from
vice, so too the god of Love makes a sweeping conquest
over the Olympian gods, transforming them, the supposed
patrons of the virtuous, into the most notorious
persecutors of the virtue which the Legend of Chastity
celebrates -- into romping Ovidian rapists in an action
already brutalized by the ever-present threat of rape
(111.xi.29ff).2B At the same time, the chthonic deities,
without entirely losing their accustomed fearful aspect,
begin suddenly to be celebrated as fecund sources of life
(III.vi.36). Indeed, as I will show in what follows, in
canto six, where the action of Book Three shifts (as in
the underworld journey in Book One) from the mortal to
the divine plane, the very boundaries are broken down
between the respective spheres of influence of the
Olympian and chthonic deities whom we are accustomed to
thinking of as intractable enemies, the cosmic patrons,
respectively, of good and evil; rather than relieving, in
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any way, the sense of moral (and semantic) confusion
which characterizes the surrounding chivalric action,
this scene is a tour de force of moral and semantic
ambiguity. But unlike in the Legend of Holiness, there
will be no reassuring emergence, in the Legend of
Chastity, from the confusion which threatens to overtake
both the mortal and divine worlds once love usurps the
action; rather, as I have already shown, the Christian
God who acted as a kind of deus ex machina in rescuing
Book One from moral relativism is Himself deeply
implicated in sponsoring the kind of morally ambivalent
action that is characteristic of Book Three. The vision
of the cosmos embodied in the Garden of Adonis stands, in
effect, 'unretracted' -- at least within the Legend of
Chastity and thus within the 1590 edition of The Faerie
Queene.26
A great deal has been written about the philosophical
underpinnings of Spenser's Garden of Adonis, which I will
not attempt to survey here, other than to observe that
there has been a long-standing (or at least recurrent)
debate as to whether Spenser was trying in this passage
to present a single, coherent natural philosophy, or
whether he was content, rather, to present in an
attractive poetic form a mere hodgepodge of thematically
related images, all of them based loosely in
philosophical discourse.27 It will already be clear, I
think, that my own position is somewhat closer to the
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latter view, in that it seems to me that the Garden of
Adonis passage does not present a coherent philosophical
vision. But I differ in seeing the fact of this
incoherence as itself thematically important and indeed
as indicative of the role of this passage in the Legend
of Chastity as a whole.23 Also, it seems to me that
writers on both sides of this debate, though particularly
those on the former, have shown too great a willingness
simply to 'translate' the images that Spenser gives us --
from the garden itself to Venus and Adonis to the "babes"
(III.vi.32) that wait at the gate -- into more strictly
philosophical terms, like "forme" and "substance"
(111.vi. 35-38 ), whose direct discussion by Spenser
actually takes up a relatively small portion of the whole
passage, without giving much regard either to the literal
meanings of the images or to how these images might be
related to the figurative meanings that they are
construed as having. My aim, in what follows, is to
observe as closely as possible what it is that Spenser
describes, before proceeding to the question of what it
all might mean.
The main difficulty in interpreting the description
of the "Gardin of Adonis" (111.vi.29, 39), it seems to me,
lies in the question whether the "Gardin" (III.vi.30,
33,41) has a literal or only a figurative existence --
that is, whether it exists as a garden -- in the world
inhabited by the characters who undertake the main
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strands of action in the Legend of Chastity.29 It is
worth noting at the outset, I think, that this question
is very similar to the one which Augustine poses about
the Garden of Eden (which the Garden of Adonis closely
resembles in many important respects30): namely, whether
the Garden described in Genesis should be thought of as
having (or having had) a literal existence in that real,
material world wherein all subsequent Biblical history
was understood literally to have taken place.31 Augustine
argues forcefully that the Garden of Eden did literally
exist in this historical world, and that, albeit the
garden and the things in it might also have figurative
meanings -- as, for example, the tree of life which grew
there was understood, in the light of Proverbs 3:18, to
mean wisdom -- this does not diminish at all the literal,
historical status of the garden or the things in it:
although they "signified something other than what they
were... none the less they themselves existed in the
world of material reality."32 In the terms which I have
been using, the things in the Garden are, for Augustine,
to be understood as symbols (see Introduction (1):
pp. 37-9). The situation with respect to Spenser's
Garden of Adonis is somewhat more complicated, as we
shall see; but let us begin by considering the evidence
for its literal existence within the world inhabited by
the characters who take part in the main action of the
Legend of Chastity.
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The principal support that Augustine gives for his
conclusion as to the status of the Garden of Eden is the
example of Adam, who himself leaves the garden to play a
role -- that of primogenitor -- in Biblical history at
large, clearly establishing that he, and the garden where
he originally lived, must from the beginning have been a
part of the same world wherein Biblical history at large
was to be played out.33 The same sort of situation
clearly obtains with respect to the Garden of Adonis.
For if it were not literally a garden -- if it were only
(as various commentators have argued) the human body, or
the womb, or the state in which unembodied forms or
vegetative souls pre-exist their incarnation34 -- then
the character Amoret could scarcely have been "brought"
there, after her birth, "To be vpbrought in goodly
womanhed" (III.vi.28-29), nor could she have come from
there to Faery Court as a mature, marriageable woman
(III.vi.52). This literal existence of the garden within
the material world inhabited by the poem's mortal
characters is further reinforced by the narrator's
specific statements that it exists "on earth" (III.vi.29)
and that "It sited was in fruitfull soyle of old"
(III.vi.31) -- characterizations which also develop the
analogy between this garden's situation and that of the
Biblical Eden.33, The further description of the Garden
of Adonis as "the first seminarie/ Of all things, that
are borne to liue and die" (III.vi.30) elaborates upon
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the nature of its literal existence in the world -- for a
seminary, or seed bed, is not a place where things exist
prior to their coming into the world, but rather where
they are grown from the seed until they are ready to be
transplanted: in other words, it is a place where things
spend that period of their lives which Amoret spends in
the Garden of Adonis, as she is raised from infancy to
the "perfect ripenesse" in which she is ready to be
"brought... forth into the worldes vew" as a marriageable
young woman (III.vi.52).3S
At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged
that there are substantial problems with interpreting the
Garden of Adonis in this way, different from any that
arose for Augustine in his literal reading of the story
of Genesis. To take but one important example, not all
of the "babes" (III.vi.32) that are described as being
nurtured in the Garden of Adonis are like those two
"babes" (III.vi.27) that Diana and Venus take it upon
themselves to raise; for unlike Belphoebe and Amoret, the
"thousand thousand naked babes" that wait at a gate of
the garden, hoping to be let out, have yet to be clothed
"with fleshly weedes" (III.vi.32), implying that their
existence in the garden is unembodied, and that their
going "into the world" refers not merely to their leaving
a walled enclave removed from sinfulness (that is, not
merely what 'going into the world' would mean for the
members of an enclosed monastic order) but to their
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entering an incarnate state from a pre-incarnate state of
existence. Such "babes" are obviously not "babes" in the
ordinary, literal sense at all37, as the various
commentators on the passage presumably have understood
who have debated as to what these "babes" are, given that
they cannot literally be babies: whether unembodied
rational souls, seminal reasons, Aristotelean vegetative
souls, or what have you.30 Now, none of these precise
meanings is offered by the text; but what is clear is
that, like the souls in Plato's myth of Er or the shades
in Virgil's underworld, who similarly wait one thousand
years between periods of incarnation, the existence of
these "babes" in the garden is an existence outside the
span of mortal, corporeal life.39
We have, then, two essentially opposite
interpretations of the Garden of Adonis, both of which
the text seems to demand: on one hand, it is a material
place, which is "on earth", and where living things,
including Amoret, spend the early part of their incarnate
lives, until such time as they are ready to be
'transplanted' into the world outside the garden walls;
on the other hand, it is an immaterial 'place',
(111.vi.32)), where things that will live, but which are
not living yet, await their incarnation and their entry
into life.40 These two different interpretations cannot
be reconciled by supposing that the things in this
Garden, like those in Augustine's Garden of Eden, are
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symbols which have two meanings at once; for the problem
is not simply that certain of the things in the garden,
like the "thousand thousand naked babes", besides being
meant literally, are also given a figurative meaning. On
the contrary, the "babes" are construed as having a
figurative meaning only because the context in which they
are introduced precludes their being meant literally:
babies without flesh are not, in the first place,
literally babies, any more than flesh is literally a suit
of clothes. The immediate context of the image "babes",
in stanza 32, demands that it not be understood
literally, while at the same time, the larger context
constituted by the story of Amoret and Belphoebe demands
that at least one of the "babes" in the garden is to be
understood literally. And because the question of what
the "babes" are is inseparable from the question of what
the "Gardin" is which they enter and leave, so, by
extension, the whole of the garden must, and at the same
time must not, be understood to have a literal existence
as a garden within the world of mortality and materiality
in which the Legend of Chastity takes place. Faced with
this paradox, we as readers are left to hover, with acute
semantic double vision, between the two irreconcilable
readings of what we see -- unless, of course, like Arthur
after his failed pursuit of Florimell, we try by means of
our own commentary to redraw the lines which ordinarily
distinguish literal from figurative meanings.
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To take a concrete example of the undecidable status
of the imagery that makes up the description of the
Garden of Adonis, let us consider what we are to make of
the statement that "double gates it had, which opened
wide,/ By which both in and out men moten pas"
(III.vi.31). This description of the gates of the garden
immediately follows its depiction (111.vi.28-30) as a
place "on earth" where Amoret was taken by Venus to be
"fostered" from infancy to "womanhed", and which serves
as a nursery or "seminarie" for other living things as
well; consequently, the most natural first reading of the
lines is a literal one: ordinary living "men", presuming
that they can find the garden ("Whether in Paphos, or
Cytheron hill,/ Or it in Gnidus be" (III.vi.29)), are at
liberty to go "in and out" through its open "gates", just
as Guyon, having survived his perilous sea voyage, was
free to enter the "gate" of the Bower of Bliss "that euer
open stood to all" (II.xii.46). But on the other hand,
this initial statement about the gates of the garden is
followed immediately by the account of "Old Genius the
porter" and the "thousand thousand naked babes" whom he
allows out at one gateway, eventually to "returne backe
by the hinder gate" (111.vi.31-2); this passage, as we
have seen, demands that the "double gates" of the garden
be understood figuratively, as 'gates' of birth and
death. Once the "gates" are understood to mean birth and
death, a non-literal interpretation becomes necessary of
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the fact that, through these gates, "both in and out men
moten pas": namely, that human beings are both born and
killed. The two different contexts of the passage yield
two different meanings, which contribute, respectively,
to our two irreconcilable understandings of the garden as
a material place of the living and as an immaterial place
of the dead (meaning by 'the dead' whatever it is that
pre-exists and survives the incarnate life of
individuals) .
Nor is the question of what kind of "babes" are
raised in the Garden the only source of difficulty for a
reader who wants to determine its semantic status within
the world of The Faerie Queene. Throughout its
description, the Garden drifts semantically back and
forth across the line that might be expected to divide
these two irreconcilable interpretations from one
another. Thus, the description of the "babes" who run
through a repeated cycle of being "clothed" by Genius
with "fleshly weedes" and sent out to live "in mortall
state" (III.vi.32-33) is followed a few stanzas later
(111.vi.37-8) by an account of "substances" which run
through a repeated cycle of being 'clothed' with "forme
and feature" ("For euery substance is conditioned/ To
change her hew, and sundry formes to don"), with the
result that each substance "Becomes a bodie" and is ready
to "inuade/ The state of life, out of the griesly shade."
The two descriptions are so similar that it is natural to
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assume that they both describe the same process, but in
different terms: that the "babes" are "substances", the
"fleshly weedes" which are subject to "corruption"
(III.vi.33) equivalent to the "formes" which "are
variable and decay" (III.vi.38), and going "forth to liue
in mortall state" the same as to "inuade/ The state of
life".41 But no sooner has this solution suggested
itself than we are confronted with a problem, namely that
unlike the "babes", whose going "forth to liue in mortall
state" is clearly equivalent to leaving the garden, the
"substances" which "inuade/ The state of life" clearly
remain in the garden once they have done so. For the
mutable "formes" which the "substances" assume are
destroyed by time not outside the garden, where "Fleshly
corruption" besets the "babes", but inside the garden,
where Venus, "When walking through the Gardin", beholds
the pitiful spectacle of their destruction
(III.vi.39-40).42 A narratorial comment makes explicit
the transition that has occurred: whereas previously,
the "mortall state" of life was what existed outside the
Garden, now the vulnerability of the things growing in
the garden to destruction by Time is to be seen as an
example of the mortality of "all that liues" (III.vi.40).
But it is not possible to discover the exact point at
which the things growing inside the garden walls ceased
representing the alternative to "mortall state" and
became instead representative examples of "all that
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liues". For in retrospect, we can see that, despite the
suggestive analogy between the "babes" with their
clothing of "fleshly weedes" and the "substances" with
/ their clothing of "forme and feature", an identity
between the two was never asserted.43 In fact, a quite
different analogy also exists between the "babes" which
are "planted" in the Garden between their successive
incarnations (III.vi.33) and the "formes" or "shapes"
which are also planted in the Garden, "ranckt in comely
rew". If we understand the "babes" to be the same
things, or the same kind of things, as the "formes" or
"shapes", then clearly the "babes" cannot also be the
same as the "substances" which are able "sundry formes to
don"; so the two processes whereby the "babes" are
dressed in "fleshly weedes" and the "substances" are
dressed in "formes" must be distinct.44 But this
interpretation also runs us into a contradiction: for if
the "babes" are the same as the "formes", then what is
said at one point (III.vi.33) to be that which remains
constantly in existence through successive incarnations,
is described at another point (111.vi. 37-38 ) as what
"does fade" and "decay" and needs to be replaced at each
successive incarnation, as opposed to what survives
unchanged through successive embodiments. Once again,
though from a different direction, we arrive at the
problem that what grows in the garden seems at one point
to be immutable and to survive the vicissitudes of life
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and even death itself, but at another point to be the
very thing in life which constantly changes and which
death finally destroys. Indeed, the problem is
unavoidable, for while the description of what takes
place in the garden progresses from one set of images to
the next by a series of apparently natural analogies and
successions, in fact it all the while veers freely
between poles of meaning which are opposite and
irreconcilable.40 Thus the account of the "babes" who go
for a time "into the world" and who are "planted" again
in the garden upon their return from "mortall state",
seems to lead naturally to a more detailed description
(III.vi.35) of what is planted in the garden to be sent
forth eventually "Into the world" (III.vi.36); mention of
the fact that these things are continually going out
"Into the world, it to replenish more" then leads to the
question of how it is that "the stocke" of the things
which replenish the world is "not lessened, nor spent"
(III.vi.36); and the answer to this question, that there
is "An huge eternall Chaos, which supplyes/ The
substances of natures fruitfull progenyes" (III.vi.36),
leads to a discussion of how each of these substances
"Becomes a bodie" ready to "inuade/ The state of life" --
which seems to bring us back (although the vocabulary has
now changed) to the original account of how the things
grown in the garden are embodied in preparation for
mortal existence. But as we have seen, by the time we
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have gone around this apparent circle of connected
descriptions, it is far from clear that the point where
we arrive is the same as the point where we began:
indeed, attempts to identify the one description of
embodiment with the other yield glaring contradictions.
And yet it is not possible to say at which link the chain
of connections is broken, for upon rereading we find that
in no case was a connection ever directly asserted, but
rather each one was only implied by the apparently
natural flow from one thought to the next. As a result,
the exact relationship among any of the various aspects
of the garden's description becomes impossible to
determine. The only thing which does become clear is
that the attempt to specify these relationships precisely
will inevitably bring to the fore the contradiction
between the Garden's two opposite and irreconcilable
meanings.
Another instance of the paradoxical nature of the
Garden is its self-contradictory relationship to the
classical, chthonic underworld. On one hand, the
description of the "babes" which "returne" to the garden
from "mortall state" to "remaine" there for "Some
thousand yeares" before being either "clad with other
hew,/ Or sent into the chaungefull world againe"
(111.vi.32-33 ) clearly indicates that the Garden is a
place of afterlife and pre-existence, similar in its
dynamics to that which was described in Virgil's Aeneid.
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and which Virgil had placed in the chthonic underworld
beyond the river Styx.46 On the other hand, Venus is
described as withholding Adonis from the "Stygian Gods"
who preside over the underworld where the shades of the
dead must go; and this implies that the Garden of Adonis
is not a place of the dead equivalent to the classical
underworld (although it clearly was this a few stanzas
earlier), but rather exists in opposition to this
underworld, as a place where Venus, by transforming her
beloved youth from one form to another so that he will
always "liue" (III.vi.47), can protect him from the gods
who would take him away to the land of the dead.
Paradoxically, the Garden is a refuge, on one hand, from
the very thing with which it has been identified, on the
other.
The respective places, in the Garden, of the Olympian
Venus and the chthonic or underworld gods is unclear also
with regard to the Garden's power of generation. On one
hand, Venus seems to represent a complementary principle
to Adonis, "the Father of all formes" (III.vi.47),
leading to the suggestion that she is the source of
matter in the garden's generative process.4-7 On the
other hand, the "Infinite shapes" and "formes" which grow
in the garden (III.vi.35) are described as receiving
"matter" not from Venus, but from "An huge eternall
Chaos, which supplyes/ The substances of natures
fruitfull progenyes" (111.vi.36-7) . The conclusion must
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be either that the roles of the Olympian goddess Venus
and ultimate chthonic goddess Chaos are conflated, or
that Venus and Chaos are themselves conflated; in either
case, the distinction between sky-gods and earth-gods,
which was so clearly drawn in the first two books of The
Faerie Queene. appears no longer to be in force.
Yet another instance of the Garden's ambivalent
status relative to the world of mortal existence is the
fact that normally animate beings -- that is, humans,
beasts, birds, and fish -- are described, on one hand, as
existing in the Garden devoid of the souls that
ordinarily animate them, and sprouting inanimately from
the ground like mere plants (III.vi.35), but on the other
hand as having a fully animate existence there, the birds
behaving like ordinary birds (or at least, like ordinary
birds in the springtime), choosing their mates
(III.vi.41) and making "their pastime/ Emongst the shadie
leaues" (III.vi.42), and, more generally, all creatures
actively going about the business of "sweet loue"
(III.vi.41). The question of whether the creatures in
the garden are animate or inanimate is of course related
to the question of whether the garden is a place of
mortal life or of some kind of pre-existence; it is also
related to the ambivalent status of Adonis himself, who
was once a youth, subsequently a flower (and thus in much
the same state as the things "ranckt in comely rew" in
the garden's various "bed[s]" (111.vi.35)), and who now,
1
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amidst his continual transformations, seems to have some
of the qualities both of plant and of animal, being, on
one hand, apparently as passive as a flower with respect
to Venus' "will", but on the other hand, quite capable of
the "wanton" activity which she "often" desires of him
(III.vi.46).
To summarize briefly: in the Garden of Adonis, the
lines are continually crossed, and therefore the
distinctions ultimately impossible to draw, between the
literal and the figurative, the material and the
immaterial, the living and the dead, the Olympian and the
chthonic, the animate and the inanimate, even the animal
and the plant. I add one final pair to this list, by way
of transition to the discussion of another episode,
namely the mortal and the divine. In the sixth canto of
Book Three generally, the pagan gods interact directly
with mortal characters in a way that does not happen in
the rest of the book -- with the possible exception of
the episode of the House of Busyrane, to which I shall
come in a moment. Of course, Cupid is described in other
episodes as interacting with mortal characters, in the
sense that he is said to shoot his arrows at them
(III.ii.26,etc.); but these arrows do not literally exist
for the characters who are described as being wounded by
them, and Cupid himself is liable to be treated as merely
a dispensable figurative representation of the power
which causes their love (111.iii.1-2 ) . The situation in
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the story of Amoret's upbringing is quite different: she
1iterally interacts with Cupid, with Cupid's mother
Venus, and with Cupid's "true loue faire Psyche", to whom
Amoret is "Committed... yfostered to bee,/ And trained vp
in true feminitee" (111.vi.50-51). The literal nature of
her interaction with the pagan gods of love causes Amoret
no problem so long as she resides in the Garden of
Adonis, where Cupid sets "his sad darts/ Aside"; but this
situation will change radically once she is brought forth
"into the world".
The episode in which Britomart rescues Amoret from
the House of Busyrane is — like one Description of the
Garden of Adonis, although in a different way -- an
astonishing tour de force of ambiguity. But there is, at
least, one aspect of the situation which is clearly and
consistently presented, namely that, whatever else it
may also mean by virtue of a symbolic status, the "house
of Busyrane" (111.xi.Arg.) first of all exists literally
as a "Castle" (III.xi.21) in the world inhabited by
Britomart and the other main characters of the Legend of
Chastity.48 In this castle, Amoret is literally
imprisoned and tormented by the enchanter Busirane partly
as a jealous punishment for the fact that she "will not
denay" her love for Scudamore (III.xi.ll), and partly in
a rather heavy-handed attempt to gain her love for
himself: "by torture he would her constraine/ Loue to
conceiue in her disdainfull brest" (III.xi.17). So far,
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this is straightforward enough, albeit perverse; but the
situation becomes more complex in view of the specific
form that Amoret's torments take. For if Amoret's
tortures were merely tortures -- if the effect that they
were intended to have on her were merely the literal
effects that torture can have in breaking a person's will
-- then any old torture would do, and Busyrane might as
well have just stretched her on a rack as to have gone to
all the trouble of removing her heart from her breast in
order to pierce it with an arrow, and of parading her
around, in this state, in the midst of a triumphal masque
(Ill.xii.21). Clearly her tortures are meant to signify
something specific, namely the conventional effects of
having fallen in love, as we have seen them described
throughout The Faerie Queene. which include, principally,
having one's heart wounded with an arrow, and being
subjected to the cruel tyranny of the god of Love.49
But the problem of interpretation arises when we try to
determine the sense in which Amoret's tortures signify
these conventional effects.
One possibility that cannot easily be discounted is
that Busyrane is simply literal-minded to a fault (and a
grievous fault, at that). Failing to note that,
conventionally, the arrow-wound and tyranny which torment
the lover have, for the one who suffers them, only a
figurative and not a literal existence, he subjects
Amoret to these torments literally, naively supposing, as
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he does so, that her suffering these things on his behalf
will mean that she is in love with him. Busyrane might
have been betrayed into this literal-minded understanding
of love by the visual art tradition, which is amply on
display in his house, wherein lovers may be "painted full
of burning darts" (III.xi.44), as if love were literally
a matter of arrows and fire. According to this
interpretation, the principal effect of Busyrane's
magical powers is to place Amoret in a situation which,
had it been brought about without the aid of magic, would
surely have killed her. Whether his spells allow him
actually to remove and pierce her heart without killing
her (as seems to be the case in III.xii.21) or merely to
create the convincing illusion that he has done so (as is
suggested by III.xii.31) is not terribly important: in
either case, Amoret experiences literally what
conventionally the lover suffers only figuratively.
Another possible interpretation of the situation is
that Busyrane is fully aware of the figurative nature of
the love conventions, but subjects Amoret to them
literally as part of a magical project whose ultimate
goal is to enchant her into the state of being in love
with him that his props figuratively represent. This
interpretation would explain why, when Britomart arrives
on the scene, Busyrane is still engaged in casting
spells, and why Amoret seems to deserve praise for her
resistance to what, according to our first interpretation
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of the scene, could scarcely be considered much of a
temptation (III.xii.31). According to this reading, the
gap still exists between the literalized conventions of
love from which Amoret suffers and the figurative effects
that Busyrane intends them to represent; but unlike in
our previous reading, that gap is not produced by a mere
ineptitude in Busyrane's understanding, but rather is one
which his magic powers threaten pressingly to close so
long as he keeps her in his power. Should he have
succeeded in enchanting Amoret, her literal tortures
would in effect have become symbols, standing
figuratively for the love which she would in fact have
felt for him.
Yet another possibility, and one which is also
difficult to discount, is that Amoret's literal
sufferings actually symbolize from the outset the love
which she already feels, namely her love for Scudamore,
just as in an earlier episode Timias' literal sufferings
clearly symbolized his love for Belphoebe. For this
reading to be viable, it has to be explained how it is
that, after Amoret's heart is healed of its arrow-wound
(111 . xii.38), she nevertheless continues to love
Scudamore (111.xii.41ff); but this presents no great
problem, for one has only to suppose that her literal
tortures symbolized not the love per se, but only the
conventionally miserable state of the lover, which she
casts aside, along with the literal tortures that
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symbolize it, when she goes forth to enjoy the
unmitigated "pleasure" of her husband's company.50 This
interpretation is bolstered by a suggestion toward the
end of the episode that the House of Busyrane from whose
torments she has been freed was, all along, a symbol of
"Her body, late the prison of sad paine,/ Now the sweet
lodge of loue and deare delight" (111.xii.45); for if the
house is a symbol of her body, then it seems to follow
naturally that the torments which take place inside the
house symbolize the torments which take place inside her
body, which can only mean the torments of love, and whose
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According to this last reading, the episode in the House
of Busyrane brings to its ultimate conclusion the process
which has been taking place throughout Book Three,
whereby the conventional -- and conventionally figurative
-- effects of love have taken on an increasingly literal
existence for the characters involved in the action.
Thus Arthur confuses his literal pursuit of Florimell
with his figurative pursuit of the Faery Queen, but at
least suffers only figuratively from a wounded heart; and
while, in the following episode, Timias suffers literally
the effects of a wound, there is still no arrow to be
seen literally protruding from his chest; but for Amoret,
the arrow-wound itself, and not only its incapacitating
effects, has a gruesomely literal existence.
Which of these interpretations is valid (if, indeed,
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any one of them can be proved more valid than the others)
might be decided by the status of the triumphal
procession in which Amoret is paraded around the house
, (111.xii.5-26), and more specifically, by the answer to
the question whether it is really "the winged God
himselfe" (III.xii.22) who presides over this event or
whether, instead, what is described as "the winged God
himselfe" is merely an actor playing his part. For if it
is really the god Cupid who gloats over "his proud spoyle
of that same dolorous/ Faire Dame" (III.xii.22), then
there cannot be much doubt that the wound from which she
suffers is genuinely (that is to say, symbolically) a
love wound; whereas, if this Cupid were merely an actor,
then the masque would have to be understood quite
differently, as a spectacle which Busyrane stages as a
part of his attempt -- whether naive or otherwise -- to
make Amoret fall in love with him.
But, as it turns out, the status of the procession,
and of the "the winged God" within it, is not readily
decidable. For on one hand, the event is likened to a
masque or a stage show (111.xii.3-5) -- although, so far
as its participants know, there is no one there to watch
it (III.xii.27) -- and its presenters are described as
"disguized" (III.xii.26), which suggests that they are
all merely actors playing parts. But on the other hand,
the procession's likeness to a play or masque does not
necessarily indicate that it is one, only that it looks a
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great deal like one; we may recall, for comparison's
sake, that the same could be said about Lucifera's royal
progress (I.iv.16ff), wherein the participants, as it
happened, were not merely actors but rather actual
personifications of the deadly sins. As in that scene,
the personages in the 'masque of Cupid' are generally
referred to not as though they were actors, but as if
they genuinely possessed the characters and the feelings
which befit their parts in the procession (111.xii . 9-13 );
this seems particularly to be the case with
"Dissemblance" (III.xii.14) and "Criefe" (III.xii.16), in
both of whose cases inner feelings, which they do not
show outwardly, contribute in important ways to their
fulfillment of their roles -- a detail which would seem
to make little sense if these were merely actors. And
yet, for all this, we could still suppose that these are
merely actors, after all, and that the narrator, serving
for the moment as a commentator on the performance,
describes directly what it is intended to signify, rather
than continually reminding us that it is, after all, only
a pretense. In this case, his reference to one of the
performers as "the winged God himselfe" would be simply a
part of the general suspension of disbelief which
characterizes his account of the masque generally. There
is, I think, no way to decide among these alternatives:
the Cupid who triumphs over Amoret may, or may not, be
the real Cupid with whom she consorted on more friendly
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terms in the Garden of Adonis.
The effect of the simultaneous possibility of the
various interpretations that I have suggested for the
events in the House of Busyrane is to make the whole
episode, in a sense, uninterpretable. In particular, it
is difficult to know whether Cupid himself -- and
therefore love, or at least a certain kind of love --
should be thought of as the direct cause of the great
torments which Amoret endures, or whether instead she
suffers not from her love at all but rather from
Busyrane's attempts to produce love in her with the aid
of physical props. what is important to note, however,
is that the uninterpretabi1ity of the House of Busyrane
is a problem faced not only by a reader approaching the
scene from outside the imaginary world presented by the
poem, but also for Britomart, the character who confronts
it from within. Britomart herself, it is made clear,
never fully comprehends the precise meaning of all that
she sees in Busyrane's castle.51 Thus, for example, when
she spies the words "Be bold" written over a door,
...she oft and oft it ouer-red,
Yet could not find what sence it figured...
(111.xi.50) .
Similarly, when she encounters further inscriptions of
"Be bold, be bold, and euery where Be bold," she is
unable to "construe it/ By any ridling skill, or commune
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wit"; and when she then sees "Another yron dore, on which
was writ,/ Be not too bold", she fails, in spite of her
best efforts, to conceive "what it might intend"
(III.xii.54). Later, after the masque disappears behind
this "yron dore", she wrongly guesses that the same
spectacle will reappear the following night (III.xii.28).
But in spite of her uncertainties and errors in
interpreting the House of Busyrane, Britomart responds
successfully to the challenge that it poses. The reason
for her success, it appears, is that she keeps her mind
continually focused upon the mission that she has taken
in hand, namely to "Deliuer" Amoret "fro thence, or with
her... [to] dy" (III.xi.18). Thus, for example, when
confronted by her inability to discern the significance
of the first of the inscriptions,
She was no whit thereby discouraged
From prosecuting of her first intent,
But forward with bold steps into the next roome went.
(Ill.xi.50 ) .
In general, the precise meaning of all that goes on
around her in the House of Busyrane is less important to
Britomart than is the role of rescuer which she has taken
on, and which she sustains single-mindedly until Amoret
is freed.
Britomart's taking on of the role of rescuer, it
should be noted, is itself an act of interpretation, and
one whose importance outshines that of the ambiguous
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details inside the castle which she leaves uninterpreted.
For she assumes this role not simply as a knight errant
redressing a "gentle Ladies helplesse misery" (III.xi.18)
-- although this is part of the role that she plays --
but specifically in response to Scudamore's lament at the
apparent failure of God, the "soueraigne Lord", to
relieve the "good and righteous" with his "grace"
(III.xi.9-10); in effect, she interprets her own
appearance on the scene as having been brought about by
the "heauenly grace" for which Scudamore prays
(III.xi.14), much as the narrator made similar
interpretations of Arthur's arrival on the scene in Books
One and Two, and of Proteus's appearance in response to
Florimell's prayer earlier in Book Three. By
interpreting herself, in advance of the rescue attempt,
as a heaven-sent rescuer -- that is, as playing the most
exalted part that a knight in The Faerie Queene can
assume -- she not only makes the success of the mission
possible by giving herself, as it were prophetically, a
sufficiently high standard to live up to, but she paves
the way for her being received by others with the most
hyperbolic appreciations that a knight can be given:
Ah gentlest knight aliue, (said Scudamore)
What huge heroicke magnanimity
Dwels in thy bounteous brest?
(III.xi.19).
And a little later, from Amoret:
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Your vertue selfe her owne reward shall breed,
Euen immortall praise, and glory wide,
Which I your vassall, by your prowesse freed,
Shall through the world make to be notifyde...
(Ill.xii.39)
Insofar as the 1590 edition of The Faerie Oueene is
concerned, Britomart's assumption of the role of heavenly
rescuer is an unqualified success, for she returns that
role at last to the decisively beneficial impact that it
had in Arthur's appearances in Books One and Two, but
which has not been seen throughout Book Three. In the
1596 edition, of course, matters will be somewhat
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immediately to a reunion with her beloved Scudamore, but
to a series of further trials, and Britomart's rapturous
reception as the agent of divine grace will quickly give
way to widespread speculation (IV.i.4,47-49,etc.) that
the knight who has rescued Amoret, like so many others in
the Legend of Chastity, has himself laid claim to the
lady as his prize for having rescued her. The reputation
which Britomart cultivates for herself so successfully in
Book Three will thus become subject to slander in Book
Four, even as the ambiguity of her appearance, which she
has used so consistently to her advantage in the Legend
of Chastity, itself begins to work against her.
It is perhaps fitting that the third book of The
Faerie Queene. in which ambiguity figures so prominently,
should have two distinct endings, each so different from
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the other in its implications for the hero. What is more
striking still is the number of details, which are
present even in the 1590 poem, that contribute
effectively to each of these different sets of
implications in turn. The most notable of these, I
think, are the questions which Scudamore and Amoret pose,
amid their rapturous praises of Britomart, concerning her
relationship to the woman whom she has undertaken to
rescue: Scudamore, when Britomart declares her
commitment to the adventure, asks, "what couldst thou
more,/ If she were thine, and thou as now am I?"
(III.xi.13); Amoret, upon being rescued, asks, "what
worthy meed/ Can wretched Lady, quit from wofull state,/
Yield you in liew of this your gratious deed?"
(111.xii.39). In the 1596 poem, the irony of these
innocent questions will soon become clear, as Amoret
comes to fear that there is indeed something which she
might be expected to give her rescuer as a reward for her
freedom (IV.i.6-8), and Scudamore, that Britomart has
indeed made Amoret her own (IV.i.47-53). But in the 1590
version of the story, this irony is not present; for the
innocence with which Scudamore and Amoret wonder how
Britomart can be rewarded for her gracious pains will
have no opportunity to be tempered by doubtful
experience. Rather, as Arthur, in Book One, fully
merited the innocence with which Una offered her "simple
selfe" to him as his reward for having rescued her
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beloved knight (I.viii.27), so the Britomart of the 1590
edition of The Faerie Queene fully deserves the trust
that is placed in her when she takes upon herself the
supreme chivalric role of heaven-sent rescuer. For a
character whose method, throughout her adventures, has
been to make claims for herself first and to set about to
live up to them afterward, to be found trustworthy in
this self-description is perhaps the greatest possible
sign of her success. This episode forms a striking
culmination, then, to the pattern of her ever-increasing
control over the advance reporting of her own deeds and
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of herself. It also brings her adventures in her own
book to a close with an adventure, and a role, never
prophesied for her by Merlin -- rather than, as in the
cases of Redcross and Guyon, with the completion of the
quest that was assigned at the outset. On one hand, the
fact that she has yet to complete her quest is a source
of sadness, "that fate n'ould let her yet possesse" her
goal (III.xii.46); but on the other hand, the fact that
she achieves another quest, assigned to another knight,
is an indication that she has at last fulfilled the
subversive possibility which she raised in putting on
Angela's armour, of usurping the masculine role which she
was meant merely to imitate, and that she has, thereby,
stepped over the line that was meant to delimit her
destiny.
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Notes to Chapter 3: The Legend of Chastity
1 As noted by Hamilton, in The Faerie Queene
III.ii.24n, and Paglia (1990) 183.
2 See also Van Dyke 269: "Merlin claims that the
forces directing Britomart are rational and benign... But
Merlin seeks confirmation of his grand claim in a
secular, linear vision of history, thus placing the claim
?— —a -j .u : . 4- ~
ucy unu uiLimauc t-vui. iniiati vu •
3 As noted by Hamilton, in The Faerie Queene
III.ii.40n.
4 As suggested by Wofford (1988) 1.
= Variorurn Vol. 3, pp. 55-8 quotes Harper, who
examines the chronicle sources (Caxton, Grafton,
Holinshed, etc.) of "the Saxon Queen Angela, for whom
England was named".
s As Lewis observes (1938) 313, "Night is hardly ever
mentioned by Spenser without aversion".
7 A convention at least as old as Ovid, who wrote
that "Love is a kind of warfare [militiae species amor
est]" (Ars Amatoria 11.233). Regarding the force of the
convention for Spenser and the Elizabethans generally,
see Roche 55-6.
a See also Silberman 17-18, who argues for the
spuriousness of this moral ideal.
9 The paradox that "Love increases the valiance and
nobility of the lover" while at the same time reducing
him to "a willing slave" is a convention traceable to
Provencal poetry of the eleventh century -- see Earle B.
Fowler 1.
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10 Compare, for example, Spenser's "Amoretti" 67, and
its Petrarchan model, Una Candida cerva (Canzoniere 190);
see also Ovid's Ars Amatoria 1.45-50.
11 Compare, for example, Spenser's "Amoretti" 34, and
its Petrarchan model, Passa la nave mia (Canzoniere 189).
12 For the courtly convention of love as a
life-threatening illness see, for example, Earle B.
Fowler, p.l.
13 As argued by Miller 225.
14 See also DeNeef 165, who attributes this error of
interpretation to Timias rather than to Belphoebe.
15 It is a convention ultimately traceable to Ovid to
point out the non-literal status of love-wounds, which
unlike ordinary wounds are "free from deadly blood [a
mortifero sanguine... carent]" (Remedia Arnoris. line 26).
See for example the extensive debate which the smitten
Alisandre carries on with himself in Chretien de Troyes's
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be said to have been wounded by Love's arrow, given that
"no cut or bruise appears".
ie There are, of course, precedents for treating love
as literally an illness, and its effects on the lover as
medical symptoms -- thus, for example, Dino del Garbo's
fourteenth-century commentary on Guido Cavalcanti's
Canzone d'amore proclaims that in certain circumstances
"love may be called a sickness, and medical authors who
fix the limits of sicknesses and of their cures treat of
this passion and even of its cure" (Trans. John Charles
Nelson, p. 37) -- but generally the symptoms which are
referred to are such as the "chaunge of hew" (I.ix.16)
which Arthur is seen to suffer on thinking of his lady
(compare Nelson's list of conventional alterationes,
p.37), not the kind which are so truly incapacitating and
so truly indistinguishable from the effects of a
festering wound as those which Timias suffers.
17 For an example of the convention, see Chretien
131; see also Earle B. Fowler, p. 37.
1S C. S. Lewis, (1938) 129, observes that the two
possible emphases are those of the two authors of the
Romance of the Rose. Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de
Meun, respectively. See also Berger (1989) 253.
19 Miller 227-8. See also Berger (1989) 253, who
sees the point of the apparently literal-minded treatment
of Belphoebe's "Rose" (III.v.51) as lying in the humour
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that results from any attempt to take the stanza
figuratively; but note that it is equally possible to
take the passage straight as the description of a literal
flower -- see for example Hamilton's marginal comment,
III.v.51n.
Hamilton, incidentally, tries to prune this semantic
thicket with the suggestion that "The Rose suggests her
virginity but is not equated with it" (III.v.51n); but
the poem will not ultimately support any such
rationalization. The rose is equated with Belphoebe's
virginity; but it also seems to exist literally as a
flower. We might compare the strangeness of this
situation with that of Guyon's literal encounter with a
lady who actually symbolizes his own "Shamefastnesse"
(II.ix.43 -- see Chapter Two, pp. 249-51).
20 My view differs from that of DeNeef 165, who
assumes that Belphoebe would offer Timias her "sweet
cordial and sovereign salve" if she understood what it
was that really ailed him. DeNeef does not seem to take
into account the fact that "She did enuy that soueraigne
salue" to the squire (III.v.50 -- my emphasis), nor, more
generally, that she is not likely to be so completely
innocent as he supposes of the possibility of erotic
interest in her, given, for example, her prior experience
of the lustful behaviour of Braggadochio (II.iii.42).
21 As noted by Berger (1988) 467.
22 A related point is made by Paglia, (1990) 185-6,
who argues, for different reasons, that Florimell should
be seen as a character who "inspires attack".
23 For the Ovidian nature of the relationship between
Paridell and Hellenore, see Earle B. Fowler, pp. 87-90.
24 See Hamilton's note in The Faerie Oueene
111.viii.29n, and Giamatti 68-9 & 121 on Proteus's
appearance in the eighth canto of Book Three, the place
reserved in other books for "the intercession of Arthur
as the power of grace".
25 Ovid, Metamorphoses, passim; on Spenser's use of
the Ovidian rape motif, see Paglia (1990) 185.
26 My choice of the word 'unretracted' to
characterize the pagan vision of love, both in Book Three
generally and the Garden of Adonis in particular, is
influenced by Spenser's own use of the word
"retractation", in the prefatory letter to his "Fowre
Hymnes", to describe the relationship between the first
two (essentially pagan) hymns and the corresponding
Christian poems: "I resolved at least to amend, and by
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way of retractation to reforme them, making in stead of
those two Hymnes of earthly or naturall love and beautie,
two others of heavenly and celestiall." If anything in
Spenser's poetry might be described as a "retractation"
of the Garden of Adonis, it is, surely, the judgement of
Nature in the Mutabilitie Cantos; but this is a topic
whose discussion I must reserve for a different place.
27 Josephine Waters Bennett and Brents Stirling
argue, in different ways, for the philosophical coherence
of the Garden, Denis Saurat against (see the summaries
in Variorum Vol. 3, pp. 344-52 and Hankins 235-9); more
recently, Robert Ellrodt and William Nelson have found
the Garden philosophically coherent ("...the myth of the
Garden certainly depends upon some systematic theory of
generation" -- Nelson 209), while Graham Hough has
revived Saurat's position: "...I believe with Denis
Saurat that the attempt to read [the passage] as a
systematic essay in natural philosophy is bound to fail"
(pp. 176-7).
20 Compare the positions of Miller 220 and Tonkin
119, both of whom see the description of the Garden as
deliberately ambiguous, but for somewhat different
reasons than the ones that I shall be offering.
29 Compare Miller 261.
30 The resemblance of the two gardens' names is noted
by Hamilton (in The Faerie Oueene. III.vi.30-50n), the
resemblance of their physical descriptions by Bennett
(see Variorum Vol. 3, pp. 346) and Hamilton (in The
Faerie Oueene. III.vi.34.7-9n). See also Hankins 238,
277-86.
3X Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis.
8.1.1-2. It has been supposed by Ellrodt llff, William
Nelson 209-10, and Hankins 238, that this work may have
influenced Spenser in his composition of the Garden of
Adonis passage; but it has not been observed, I think,
that the key question which this work addresses and which
gives it its title may also be of relevance to
understanding the Garden of Adonis.
32 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 8.4.8;
see also 8.5.10.
33 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis 8.1.4.
34 Hankins 239 cites many critics who have suggested
that the garden represents the body or the womb; Bennett
argues that it is the place of unembodied forms (see
Variorum Vol. 3, p. 346), Ellrodt 82 and Hankins 269-74
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that it is the place of "vegetable" (or "vegetal")
"souls".
35 See, as well, Augustine's citing of the earthiness
of Eden, and of the man placed in it, as indications of
their having had a literal, corporeal existence -- The
Literal Meaning of Genesis 8.1.1-2.
36 Nohrnberg 530 allows that this is one of the
Garden's meanings.
3-7 Tonkin 121. See also Miller 261.
30 Upton (see Variorurn Vol. 3, pp. 256-7), Saurat
(see Variorurn Vol. 3, p. 344) and Bennett (see Variorum
Vol. 3, p. 346) take the "babes" to be rational souls;
Ellrodt 82, disagreeing, suggests seminal reasons or
vegetative souls; William Nelson 211ff, citing Plotinus
and Ficino, takes them to be seminal reasons; Hankins
269-74 understands them to be vegetative (or "vegetal")
souls.
39 Plato, Republic 615a; Virgil, Aeneid 6.743-51; the
regular citation of these two works as sources for the
passage in question in noted by William Nelson 215.
40 Miller 262.
4X The "babes" and "substances" were identified in
this way by Brents Stirling (see Variorum Vol. 3,
pp. 349-50, 351).
42 Hamilton (in The Faerie Queene III.vi.39n)
correctly rejects the arguments of those (including
Ellrodt, Lewis, and Tonkin) who try to place Time's
ravages outside the Garden.
43 Commentators who reject the equation of the
"babes" with the "substances" include Saurat (see
Variorum Vol. 3, p. 344), Bennett (1942) 53, W. Nelson
216, and Hankins 238.
44 This line of reasoning is followed by Josephine
Waters Bennett (1942) 57-58.
45 Compare the reading of Miller 269-72.
46 Aeneid 6, esp. 11.743-51. See also Hamilton, in
The Faerie Queene III.vi.33.5n.
47 Stirling (1934) 536-7, and Hankins 237-8, who
cites precedents from Ficino to bolster Stirling's case,
see Venus as the source of matter; Stirling draws the
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conclusion that, in this passage, the roles of Venus and
of Chaos are identical -- indeed, that Venus and Chaos
are identical.
40 Somewhat the same point regarding the literal
meaning of this episode is made by Kouwenhoven 95-7,
although his view of the relation between literal and
figurative meanings in allegory is quite different from
mine. The reality, for the characters in the story, of
the literal meaning of what happens in the House of
Busirane, is denied, against the evidence of the text, by
DeNeef 170-1.
49 Thus for example the loves of Arthur (I.ix.10-12)
and Britomart (111.ii.23, 26, 35-36 ); see also Earle B.
Fowler 1-2. For the sources of Cupid's triumphal
procession see Ovid, Amores I.ii, and Petrarch's "Triumph
of Love".
=° Thus Lewis, (1938) 341ff, sees in the episode a
rejection of the negative courtly love tradition in
favour of a positive ideal of married love.
61 In spite of some critics' claims to the contrary:
see, for example, Tonkin 131.
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Conclusion
We have seen that, in all three books of the 1590
edition of The Faerie Oueene, the protagonists become
involved in the interpretation of their own stories.
In Book One, the primary problem which such
interpretation addresses is that of guidance, that is, of
knowing what is to be done and finding the motivation to
carry it through. An important source of such motivation
was found to reside in the existence of a community of
virtuous interests which undertakes to reward the good
deeds of its members by enshrining a favourable
interpretation of those deeds in its collective memory --
in other words, in the prospect of fame.
Book Two takes up as a central theme this concern,
which emerges toward the end of Book One, with report,
that is, with the interpretation of deeds after the
event. In Guyon's adventures (or misadventures), we saw
both a reiteration of the importance of community to the
proper choice of undertakings and to favourable reception
of good deeds, as well as a warning of the pressures,
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exerted through false reports and malicious misinterpre¬
tations, that threaten to fragment such a community of
virtuous intentions. Like Holinshed in his Preface to
the Reader of his Chronicles. the Legend of Temperance
stresses, above all, that dissention within the group
will always leave it vulnerable to its enemies, and is
therefore to be avoided at all costs.1
In Book Three, the themes of guidance and report,
which are central to Books One and Two respectively, are
united in the theme of prophecy -- or a kind of report
which, because it is offered before the fact, is able to
play a guiding role in the development of the events so
reported. Here the collective project of history-making,
which had served well the interests of the Redcross
knight, is seen rather differently from the perspective
of a virtuous outsider: described now as a specifically
male institution, it threatens with its partiality toward
its own interests (its concern with its "proper prayse")
to belittle rather than to magnify the accomplishments of
the female knight Britomart (III.ii.1-2). Accordingly,
the emphasis shifts, in Book Three, from the interpretive
power of the community onto that of the individual: in
the person and adventures of Britomart, the Legend of
Chastity explores the limits of one person's capacity to
make a good name for herself.
The success which Britomart has in this regard, while
impressive, can only be provisional: in her further
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adventures, in the 1596 installment of The Faerie Queene.
even she will become the victim of misrepresentation and
misinterpretation, and will need to return to the fold of
the community -- a community which does intend to glorify
her, but on its own terms, in a role subordinate to that
of her husband and offspring. While, by her final
adventure in Book Three, Britomart shows herself capable
of laying claim even to God's backing in asserting the
virtuousness of her own 'freelance' undertakings, in
subsequent books it is God's purposes for the nation to
which she belongs which will assert their claim upon her.
In a sense, the full course of Britomart's adventures
will repeat the pattern established in the Legend of
Holiness. Like the Redcross knight, Britomart must pass
beyond a stage of knight-errantry, with its ethic of mere
self-glorification, to acknowledge the providential
purpose which she served in donning armour and knighthood
in the first place. For Britomart, however, the
alternatives are not so starkly presented as for
Redcross, in whose adventure errantry was revealed to be
straightforwardly equivalent to waywardness and sin, and
for whom only the completion of his quest could lead to
real glory. On one hand, Britomart finds a significant
degree of glory even in knight-errantry -- sufficient to
sustain her good name through the whole of her own book,
and to produce a climactic adventure in the House of
Busirane whose virtuousness commentators have always
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lauded rather than doubted (in sharp contrast to Guyon,
whose reputation is not secure among critics in spite of
his faithful adherence to the task set for him). On the
other hand, completing her quest entails, for Britomart,
a significant compromise of the glorious self-sufficiency
to which she has attained en route.
In passing from the adventures of the Redcross knight
to those of the Briton princess, we seem to be moving
through an imaginary world which increasingly reflects
the moral complexity of the world that Spenser might have
known as reality: a world wherein God's purposes for a
nation -- even for a 'chosen* nation -- tend to be
revealed with neither the clarity nor the finality that
characterizes the Redcross knight's battle with the
dragon, but seem rather to include setbacks as well as
advances, aims which are hidden or ambiguous as well as
those which are manifest. Like Merlin's prophecy to
Britomart, the Elizabethan state's casting of Queen
Elizabeth (and therefore of itself) as the vehicle of
God's purposes on earth entailed a "grand claim" --
namely, "that the forces directing her, and thus
directing history, are rational and benign" -- a claim,
like Merlin's, for which the ambivalent facts of history
could never provide an "ultimate confirmation".2 But the
increasing moral complexity of the imaginary world
presented by The Faerie Queene does not, it seems to me,
entail a subversion of this "grand claim" in favour of a
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more relativistic reading of political realities, nor,
more generally, does it require us to see the poem as
turning skeptically against the idealism of its opening
book: on the contrary, even in that first book, as we
have seen, idealism is tempered by a considerable dose of
pragmatism; and it is, I think, a pragmatic grappling
with the difficulty of perceiving (much less realizing)
the ideal in a fallen world, rather than a cynical
assault on that ideal, which takes us, as the poem
continues, into regions wherein the purposes of God come
to seem increasingly ambivalent and obscure. The nature
of virtuous action may become more difficult to ascertain
as we pass from one book to the next; the degree to which
success is possible and the quality of earthly rewards
may falter; there may even emerge the necessity of
compromise between the interests of the individual and of
the group in which that individual's hopes of earthly
fame reside. But so far as the poem puts a stake in any
earthly thing, it is in the moral order which inheres
(however imperfectly) in the existing, hierarchical
social order, not in one which subverts or undermines it.
The increasing moral complexity of the imaginary
world presented in successive books of The Faerie Oueene
manifests itself principally in the increasing difficulty
of interpreting this world, both for idts inhabitants and
for the poem's readers. This presentation of the world
as increasingly difficult to interpret is effected, in
392
turn, largely through an increasingly complex
relationship between the literal and figurative meanings
of the poem's imagery -- that is, through the increasing
complexity of the poem's allegory.
In Book One, the allegory consists chiefly in the
presentation of secular or earthly things (knighthood,
the quest, and so on) as symbols of the heavenly or
sacred; learning to read this world properly was a matter
of recognizing and responding to the simultaneous truth
and importance of both 'levels' of meaning.
In Book Two, recognizing the symbolic nature of
experience and responding to the doubleness of meaning
remains important, as does the project of searching in
the earthly (for example, in the genealogy of the kings
of Britain) for a heavenly significance; but the two
things are no longer systematically aligned as they were
in the Legend of Holiness. On the contrary, figurative
meaning itself tends to be as earthly as the literal --
whether, for example, in a castle which symbolizes the
human body, or in a "Babes bloudie hands" for which the
Palmer insists on finding a secular rather than a
religious significance (II.ii.Arg. & 4-10) -- and the
frequently-expressed aim of enrolling earthly deeds in
heaven is left, as it were, to fend for itself, without
the aid of the kind of symbolism according to which the
Redcross knight was "chosen" simultaneously to serve
purposes both human and divine, and according to which
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earthly and heavenly fame were therefore intertwined.
In Book Three, yet again, success in undertakings
depends on the apprehension, on one hand, of the relation
of literal to figurative meanings, and, on the other, of
heaven's purposes in the world; but not only (as in the
second book) do figurative meanings not ordinarily
correspond to the heavenly, as they did in Book One, but
the relation between literal and figurative itself
becomes so vexed that often it is not possible for
characters to control the precise meaning either of words
(such as the words of Proteus's prophecy, or Florimell's
words to the fisherman) or of the things that make up
their immediate sense experience (such as the wounds
suffered by Timias and Amoret). The impossibility of
deciding whether given words pertain to one literally or
figuratively or both, or whether a given thing is a
symbol or not, frequently render the detailed
significance of the various characters' experience -- and
of ours as readers -- genuinely uninterpretable. Heaven
does still have a role to play in all this; not, however,
(as in Book One), in the sense of creating a clear
analogy and correspondence between its own purposes and
the purposes of the virtuous on earth, but rather in
deliberately contriving the very "double senses" which
confound the attempt to interpret earthly experience --
double senses which, while they do ultimately advance
heaven's purposes on earth, in doing so also render those
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purposes largely "vnknowen" to mortals (III.iv.28).
What Books One to Three have in common is that, in
each case, the nature of the allegory is inseparable from
the nature of its characters' experience: the structure
of the allegory is the shape of their world, just as the
structure of medieval and Renaissance exegesis
constituted the medieval and Renaissance world picture
(see Introduction (1): p. 54). Spenser's symbolic world
is not, by any means, identical in its structure to this
other imaginary symbolic world; it is not, in this sense,
a piece of realism, even by sixteenth-century standards.
Nevertheless, the experience of its characters may have a
great deal to do with the kinds of experience involved in
real life as Spenser knew it.3 To try to substantiate
this point, I would like to conclude with one final look
at the way in which Spenser frames his poem for public
presentation by means of the dedicatory sonnets and that
favourite crux of Spenser criticism, the Letter to
Raleigh.
As we have already noted, it is likely that one
important factor in determining the ways in which the
Letter to Raleigh and the dedicatory sonnets describe the
workings of the poem was Spenser's acute awareness of the
degree to which favourable or unfavourable interpreta¬
tions of the poem by those in power were likely to be
based on these readily graspable expressions of its
nature and his intention (Introduction (2): p. 97).4
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What we may now add to this picture is a recognition of
just how closely the need for such a politic presentation
of his own story resembles what is often required of
characters within the poem -- and especially of the
Redcross knight upon his own completion, in a different
sense, of a major installment of the same story. Like
Redcross at the court of Una's parents, Spenser in the
Letter to Raleigh makes his best case for a tale which,
in spite of good intentions, is not above the reach of
detractors, by emphasizing its worthy qualities (it is an
instrument of praise and a persuader to virtue) and
passing lightly over its moral complexities.
Interestingly, I think, as a part of this project of
representing his own deed in the best possible light,
Spenser makes the best case also for the principal
knights within his story, describing them as
straightforward exemplars or even personifications of
their respective virtues, without any indication that any
or all of them must in any respect learn their virtues in
the course of their adventures. Thus, for example, the
account of the Redcross knight simply as a character "in
whome I expresse Holynes" surpasses, as a favourable
gloss on the knight's story, anything to which either the
knight himself or the narrator within the poem can
attain. In thus perfecting his knights' reputations,
Spenser makes himself, in a sense, their allies: for
just as he fulfils, more fully and (as some have thought)
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more authoritatively than in any other place their
interest in being favourably received, so too their
favourable appearance reflects well on the poet who
adduces their exemplary qualities as evidence of his
moral intention in writing the poem. In a real sense,
then, the community of interests which includes the
various knights of The Faerie Queene expands, in the
Letter to Raleigh, to embrace its author as well.
Spenser further shows himself to be aware of the
importance of community membership to the favourable
reception of his deeds by the extent to which he
represents his poem as serving the real-life community of
interests of the Elizabethan court, which is to him
what Faery Court is to his imaginary knights: namely,
the place where his story must be favourably received if
he is to receive the glory and fame which are the due
reward of his loyal service. By means both of the
dedicatory sonnets and of the Letter to Raleigh. Spenser
represents his poem as addressed to the specific
interests of Elizabethan courtiers.
So far as the sonnets go, the poet's claim that his
poem serves the interests of their particular addressees
is probably, for the most part, show rather than
substance -- a rhetorical gesture recognizing the
importance, in general, of such relationships of mutual
interest, rather than a factual indication of his
supposing that the specific courtiers addressed have
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anything personally to gain from the favourable reception
of his poem.
With the Letter to Raleigh, however, the case may be
somewhat different. In particular, if the recent article
by Jean R. Brink is correct in arguing that the Letter
was written in January 1589, not in January 1590 as is
usually supposed, then we would need to see it, not (like
the dedicatory sonnets) as a composition custom-designed
for the occasion of publication, but rather as the
reprinting of a genuine piece of correspondence
occasioned by Raleigh's interest in the poem while both
men were still living in Ireland.® Raleigh, having seen
the poem in manuscript and conceived of the notion of
taking Spenser and The Faerie Oueene to court as a kind
of present for the queen, may well genuinely have
"commanded" the poet to produce such a summary apology
for his work, in order to see how the present (whose
interpretation at court was otherwise as unpredictable as
the poem itself was sprawling and complicated) might be
neatly gift-wrapped the better to assure its favourable
reception. If such were the case, then the subsequent
printing of the Letter along with the poem would indicate
Raleigh's satisfaction with the result of his experiment,
and his wish to see the poem presented as convincingly to
its general readership as it had been to himself.
(Nor is it difficult to imagine, I think, that Raleigh
might have used an actual reading of this "Letter of the
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Authors" in introducing the poet and his poem to the
queen herself: 'Your majesty, I have on purpose kept
this letter of the author's about me, with the thought
that you may find it interesting to hear in brief his
intention in writing, as he expressed it to me on my own
first acquaintance with the poem...'). Spenser, for his
part, shows himself in the Letter to be anything but
reluctant to be "so... commanded" by Raleigh: such an
apology is something which he himself had "thought good"
to produce, "for auoyding of gealous opinions and
misconstructions". The poet knows that it is in his own
interest, as much as in the interest of the patron who
will give him access to the queen, to see his poem well
received when presented at court. In the Letter to
Raleigh. then, we may have a partial record of a
real-life alliance of mutual interest such as appears so
prominently in the poem itself, in which two men seeking
fame and glory "friendly each did others prayse deuize/
How to aduance with fauourable hands" (I.ix.l). If such
is the case, then it is indeed fitting that Spenser's
"gathering the whole intention of the conceit" of The
Faerie Queene should be presented as a Letter to Raleigh
-- that is, as an instance of the workings of such a
virtuous alliance in real life.
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Notes to Conclusion
1 Holinshed Vol. 2, A3v-4r: (pages unnumbered in this
gathering); see also Levy 184, Stephen Booth 13-15.
2 This characterization of Merlin's prophecy is taken
from Van Dyke 2S9. See also Chapter Two, pp. 294-5 &
346-8.
3 As suggested (though not of Spenser's experience
specifically) by Williams (1966) xiii, for whom the
quality of the experience of the characters in Faery land
is "very close to what it feels like to be living in a
world whose significance is only dimly and occasionally
discernible". See also MacCaffrey 47, for whom
"Spenserian narrative... mimes the epistemological
experience of fallen man".
4 See Erickson 152-5.
s Brink 219: "all substantive evidence indicates
that the 'Letter to Ralegh', which is internally dated 23
January 1589 in the 1590 printed edition of the Faerie
Queene. should not be arbitrarily modernized to 1590.
Thus, Spenser wrote the 'Letter to Ralegh* nearly a year
before the Faerie Queene was entered in the Stationers'
register." Also pertinent to my argument is 224n: "We
need not assume that Spenser and Ralegh first became
acquainted in 1589. Ralegh, like Spenser, accompanied
Arthur Lord Grey to Ireland in 1580. Moreover, Ralegh
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